Mathematicians against the myth of genius: beyond the envy interpretation Author: Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward Abstract. This paper examines Timothy Gowers' attempt to counter a mythology of genius in mathematics: that to be a mathematician one has to be a mathematical genius. Someone might take such attacks on the myth of genius as expressions of envy - the very good opposing the great - but I propose that there is another reason for cautioning against placing a high value on genius, by turning to research in the humanities. The reason, more specifically, is for someone keen on being described as such while alive! A cult-like group develops around a figure cast in the role of genius, but they are expected to do the advanced problem-solving for their system, because they are the genius of the group after all! That is a very demanding position to be in: not just conceive the system, have the vision, but also come up with the best solutions. Draft version: Version 3 (30 September 2026, minor additions, acknowledgement added; v2 August 20th 2022, "reason"). Be brave: it's just a little cut -The gentlest of but In a chapter of his introductory book on mathematics, Timothy Gowers writes: "People like to think of mathematicians as geniuses, and of genius itself as an utterly mysterious quality which a few are born with, and which nobody else has the slightest chance of acquiring." (2002: 126) He goes on to define genius, or genius in mathematics, as follows: "...somebody who can do easily, and at a young age, something that almost nobody else can do except after years of practice, if at all. The achievements of geniuses have a sort of magic quality about them - it is as if their brains work not just more efficiently than ours, but in a completely different way." (2002: 127) Gowers argues that genius, as defined, is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a mathematician. The vast majority of mathematicians, he tells us, find that their knowledge and expertise steadily improve with time and practice, even if there is some decline in raw brain power - a concept he is not sure even makes sense in mathematics (2002: 126). He points to an example which he thinks depended on "great courage, determination, and patience, a wide knowledge of some very difficult work done by others, the good fortune to be in the right mathematical area at the right time, and an exceptional strategic ability." (2002: 128) One might well react by judging that without genius a field becomes sterile. It is all predictable and unexciting work. Furthermore, one might take such attacks on the mythology of genius as expressing envy. The good, the very good, are envious of the great and making life difficult for them by denying the importance of genius. My purpose here is to challenge that interpretation, though it may have some truth in it. Such an interpretation applies to attacks on the mythology of genius across fields, which gives us room to set aside mathematics and move towards more familiar territory. If we turn to research elsewhere, what can sometimes happen is that a figure who is a cut above the rest is treated as a genius and a cult-like system develops around them. But there is a cost with that. Whenever there is a more advanced problem which the texts of that figure do not provide a solution to, the person in the genius role usually has to sort it out. Nobody else is going to. They have to do the more advanced problem solving. To illustrate this point, compare all the responses to an objection by Jerry Fodor with problem-solving in the Derridean system. The objection is directed towards the view that all theories can affect perceptual experience, that perception is theory-laden to this extent. Fodor objects that knowledge that something is a perceptual illusion does not affect perception itself, because the illusion does not go away (1984: 34-35). There are lots of responses to this argument, which try to block it, most or all by humdrum workers (e.g. Churchland 1988; Cam 1990; Henrich and McCauley 2006; Edward 2011). What happens, in contrast, when an objection is made to Jacques Derrida - let us take the objection that he depends on the dispensable assumption that either something falls under a concept or it does not, e.g. either something is a work of fiction or it is not (Searle 1994: 638)? Well, Derrida is going to have to sort it out (1988: 126). [1] Attacks on the myth of genius may well serve as a warning: be careful of letting oneself be cast in the role of genius by admirers, whether you are or are not, only to find that when problems come along, you have to do all the advanced problem-solving. "You're the genius, after all." I cannot say that this is a risk in mathematics, but it is a risk in various fields. And that gives us an alternative to the envy interpretation, in at least some cases. Acknowledgement I wish to acknowledge conversations with Fang-fang (Cindy) for inspiring this paper. References Cam, Philip. 1990. Insularity and the Persistence of Perceptual Illusion. Analysis 50: 231-235. Churchland, Paul M. 1988. Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality. Philosophy of Science 55: 167-187. Available at: https://joelvelasco.net/teaching/5330/Churchland88-perceptual_plasticity_fodor.pdf Derrida, Jacques. 1988. Limited Inc. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Available at: https://lab404.com/misc/ltdinc.pdf Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2011. Theory-Laden Experience and Illusions. Ethos 4: 58-67. Available at: https://ethosfelsefe.com/sites/default/files/2021-09/Theory.pdf Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2022. Doing history in the original position. Available at: https://philpapers.org/rec/EDWDHI Fodor, Jerry. 1984. Observation Reconsidered. Philosophy of Science 51: 23-43. Available at: https://joelvelasco.net/teaching/5330/fodor84-observation_reconsidered.pdf Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Rawls. London: Routledge. Gowers, Timothy. 2002. Mathematics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Henrich, Joseph and McCauley, Robert N. 2006. Susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer Illusion, Theory-Neutral Observation, and the Diachronic Penetrability of the Visual Input System. Philosophical Psychology 19: 79-101. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/125246765/Susceptibility_to_the_M%C3%BCller_Lyer_Illusion_Theory_Neutral_Observation_and_the_Diachronic_Penetrability_of_the_Visual_Input_System Searle, John R. 1994. Literary Theory and Its Discontents. New Literary History 25: 637-667. [1] What others might provide is satire of objectors and various other responses which may temporarily shut opponents up, but do not actually solve the problem. They do not say, "Here is a version of deconstruction which does not depend on this assumption," when that seems doable. I once heard a response to the familiar reaction to John Rawls of "I cannot imagine people behind the veil of ignorance": a response of loudly saying, "I can!" Is the method meant to be for the few? I think there is a better response available, though not as brief (see Freeman 2007: 160; Edward 2022: 2-4).