An argument against a basic right to democratic say
This
handout is a draft.
Richard Arneson argues that there is no basic right to democratic
say.
What is a basic right to democratic
say?
Arneson understands a basic right to
democratic say as follows:
(a) It is a right to an equal say in the political process that determines the laws and a right to an equal say in which people shall be rulers or top officials.
(b) It is a natural right. (It does not require any act to acquire and is there independently of whether or not it is legally recognized.)
(c) It is a right that is there independently of whether it would be a useful means to achieve some end.
Component (a) of this definition uses
the term ‘equal say’. Arneson defines ‘equal say’ as
follows:
You have an equal say in the political
process if, and only if: should you and someone else in the society have equal
talents and equal motivation to devote resources to influencing the political
process, the chances of either of you influencing the outcome of the process
are the same.
Components (b) and (c) are part of
what it is for a right to be basic.
What
is Arneson’s argument against a basic right to
democratic say?
Arneson argues as follows.
First, he commits himself to a thesis
that I shall call the IP thesis:
(IP
Thesis) Any right
that gives you significant power over the lives of others can only be justified
instrumentally.
Then he argues that, owing to feature
(a) of a basic right to democratic say, this right would give you significant
power over the lives of others. But owing to feature (c), this right (if it
exists) has a non-instrumental justification, contrary to the IP Thesis.
The IP Thesis therefore leads to the
conclusion that it is impossible for there to be a right with features (a), (b)
and (c), because a right cannot have both feature (a) and (c).
Another way of putting Arneson’s argument is like this: a right to equal say in
the political process would give you significant power over others, such a
right can only be justified instrumentally, but then it cannot then be a basic
right, because basic rights are not justified instrumentally.
An
objection and a reply
Is there not an intrinsic value in
people being able to form a community of equals?
The simple way of understanding Arneson’s reply to this objection is like this. People may be
equal in some ways, but they are not equal in the relevant ways. People differ
greatly in how motivated they are to involve themselves in political work and
to work out the demands of social justice, and in their political skills, such
as skills in communicating a political vision and their skills in working out
the details. Given such inequalities, the only reason for giving everyone a
right to democratic say has to be instrumental, for example because it prevents
abuse of power by corrupt elites.
(Note: the actual text is quite
complicated.)
Reference
Arneson, R.J. 2004. Democracy is not intrinsically just.
In K. Dowding, R.E. Goodin
and C. Pateman, Justice
and Democracy: Essays for Brian Barry. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.