Paradoxes of analytic philosophy's dominance Author: Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward Draft version: version 3 (28th June 2026; v2 26th June 2026) Analytic philosophy was founded by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, legend says, around the turn of the 20th century. Gottlob Frege was an important predecessor. It values clarity, careful definition, and logic, often formal logic. Tim Crane has presented a paradox which he refers to as the paradox of analytic philosophy's spread or increasing institutional dominance, but Stuart Hampshire has another perhaps, from decades earlier. and there are several that I have been able to identify. (In the process of doing so, a method for identifying paradoxes of a social institution occurred to me.) Tim Crane's paradox. Crane writes, "the paradox is that the more analytic philosophy became dominant in the universities, the more it became removed from the concerns of the average person with philosophical interests." A diversity paradox. It seems an important factor in the success of analytic philosophy that there is a fair system of rules for evaluating philosophies. It is not that one has to join a cult-like group and promote the works of an obscure master, whatever objections one privately has. But given this explanation, one would expect analytic philosophers to be a diverse bunch, rather than historically mostly white posh men, now a few white women too? A protection paradox. Many people accord low value to philosophy. This supposed low value is the subject of countless jokes, for example, "A mathematics department is cheap: you need a pen, a paper, and a wastepaper basket. Philosophy is even cheaper: you don't need the wastepaper basket." But that gives rise to a paradox: why does so much effort go into protecting philosophy departments from outsiders? It has long had severe underrepresentation issues, being dominated by white men. There are numerous scandals associated with it. My own experience is that it was hinted to me as not a good direction for me and then I moved to a next stage of opposition. As undergraduate taking outside units, the lecturer suddenly said, "This kid keeps going," upon asking about Donald Davidson and Freud was told "Terence, I'm a philosopher, you're an intellectual" - all the other minorities left (two after flagging that they believe the lecturer set aside a good proposal); some years later as a teaching assistant, I was in a lecturer's office and a student appeared and the lecturer loudly said, "Terence, what are you doing here?" (The obvious solution is that, while department members show some interest in philosophy, they are chiefly interested in preserving their heritage: teaching the English empiricists - Locke, Berkeley, and Hume - and recent English philosophy. And such heritage-oriented people are racist! But, then, what about the woman issue? Should it not be more like a supermarket, where one pays with the coin of one's talent for this?) A dominant craftsmen paradox. When you meet actual analytic philosophers, they mostly appear to be skilled academic craftspeople: craftsmen or craftswomen. They are good with knowing a specialist literature, making elementary distinctions, meeting professional journal norms, etc. But outside of the matters of their specializations, they mostly do not show any special insight or astuteness. I am not sure I would turn to them for advice on various matters (even on, for example, should I try to turn my philosophical contributions into brief quotable lines or not, Professor Graham Stevens, Professor Chris Daly, etc.? Apologies.). How exactly does this type become dominant, because one would expect them to be readily outstrategized? For example, a neighbouring department thinks, "We can offer some philosophy too and have less reputation for impracticality, so we can attract all your students." Psychology, law, computer science! A Hegelian paradox. Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore rebelled against the fashionable Hegelian philosophy which has taken root in late nineteenth and early twentieth century British philosophy. Conceptual clarity, logic, and empiricism against the Hegelian enemy. Now Hegel is famous for his history of ideas according to which someone puts forward a thesis, someone else opposes it with an antithesis, and there is a synthesis. But is not anti-Hegelian analytic philosophy’s path to dominance this: first it severely opposed continental philosophy (predominantly from continental Europe, done in cults led by obscure masters) - it was antithesis to the continental thesis; then there was synthesis: the lengthy interpretation and then assessment of continental works while maintaining the standards of clarity associated with analytic philosophy? An anti-Hegelian movement could only come to dominance by means of a Hegelian history? A paradox of analytic philosophy's location. On the one hand, an explanation for the rise of analytic philosophy and its dominance in various departments is that it is inevitable in an age of science, with its emphasis on formal logic and supporting positions taken up as strongly as possible. On the other hand, if it is inevitable in an age of science, why does it not dominate worldwide? It dominates especially in the elite universities in the English speaking world. A