Thomas Nagel on the scope of justice
This handout is a draft.
Duties of humanity and justice: Nagel's definitions
Duties of humanity = duties to ensure that no human being falls below a
minimal level of well-being. Duties to help people suffering from a famine are
an example.
Duties of justice = duties to ensure that any differences in X (income,
well-being, etc.) between person A and person B or group A and group B are
acceptable.
I have used X here because different thinkers might have different views
about what exactly we should be comparing.
Nagel describes duties of humanity as absolute and duties of justice as
relative, but relative here does not mean 'a matter of opinion'. Duties
of humanity are absolute because there is an absolute line which no one should
fall below. Duties of justice are about the level of A relative to B, e.g. if
footballer A and B are both rich, but footballer A complains that B is paid
twice as much as him even though their contributions to the team are the same,
they may have a good point.
Cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolitanism = the view that a person has duties of justice to all
persons and, if one
is a citizen of a given state, this does not affect the duties of justice one
has.
People usually suggest that the argument for cosmopolitanism is this:
(1) We have some duties of justice.
(2) Arbitrary factors do not affect which duties of justice one has.
(3) The fact that one is a citizen of state X is an arbitrary factor about
oneself.
Therefore:
(4) We have some duties of justice and the fact that one is a citizen of
state X does not affect which duties we have.
Statism
Statism
= the view that being a
citizen of a given state affects the duties of justice we have.
Nagel supports a version of statism according to
which citizens only have duties of justice within their state. The duties they
have beyond their state are purely duties of humanity.
Note: statism is not Nagel's term. I would be
careful with some of Nagel's terms. For example, he uses the term 'associative
obligation' but this is commonly used for a different argument in favour of statism to Nagel's
argument.
Nagel's argument in brief
Nagel's argument seems to be this: the fact that citizens of a state are
both (i) coerced by a common authority and (ii) involved
in coercion means that they have duties of justice within that state. I tend to
make sense of the argument by starting with (ii).
Coercion in our name
Suppose that you are a citizen of state X and state X coerces another
citizen, e.g. forces them to pay tax. It might well say that it does so in the
name of its citizens. One of these citizens is you. So the state is coercing in
your name as well. That gives you duties which you do not have to other states
- duties to ensure that the coercion is proportionate, e.g. that this citizen
is not subject to a greater degree of coercion than other citizens of the same
state in a comparable position.
In order for this theory to work, it needs to be accompanied by a theory of
when it is legitimate for a state to coerce in my name. Just because a state
claims to coerces in my name, it does not mean that it
is legitimate for it to do so. It is only when it coerces in my name
legitimately that I have a duty to ensure that the coercion is just.
I don't think Nagel explicitly provides such a theory, but it is possible
to fill in a theory for him. What Nagel says fits quite well with a fair-play
theory of political legitimacy. According to such a theory, a state is a
cooperative enterprise to produce certain important benefits and the benefits
provided result in an obligation to abide by the state's commands. When such a
state engages in coercion, it does so in the name of its members, i.e. the
citizens of the state.
Nagel takes inspiration from Rousseau, so I think it would be part of his
theory of legitimacy that a legitimate state does not just provided important
benefits: it is also democratic and regards citizens as having an equal claim
to the benefits of the enterprise. Under these conditions we have a legitimate
state: one that can legitimately coerce in the name of its citizens.