Daniel
McDermott on fair-play obligations
What
is fair-play theory?
H.L.A. Hart offers a classic
statement regarding when fair-play obligations arise:
when a number of persons conduct any joint
enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have
submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to similar
submission from those who have benefitted by their submission. (1984: 185)
The
fair-play theory of political obligation explains political obligation as a
fair-play obligation, representing the political community as a cooperative
enterprise. The benefits citizens gain from this enterprise generate
obligations to do their part in ensuring that these benefits can be provided.
A
reconstruction of McDermott’s argument
McDermott’s
argument can be divided into two parts. Here is the first part:
(1)
Assume that there are
fair-play obligations.
(2)
These obligations cannot
arise merely if benefits are received.
(3)
If these obligations cannot
arise merely if benefits are received, there must be other conditions that need
to be met in order for these obligations to arise.
Therefore:
(4)
There must be other
conditions that need to be met in order for fair-play obligations to arise.
Here
is the second part:
(5)
In order for a fair play
theory of political obligation to be adequate, the theory must specify what
these other conditions are and:
(a) there must be a morally
relevant difference between these conditions being met and their nor being met,
for explaining why there is a fair-play obligation;
(b) if the conditions are met,
the provider of the benefits must have a right that something is done in
return.
(6)
It is impossible for a
fair-play theory of political obligation to specify the conditions in a way
that fulfils both requirements (a) and (b).
Therefore:
(7)
There cannot be an adequate
fair-play theory of political obligation.
McDermott
justifies premise (2) by appealing to Robert Nozick. Nozick provides examples where benefits are received but it
seems wrong to say that the person who receives them has an obligation to do
something in return.
With
regards to requirement (b) in premise (5), McDermott observes that one can have
reason to do something for another person or group, even to the point where it
would be morally wrong not to do that thing, without the person or group having
a right that you do that thing. He thinks that reasons of gratitude
function like this. It may be morally wrong not to show gratitude in some
contexts, but gratitude is only possible if the person to whom gratitude is
owed lacks a right to its being shown. (This is an implicit case against
gratitude theories of political obligation.) McDermott takes it as obvious that
an adequate theory of political obligation must, in contrast, leave the state
with a right to be obeyed.
McDermott
justifies premise (6) by evaluating conditions proposed by actual fair-play
theorists. Actual fair-play theorists, as he depicts them, divide into two
groups. One group propose the following two conditions for when there is a
fair-play obligation: (i) the cooperative enterprise
condition; (ii) the voluntary acceptance condition. The other group propose
these two conditions: (i) the cooperative enterprise
condition; (ii) the public goods condition. I will explain these conditions in
the sections below. The terms for conditions (ii) and (iii) are mine.
McDermott
argues against appealing to condition (i) when
explaining fair-play obligations. For him, this means that fair-play theorists
who currently recommend (i) along with some other
condition must either recommend (ii) by itself or else (iii) by itself. He
argues against these approaches. (Note: McDermott does not consider whether
there are other conditions that might plausibly be appealed to, conditions
which current fair-play theorists have yet to conceive.)
The
cooperative enterprise condition
According
to the cooperative enterprise condition, ‘a fair-play obligation is a special
species of obligation that is generated only when benefits are provided by just
ruled-governed, cooperative enterprises.’ (2004: 219)
McDermott
attacks this condition by beginning with examples that appear to support it,
adapting them so that they are about individual enterprises, not cooperative
ones, and then observing that there is no morally relevant difference for the
question of whether there is a fair-play obligation.
One
such example, from A. John Simmons, involves some neighbours getting together
and digging a well on public land. One person, Jones, refuses to participate in
this project or contribute to the maintenance of the well. But once the well is
functioning, he sneaks down to it each night and takes some water. Simmons
proposes that Jones has an obligation to do his part in maintaining the well,
because of the co-operative enterprise condition and another condition, the
voluntary acceptance of the benefits. However, McDermott observes that if the
well had instead been dug by one person and henceforth maintained by them, the
moral situation for Jones would not change, despite the cooperative enterprise
condition not being met. So it seems that this condition should not be appealed
to at all.
McDermott
adapts a different example to challenge those who advocate the cooperative
enterprise condition without the voluntary acceptance condition, again
observing that if it is an individual enterprise instead, there is no morally
relevant difference regarding whether there is a fair-play obligation.
The
voluntary acceptance condition
The
voluntary acceptance condition is that a fair-play obligation only arises if
the benefits are voluntarily accepted. This condition is usually advocated
along with the cooperative enterprise condition, but owing to the attack above,
McDermott considers it on its own. He thinks that appealing to it is not of
value given the eventual aim of explaining political obligation as an instance
of a fair-play obligation.
An
adequate explanation of political obligation must not just explain why citizens
have a reason to obey the state. It must explain this in such a way that
the state has a right to obedience. McDermott thinks that the voluntary
acceptance condition, on its own, cannot be appealed to in a way that reveals
the state to have this right, because voluntary acceptances of benefits often
do not leave the provider of benefits with rights of this nature.
One
of the examples McDermott gives to support this point involves a group of
friends who, without a formal agreement between them, cook dinners for one
another. One person, despite being an able cook, eats dinners but never takes
his turn to cook. It becomes apparent that he is free-riding. McDermott thinks
that he has a reason to reciprocate but the rest of the group do not acquire a
right that he reciprocates.
The
public goods condition
The
public goods condition says that a fair-play obligation only arises when the
goods which one benefits from are public goods. Advocates of the public goods
condition, as McDermott depicts them, do not place any weight on whether the
goods were voluntarily accepted or not. It is the fact that they are public
goods, along with the fact that the goods were provided by a cooperative enterprise, that they appeal to. McDermott, having rejected
the cooperative enterprise condition, focuses on whether the public goods
condition can explain a fair-play obligation by itself.
Richard
Arneson tries to support the public goods condition
by saying that providers of private goods can exclude free riders, whereas
providers of public goods cannot. Hence only with public good is there a
fair-play obligation. McDermott thinks that this justification ought to be
rejected. To counter it, he gives the example of a machine that members of a community
use to improve the air quality. One person spends much time exercising
outdoors, benefitting from the clean air, but refuses to contribute to the
support of the machine. She is free-riding. McDermott thinks that if technology
is somehow developed so that this person can be excluded from enjoying the
clean air that results from the machine yet the technology is not used, her
situation would not change. If she has an obligation without the technology,
she has it when it is available but not used.
McDermott concludes that there is no morally relevant difference between free-riding in relation to goods which people can be excluded from using and non-excludable goods. He considers some objections to this conclusion, which I will not detail. My initial impression is that this is the weakest part of his article.
References
Hart,
H.L.A. 1984. Are There Any Natural Rights? In J. Waldron (ed.), Theories of
Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McDermott, D. 2004. Fair-Play Obligations. Political Studies 52: 216-232.