method paradox. On the one hand, analytic philosophy's methods are defended as those most conducive to achieving knowledge, such as defining one's terms, clearly specifying one's argument, considering all plausible objections, the use of formal logic and more. On the other hand, its dominance is achieved under conditions in which there is lots of evidence that these methods do not lead to knowledge regarding what the answers are to the question addressed. More and more positions appear and each is argued for as plausible. For example, in Crane's specialism, consider the positions that have since the 90s been defended regarding what sensory perception consists in. No philosopher seriously interested in whether the methods lead to knowledge can insulate themselves from reasonable doubt about this matter. An ego paradox. These topics in philosophy such as “What is a fair society? And what is the fairest humanly possible society?” and “When should one trust the testimony of others?” and “So many scientific theories have been wrong, so should we infer that current science will be displaced as wrong too?” would seem ideal for massive egos, who want recognition by everyone and over centuries. But analytic philosophy is hard to understand, with its technicalities and submergence into subtle details. and hardly anyone values it. The paradox is: however did analytic philosophy become dominant when the attraction of philosophical topics is largely for universal recognition, and it does not offer this? An accreditation paradox. Analytic philosophy, for some philosophers (e.g. Sorensen 2012), is about finding and solving paradoxes. But it doesn't have an accreditation method which incentivizes sharing new paradoxes (so how does it spread?). A lot of value sometimes goes to the person who formulates the paradox more neatly, rather than the original conceiver. For example, the concern that act utilitarianism - the morally right action is the one that produces the most happiness in the world - requires producing more and more children if it increases overall happiness in the world, even if each individual is less happy than with a small population, was surely known before Derek Parfit. It independently occurred to me, simply thinking up objections to myself one day and I would expect it to occur to 19th century others, with the massive expansion of population then; The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives evidence it was known to Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick. But Parfit is often presented as the maker/finder of that paradox: the repugnant conclusion (e.g. See Philopedia 2026). (Note: also there are objections which are widely miscredited. The renowned G.A. Cohen is often credited with Jan Narveson's objection to Rawls's version of the difference principle, e.g. Quong 2010, although Cohen takes strong measures to ensure that readers know that Narveson first presented it, quoting a dialogue from Narveson at the heading of the first chapter of a book.) A Gettier-related paradox. Let's imagine that it is the mid-twentieth century and you desire to join the community of analytic philosophers. You develop a simplified model of what this community wants. "It wants conceptual analyses, a conceptual analysis being a definition. But it also wants a specific kind of conceptual analysis." Here is some background in order to understand this kind. A definition must not be circular, i.e. the term defined must not feature in the definition, as in "A bachelor is a human male who is a bachelor." A definition must also not go on forever. And to stop definition while avoiding circularity there must be some undefined concepts: "atomic concepts" they are sometimes called; "primitives" is another term for them. For example, if you define a bachelor as an unmarried human male, then you have to define unmarried and human male (or cite definitions of these concepts), and those definitions will use other terms, and perhaps you will define them too, but at some point you must say, "Enough definitions: these terms are associated with atomic concepts." Background over. According to the simplified model, what the community of analytic philosophers wants is specifically an analysis of a concept that captures how the concept is used and defines it purely with atomic concepts.This model I have presented seems sensible to me (one perhaps has to add that the focus should be on analysing philosophical concepts). And given this model, one can make predictions. But what happens if these predictions are massively off target? For example, you hear Edmund Gettier give a paper targetting the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief and you say, "Interesting counterexample, Edmund, but the definition being targetted is not of much interest. Justification does not appear to be an atomic concept and we have no adequate analysis of it into more primitive concepts." Gettier ignores you and submits his paper; there is explosion of interest in it and it remains of interest for decades! It seems to me likely that there is a competent philosopher who will conclude, "If my predictions with my sensible model are this far off target, I cannot make important decisions for myself in this community. I can pass a PhD, but when it comes to choosing which article idea of mine to focus on writing up in