Marilyn
Strathern on the concept of society is theoretically
obsolete
In a 1989
debate on the question ‘Is the concept of society theoretically obsolete?’
Marilyn Strathern makes arguments according to which contemporary
anthropologists should not rely on the concept of society in their theorizing.
I present two arguments of hers. Note that the arguments may not represent her
ultimate views, because it was a debate where her task was to make the
strongest possible case for her side.
Argument
1
The first argument is suggested by the
following quotation:
“To think of society as a thing is to
think of it as a discrete entity. The theoretical task then becomes one of
elucidating ‘the relationship’ between it and other entities. This is a
mathematic, if you will, that sees the world as inherently divided into units.
The significant corollary of this view is that relationships appear as
extrinsic to such units: they appear as secondary ways of connecting things
up.”
Here is a reconstruction of the
argument:
(1) Anthropologists
should not engage in false representations unless there is special reason to.
(2) If
anthropologists think of society as a thing, the theoretical task is to connect
it to other things.
(3) If the
theoretical task is to connect society to other things, then relationships
between such things are represented as extrinsic to the things themselves.
(4) Relationships
are not extrinsic.
(5) There
is no special reason to falsely represent relations as extrinsic.
Therefore:
(6) Anthropologists
should not think of society as a thing.
In this argument, as presented above,
the term ‘thing’ and the term ‘relationship’ are in need of further
elaboration, as well as the exact meaning and justification for premise (4).
Note that the conclusion of this
argument is not that anthropologists should not rely on the concept of society
at all, but that they should not think of it as a thing. However, my impression
is that Strathern is sceptical of the possibility of
using the concept but not thinking of society as a thing.
Argument
2
The other argument I shall present is
suggested by the following quotations:
“The motion I put to you is that we do not need
the concept of society precisely because we do not need the concept of the
individual in contradistinction to it.”
“We have now reached the point of having to
tell ourselves over again that if we are to produce adequate theories of social
reality, then the first step is to apprehend persons as simultaneously
containing the potential for relationships and as always embedded in a matrix
of relations with others.”
Here is a reconstruction of the argument:
(1) Anthropologists
should not use a given concept for theoretical purposes if using that concept
distorts our understanding of social reality (unless there is special reason to
engage in this distortion).
(2) One way
in which using a concept theoretically can distort our understanding of social
reality is if it can only be used in conjunction with another concept and using
that other concept theoretically distorts our understanding of social reality.
(3) The
concept of society can only be used in conjunction with the concept of a relation-independent
individual.
(4) The
concept of a relation independent individual distorts our understanding of
reality, because there is no such thing.
(5) There
is no special reason to engage in this distortion.
Therefore:
(6) Anthropologists
should not use the concept of society for theoretical purposes.
This argument can be seen as drawing
attention to a specific instance of the general problem that the first argument
draws attention to: treating relations as extrinsic.
Reference
Strathern, M. 1996. For the motion: the concept
of society is theoretically obsolete. In T. Ingold (ed.). Key
Debates in Anthropology. London: Routledge.
Other
anthropology materials
Anthropology in the context
that produced it
Cartesian
dualism and the study of cultural artefacts
Feminist research and
paradigm shift in anthropology
Marilyn Strathern
on the facts of English kinship
Origins of anthropology: arguments
for and against fieldwork
Taking
the concepts of others seriously