F.H. Bradley’s note on freedom

The material for this handout comes from ‘Note C’ to Essay I, ‘The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility,’ from Ethical Studies. Bradley begins with a proposal which he attacks, then considers another proposal, then settles on a third proposal.

Proposal 1

The proposal Bradley consider begins with the first claim below:

(i) Freedom means freedom from.

It is not entirely clear what (i) means, but Bradley proceeds as if he can reason from it.

He thinks that whoever accepts it will also accept the following claims:

(ii)          If freedom is good, one cannot have too much of it.

(iii)         Freedom is good.

Bradley observes that if this proposal in combination with these further claims is correct, then it is better to be free from thought, from sense, and from having a self than it is to have these things.

He then attacks this proposal (combined with the further claims) as follows:

(1)  If a proposal regarding the nature of freedom entails that the end of the self is the greatest freedom, the proposal should be rejected

(2)  This proposal regarding the nature of freedom entails that the end of the self is the greatest freedom.

Therefore:

(3)  This proposal should be rejected.

Bradley does not argue for (1), beyond saying that everyone sees that freedom from oneself is not the freedom people want.

Proposal 2

Bradley imagines someone saying, ‘It is absurd to think that I am to be free from myself. I am to be free to exist and to assert myself.’ (1876: 52)

Bradley agrees with this, but interprets it as follows:

(i)            Freedom means the self-assertion which is nothing but self-assertion.

He thinks that by itself, we can agree with this claim, but it does not tell us much. What is needed is an analysis of what the self is and what self-assertion is. Here is an analysis he considers:

(ii)          Myself is what is mine.

(iii)         Mine is what does not belong to anyone else.

(iv)         Self-assertion is the assertion of my private will.

(v)          My private will is the will peculiar to me.

Bradley objects to (iv) by pointing to cases of people acting because they are slave to appetites: the drunkard and the glutton pursuing their vices. He thinks we will agree that pursuing these vices is asserting one’s private will and also agree that it is not genuine self-assertion.

Proposal 3

This is Bradley’s proposal:

(i)            Freedom means the self-assertion which is nothing but self-assertion.

(ii)           Assertion of one’s private will which is the result of being slave to appetites is not self-assertion.

(iii)         Self-assertion is the assertion of one’s true self.

Bradley ends his note on freedom by recognizing that this leaves the question of what exactly the true self is.

Negative and positive

Bradley describes proposal 1 as negative. Proposals 2 and 3 are described by him as a mixture of positive and negative, owing to claim (i) within them. The positive also has priority:

Freedom now means self-assertion which is nothing but self-assertion. It is not merely negative—it is also positive, and negative only so far as, and because, it is positive. (1876: 52)

He does not define the terms ‘negative’ and ‘positive’.

Reference

Bradley, F. H. 1876. Ethical Studies. London: Henry. S. King & Co.

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