Summaries of essays by David Hume Author: Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward Date: 2nd September (v5?) (v4? 20th July 26 5 July, I forgot to do version updates; v 1 24 June 26) Essay 2. Of the liberty of the press. He says that we have more liberty to communicate in his country (Great Britain) than in any other country whether monarchical or republican, naming France, Holland, Venice, and Spain. He says that the liberty is used often to contradict government ministers, e.g. if the ministers are intent on war, political writers say that peace is in the nation's interests. He explains why there is such liberty by saying that there is a mixture of monarchical and republican in our government. But then he seems to contradict his assessment of which nation has most freedom of speech: "In a government, such as that of France, which is absolute, and where law, custom, and religion concur, all of them, to make the people fully satisfied with their condition, the monarch cannot entertain any jealousy against his subjects, and therefore is apt to indulge them in great liberties both of speech and action." Anyway, his explanation for why a government of mixed forms produces more liberty is that ministers must uphold rule of law and only punish if there is legal proof of crime or else they themselves would be at risk of punishment (presumably from the monarchical element). He compares Britain and Rome. Tacitus says that they neither could bear total slavery nor total liberty. The English are the same but the balance is towards liberty, whereas for Romans it was towards despotism. He ends by saying that the unbounded liberty of the press is actually an evil that accompanies mixed governments. Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1747. Of the Liberty of the Press. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at: https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/lp Essay 3. That politics may be reduced to science. Hume considers whether good and bad governments are totally dependent on who administers them and their characters, rather than the design of the constitution. He strongly disagrees but concedes that those who think this can cite cases where the same type of government was good when administered by one set of people and bad when administered by another, giving as an example the French government under Henry III (oppressive) and Henry IV (pleasant). Hume's argument is that a republican government is pointless if its rules do not ensure that even bad men act in the interest of the public good. The goodness or badness of republican governments depends on design. He writes, "So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us." Hume gives the constitution of the Roman republic as a bad one, because it gave legislative power wholly to the people, with no representatives and no greater ability of nobles to have a negative voice. The government was "cajoled by every one that affected popularity." The cure for the Romans to the problems of this democracy was turning to the despotic Caesar. Hume asserts the possibility of forming a free government with one person having a large share of power, either a foreigner or a native. In the case of a foreigner, he writes, "The former will be ignorant of the people whom he is to govern; suspicious of his new subjects, and suspected by them; giving his confidence entirely to strangers, who will have no other care but of enriching themselves in the quickest manner, while their master's favour and authority are able to support them." The considerations from this case and the Roman case lead him to what he calls "universal axiom in politics, That an hereditary prince, a nobility without vassals, and a people voting by their representatives, form the best Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy." Hume asserts that when a monarchical government extends its territory by conquest, it soon applies the same general laws to the newly conquered as elsewhere, but when a free government does, this is not so, for the conquerors are legislators and each seeks their own advantage, by restrictions on trade and taxes. Governors also change frequently, so they will be keen to take what advantages they can while in power, to accumulate wealth. He refers to Cicero's account of Romans to support this view, and Polybius on the Carthaginians in Africa. Hume declares a claim of Machiavel [Machiavelli] to be a universal truth. A monarch may govern his subjects in two kinds of ways: one is the Eastern way of recognizing no distinction of rank between subjects, except what arises from himself [does he mean they are all equal in rank or any inequality in rank is what he has declared? I use the former interpretation]; the other is the way of European princes, to "leave other sources of honour, beside his smile and favour: Birth, titles, possessions, valour, integrity, knowledge, or great and fortunate achievements." In the latter case, if there is discord amongst the victors, the vanquished will take arms, because they have leaders amongst themselves; in the former case, no, because no one possesses sufficient authority for this. Hume then asserts that Machiaviel mixed falsehood with truth, because Machiaviel declares that a people "governed according to eastern policy, though more easily kept when once subdued, yet are the most difficult to subdue". Not sure why Hume declares this false and declares in favour of mild government always. Hume then once again asserts the importance of constitutions and rules, which make bad men behave better, referring to the stability of the Venetian government and the defects of Athens and Rome. Hume declares that the ages of greatest public spirit are not always best in terms of private virtue. Good laws may instil little humanity into the tempers of men. Refers to the poisoning during the Punic war. Hume interestingly writes, "There are enow of zealots on both sides who kindle up the passions of their partizans, and under pretence of public good, pursue the interests and ends of their particular faction. For my part, I shall always be more fond of promoting moderation than zeal; though perhaps the surest way of producing moderation in every party is to increase our zeal for the public." And "Those who either attack or defend a minister in such a government as ours, where the utmost liberty is allowed, always carry matters to an extreme, and exaggerate his merit or demerit with regard to the public." Hume offers an interesting argument for those who go to extremes to defend a minister against the demand for change. If the constitution is good, then it will ensure the replacement is not a big problem. If the constitution is bad, then public affairs will always be bad, whoever you put in charge. Hume compares having such a constitution to marrying a prostitute. But Hume tries to resist the conclusion that the administration of public affairs deserve no attention whatsoever, only the constitutional rules themselves. There can still be mal-administration to some extent with an excellent constitution. And he tells us that a good constitution with laws maintained allows one to judge the intentions and characters of ministers. Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1747. That Politics may be reduced to a Science. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at: https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/pr Essay 4. Of the first principles of government. It is surprising because the many who are governed have, amongst themselves, more force. Hume denies that attaining the position of governing can be based on causing fear in the governed alone: "The soldan of Egypt, or the emperor of Rome, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclination: But he must, at least, have led his mamalukes, or praetorian bands, like men, by their opinion." [If the many elsewhere are like here, they have interests in a stable prosperous society, in which they are comfortable, and it is rational for them to submit to being governed by people who are clever in achieving this for them: by better design of legal systems, better strategy in relating to other nations, etc.] Hume distinguishes opinion of interest and opinion of right. When people are of the opinion that the government is in their interest - to their advantage - the government is secure. [He later writes of self-interest, so does he mean by interest the interest of the people in general?] What about the opinion that these people have a right to govern. Hume divides opinions as to what is right, as concerning power and property. In all nations, Hume thinks, what people feel to be right in power is the government that corresponds to their tradition. Hume says our political writers focus on right to property as the foundation of government, which he thinks is carrying the matter too far. Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1747. Of the first principles of government. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at: https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/fp Essay 5. Of the Origin of Government. Man finds that he must live with others and that there can be no peace without a government to administer justice. Hume strangely makes a large inference from this: "We are, therefore, to look upon all the vast apparatus of our government, as having ultimately no other object or purpose but the distribution of justice, or, in other words, the support of the twelve judges." Hume considers the duty of obedience that magistrates require. If various men are unjust in the state of nature (no government) or inevitably unjust to neighbours, does the duty to obey the magistrate help, or will not the weaknesses of human nature equally cause violations of that too? And won't weaknesses prevent the role of magistrate from being carried out well? "Experience, however, proves, that there is a great difference between the cases… The love of dominion is so strong in the breast of man, that many, not only submit to, but court all the dangers, and fatigues, and cares of government; and men, once raised to that station, though often led astray by private passions, find, in ordinary cases, a visible interest in the impartial administration of justice." [After the semicolon sounds like an appeal to wearing a uniform effect, um, but Hume's next sentence...] Hume says one should choose those who decide justice by qualities of character: "valour, force, integrity, or prudence, which command respect and confidence." Hume is concerned, as in previous essays, in how many end up being ruled by few, or ought to: some distinction is made here, because real life is messier. "It is probable, that the first ascendant of one man over multitudes begun during a state of war; where the superiority of courage and of genius discovers itself most visibly, where unanimity and concert are most requisite, and where the pernicious effects of disorder are most sensibly felt." He says savage tribes are often in a long condition of war. In all government, there is a clash between authority and liberty, with neither totally prevailing. "The sultan is master of the life and fortune of any individual; but will not be permitted to impose new taxes on his subjects: a French monarch can impose taxes at pleasure; but would find it dangerous to attempt the lives and fortunes of individuals." Reference. David Hume. 1777. Of the Origin of Government. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at: https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/og Essay 6. Of the Independency of Parliament. Hume says that according to political writers, when designing a constitution, one should assume that every man is a knave: his actions are oriented towards private interest. The aim is to set up rules which produce better behaviour from the assumed knaves. [Note: I have read, more recently, that political constitutions are supposed to be vague, which seems to allow for exploitation by knaves.] Hume raises a puzzle: why assume this, if it is false in fact. I am not sure what Hume's response to this puzzle is, but he suggests most men are not knaves, because honour is a great check on mankind. "But where a considerable body of men act together, this check is, in a great measure, removed; since a man is sure to be approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of adversaries." Taking this into account, Hume's proposal, regarding constitutions which distribute power to several distinct institutions, is to ensure that by any one of these institutions following their interests, the public's interests are also met. This proposal has the support of both ancient and modern thinkers on the