detail, I am hopeless, because I cannot predict reactions sufficiently well." Today our model of what analytic philosophers want is likely to be more complicated - there is more than conceptual analysis - but it seems to me many philosophers have reason to be puzzled by analytic philosophy. For example, the Gettier literature remains puzzling (though I find it valuable). And yet analytic philosophy expands. Also Posh craftsman paradox. Analytic philosophy is done by very posh people, but it is like what one would expect a person from a far less privileged background to do, the academically-gifted son of a butcher say: good grammar, no big system or idea, but high craftsmanship skill. (Elsewhere I "imagine" a country in which highbrow literature is written by a small connected circle of people. A schoolpupil outside this circle has some talent and ambition, and so he sends short works off for magazine publication, short stories say: his thinking is, if these are successful, he will get his name known and hopefully that will bring more opportunities, such as if he submits a novel - who is going read through the novel manuscript of an unknown? A sensible approach, it seems, but realizing that some outsiders are likely to think in this way, the circle send some of their best writers into short form genres, making it difficult to get in that way!) Stuart Hampshire's paradox. Hume is influential in analytic philosophy, but does not meet the rules of analytic philosophy, which are oriented towards proof. Like a lawyer, one must check every sentence one writes for its truth and what objections may be raised against it, we are told. Another Hume influence paradox. Hume had various conflicts with professors, never attaining an academic post. Today Hume is remembered and treasured in analytic philosophy while we have forgotten all these professors. But it is strange to think Hume's value surpasses 12 professors, say, and especially strange for analytic philosophers. Are not analytic philosophers, an increasing number of whom are related to earlier academic philosophers, much more like the professors who would have excluded Hume? References Arrhenius, Gustaf, Jesper Ryberg, and Torbjorn Tannsjo. The Repugnant Conclusion. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2026 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2026/entries/repugnant-conclusion/ 3am. 2012. Philosophy's Mad Hatter. Interview of Roy Sorensen. Available at: https://www.3-16am.co.uk/articles/philosophy-s-madhatter Cohen, G.A. 2008. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Crane, Tim. 2025. "Bloodless Pedantry." The Ideas Letter. Available at: https://www.theideasletter.org/essay/bloodless-pedantry/ Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2025. On Stuart Hampshire's paradox of Hume's influence. Available at: https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWOSH-2.pdf Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2025. Tim Crane's paradox of analytic philosophy's success. Available at: https://philpapers.org/rec/EDWTCP-3 Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2025. Other paradoxes concerning the becoming dominant of analytic philosophy. Available at: https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWOPC-2.pdf Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2025. Sensible models, Gettier cases, and underrepresentation in philosophy/comedy. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/129961406/Sensible_models_Gettier_cases_and_underrepresentation_in_philosophy_comedy Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2025. A paradox of analytic philosophy's location and a solution. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/144743694/A_paradox_of_analytic_philosophys_location_and_a_solution Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2025. A fifth paradox of mine concerning the rise to dominance of analytic philosophy. Available at: https://philpapers.org/rec/EDWAFP Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2025. How to find social science paradoxes? A simple method. Available at: https://philpapers.org/rec/EDWHTF Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2025. Baby chair at table of the great: improvements with my method for detecting paradoxes (and appendix with coding homework). Available at: https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWBCA.pdf Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2026. Video games and yet another paradox of analytic philosophy. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/164675910/Video_games_and_yet_another_paradox_of_analytic_philosophy Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2026. Why read short stories? Available at: https://www.3-16am.co.uk/articles/philosophy-s-madhatter Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2026. Hume's influence. Another paradox. Available at: https://www.instagram.com/p/DZ2yAMDs4ae/ Hampshire Stuart. In D. Pears (ed.), David Hume: A Symposium. Macmillan. (I need to fill out this reference later.) Narveson, Jan F. 1978. Rawls on equal distribution of wealth. Philosophia 7 (2):281-292. Philopedia. 2026. The Repugnant Conclusion. Philopedia. Available at: https://philopedia.com/arguments/the-repugnant-conclusion/ Quong, Jonathan. 2010. Justice Beyond Equality. Social Theory and Practice 36 (2): 315-340.