Thomas Nagel on the scope of justice

 

This handout is a draft.

Duties of humanity and justice: Nagel's definitions

Duties of humanity = duties to ensure that no human being falls below a minimal level of well-being. Duties to help people suffering from a famine are an example.

 

Duties of justice = duties to ensure that any differences in X (income, well-being, etc.) between person A and person B or group A and group B are acceptable.

 

I have used X here because different thinkers might have different views about what exactly we should be comparing.

 

Nagel describes duties of humanity as absolute and duties of justice as relative, but relative here does not mean 'a matter of opinion'. Duties of humanity are absolute because there is an absolute line which no one should fall below. Duties of justice are about the level of A relative to B, e.g. if footballer A and B are both rich, but footballer A complains that B is paid twice as much as him even though their contributions to the team are the same, they may have a good point.

 

Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism = the view that a person has duties of justice to all persons and, if  one is a citizen of a given state, this does not affect the duties of justice one has.

 

People usually suggest that the argument for cosmopolitanism is this:

(1) We have some duties of justice.

(2) Arbitrary factors do not affect which duties of justice one has.

(3) The fact that one is a citizen of state X is an arbitrary factor about oneself.

Therefore:

(4) We have some duties of justice and the fact that one is a citizen of state X does not affect which duties we have.

 

Statism

Statism  = the view that being a citizen of a given state affects the duties of justice we have.

 

Nagel supports a version of statism according to which citizens only have duties of justice within their state. The duties they have beyond their state are purely duties of humanity.

 

Note: statism is not Nagel's term. I would be careful with some of Nagel's terms. For example, he uses the term 'associative obligation' but this is commonly used for a different argument in favour of statism to Nagel's argument.

 

Nagel's argument in brief

Nagel's argument seems to be this: the fact that citizens of a state are both (i) coerced by a common authority and (ii) involved in coercion means that they have duties of justice within that state. I tend to make sense of the argument by starting with (ii).

 

Coercion in our name

Suppose that you are a citizen of state X and state X coerces another citizen, e.g. forces them to pay tax. It might well say that it does so in the name of its citizens. One of these citizens is you. So the state is coercing in your name as well. That gives you duties which you do not have to other states - duties to ensure that the coercion is proportionate, e.g. that this citizen is not subject to a greater degree of coercion than other citizens of the same state in a comparable position.

 

In order for this theory to work, it needs to be accompanied by a theory of when it is legitimate for a state to coerce in my name. Just because a state claims to coerces in my name, it does not mean that it is legitimate for it to do so. It is only when it coerces in my name legitimately that I have a duty to ensure that the coercion is just.

 

I don't think Nagel explicitly provides such a theory, but it is possible to fill in a theory for him. What Nagel says fits quite well with a fair-play theory of political legitimacy. According to such a theory, a state is a cooperative enterprise to produce certain important benefits and the benefits provided result in an obligation to abide by the state's commands. When such a state engages in coercion, it does so in the name of its members, i.e. the citizens of the state.

 

Nagel takes inspiration from Rousseau, so I think it would be part of his theory of legitimacy that a legitimate state does not just provided important benefits: it is also democratic and regards citizens as having an equal claim to the benefits of the enterprise. Under these conditions we have a legitimate state: one that can legitimately coerce in the name of its citizens.

 

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