subject, he says, as well as most experience. In light of this, Hume says that it would have surprised a genius such as Cicero or Tacitus that there is a constitution within which one rank of persons can swallow up another rank and have the whole power of the constitution. It's surprising because such constitutions don't seem to take into account the natural ambition of men. [They go against Hume's proposal.] The constitution Hume has in mind is the British one: "The share of power, allotted by our constitution to the house of commons, is so great, that it absolutely commands all the other parts of the government. The king's legislative power is plainly no proper check to it. " The crown merely has executive power; furthermore, this costs money and the house of commons has the sole right to grant money. Hume raises the puzzle of why the house of commons does not simply swallow up the other ranks. His answer: "the house of commons stretches not its power, because such an usurpation would be contrary to the interest of the majority of its members." The details of this answer seem to be: the crown has so many offices and it would be too much work for any individual in the house of commons to cover the allocated tasks in a collective attempt to extend power. Hume's thought is that the British system invites take over by the house of commons - it is powerful, men are ambitious, no rule stops this - but contingent empirical factors are a barrier: the sheer number of offices whose work one must do in a take over and [my addition?] the preferences of individual members, for a bit more rest in this life, for having a family, etc. Hume ends by saying that with a republican government, one can safely make generalizing assumptions about what the many individual members will do, but with a limited monarchy one cannot: much depend on what the characters and desires of the monarch and their ministers are. [Note: I found this essay difficult to follow.] Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. Of the Independency of Parliament. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at: https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/ip Essay 7. Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic. Prudent men, even if confident of their principles, avoid prediction: "A physician will not venture to pronounce concerning the condition of his patient a fortnight or month after". Refers to the falsified prediction of a Harrington. [Who?] Hume will try to predict though: "Whether the British government inclines more to absolute monarchy, or to a republic; and in which of these two species of government it will most probably terminate?" Hume considers the maxim "the balance of power depends on the balance of property." This seems to mean or entail the following: if group A and group B are opposed groups, for there to be a balance of power the total amount of property owned by A and B must be the same (necessary condition at least - see later for meaning of "property"). Hume denies this. "It is evident, that much less property in a single hand will be able to counterbalance a greater property in several; not only because it is difficult to make many persons combine in the same views and measures; but because property, when united, causes much greater dependence, than the same property, when dispersed." This explains for Hume why there is jealousy of the rich in free governments. Gives the historical examples of Crassus, "able, by means of his riches alone, to counterbalance, during his lifetime, the power of Pompey as well as that of Cæsar" and how the wealth of Medicis made them masters of Florence. How did the British maintain their liberty despite a monarchy which owns much property? Hume thinks one is disposed to make much of the British spirit and love of liberty, but he warns that increase of the crown's property will be a threat to this situation. 3 million a year, he says, at disposal of the Crown. [From his examples, he sounds as if he means income sometimes by "property".] Hume presents the argument that a republican government with an individual with the income of the crown would justly cause much jealousy, but this is avoided with the crown because it is "joined to the dignity of first magistrate, and to many other legal powers and prerogative". [Not sure if he subscribes to the argument.] Amongst other things, such a republican individual experiences this: "His enemies provoke his ambition, with his fears, by the violence of their opposition." It is like with sects. Hume describes how new sects spread, attracting extremes of opposition or defence, and benefit from opposition. And "Such is the nature of novelty, that, where any thing pleases, it becomes doubly agreeable, if new; but if it displeases, it is doubly displeasing, upon that very account." Hume describes the situation for the old order with the progress of learning in the last 50 years: "The clergy have much lost their credit... The mere name of king commands little respect; and to talk of a king as GOD's vicegerent on earth, or to give him any of those magnificent titles, which formerly dazzled mankind, would but excite laughter in every one." Hume ventures that the tide is only just beginning to turn towards monarchy. He says that it is well-known that death is unavoidable for the political as much as the animal body, but is it preferable to die a monarchy or republic for Britain? [This seems different from his original question of what will happen.] He prefers a monarchy, surprisingly. Sure, we can imagine a more perfect republican government, but what is its likelihood if the monarchy is dissolved? Hume's argument seems to be this: if a single person is powerful enough to dismantle the current constitution, he must himself be an absolute monarch [i.e. it is contradictory, for Hume, to think monarchical government itself can be dismantled like this] and will not yield this power; however, if the house of commons dissolves the monarchy, the country will be ruled by a faction, subdivided into factions, and civil war will soon result. [From their disputes with one another or the people governed?] Absolute monarchy is the easiest death, ends Hume. Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at: https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/bg Essay 8. Of Parties In General. (Hume means factions by "parties.") Hume's opinion is that first place amongst people with memorable achievements goes to legislators and founders of states. He says that inventions in arts and sciences may extend further than wise laws, but the benefits of the latter are "more sensible." Speculative sciences improve the mind but these improvements only reach a few. And, regarding art, he says that it is well-known that men's happiness does not arise from an abundance of this mainly, rather the peace and security required to enjoy art. And moral behaviour does not arise from philosophy or even religion, rather an education in virtue during youth. Against Francis Bacon, Hume says antiquity was unjust to rank legislators below artists in honours. Hume says in turn factions and sects ought to be hated [as I am sometimes disposed to!]. They act against laws and cause fierce animosity between individuals of one nation. Hume thinks they arise more easily in nations with free governments and are difficult to uproot. Factions are founded on personal friendship or else are referred to by Hume as real factions. Personal factions arise most easily in small republics. Hume gives these examples: "The Neri and Bianchi of Florence, the Fregosi and Adorni of Genoa, the Colonesi and Orsini of modern Rome, were parties of this kind." Trivial things cause divisions into factions, owing to human nature: "What can be imagined more trivial than the difference between one colour of livery and another in horse races? Yet this difference begat two most inveterate factions in the Greek empire, the Prasini and Veneti," which ruined that government, as sects often do. Hume gives a Roman example, of opposed sects for 300 years: The Pollia and Papiria. He observes that rival sects founded on different non-personal interests (real factions) continue rivalrly after the difference is lost: "the Guelfs adhered to the pope, the Ghibbellines to the emperor". Hume interestingly says we laugh at rival groups of Moroccans: "The civil wars which arose some few years ago in Morocco, between the blacks and whites, merely on account of their complexion" (though these are sects of real interest, using Hume's classifcation). Even more absurd are the religious conflicts of Moors, based on unintelligible religious precepts. Hume divides real factions into interest-based, principle-based, and affection-based. The first are the most reasonable and excusable. They naturally arise from selfishness when two groups have distinct authority in relation to government, e.g. nobles and the people. It takes a skill comparable to magic even to prevent factions from arising in this situation. In despotic governments, such factions do not appear though, because powerful oppresses weaker with impunity. In England, there has been an attempt to divide the landed and tradiing parts of the nation, but to no success, because their interests are not distinct. Factions based on principle are a modern phenomenon, says HUme, giving the example of some men thinking one family only have a right to rule and other men thinking another family only do so. He refers rhetorically to the situation of principles - presumably vague - which allow each to follow in their own way. [Is it that strangely there are rival factions, each with such a principle? They don't realize the behaviour of the other faction is compatible with their own vague principle?] He writes of how the human mind is disturbed by what is contrary, even in speculative matters. Hume has this puzzle: this seems to explain religious wars, but as it is a universal tendency of the human mind, why are religious wars a modern thing? He writes that things were different in ancient times: "Most religions of the ancient world arose in the unknown ages of government, when men were as yet barbarous and uninstructed, and the prince, as well as peasant, was disposed to receive, with implicit faith, every pious tale or fiction, which was offered him. The magistrate embraced the religion of the people, and entering cordially into the care of sacred matters, naturally acquired an authority in them, and united the ecclesiastical with the civil power." Christianity brought with it change. Christians clarified their doctrines more, to the point where it became easier to detect opposition, and severe religious wars ensued. Beyond interest and principle, Hume writes, "By parties from affection, I understand those which are founded on the different attachments of men towards particular families and persons, whom they desire to rule over them. These factions are often very violent; though, I must own, it may seem unaccountable, that men should attach themselves so strongly to persons, with whom they are no wise acquainted, whom perhaps they never saw, and from whom they never received, nor can ever hope for any favour." Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. Of Parties in General. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at: https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/pg Essay 9. Of the Parties of Great Britian. The British government combines monarchical and republican parts, in a delicate balance, so any attempt to assess its value is sure to divide men. Those who favour peace and order will feel that the republic part is too much. Those who are lovers of liberty, and regard slavery as the worst of evils, will feel that the monarchical part is too much. All reaasonable men agree to keep both parts, but the division is there amongst them too. A good administration will lead the passionate lovers of liberty to accept the court for now. But the two parties will still persist. The adherents of a party are not only due to different principles, but also different interests. A person whose ambitions are thwarted by the monarchy will support a party opposed to monarchical power. Priests have always been enemies of liberty, for it is fatal to priestly power, and so established clergy support the party of court, of monarchy. Hume tells a brief history, of how the English constitution before the great rebellion, before the English civil war, was in a state of confusion. But various nobles possessed various privileges by birth-right. An ambitious prince arose who regarded these as concecessions of his predcessors, which he could revoke as he wished, and he did so. Necessity caused him to eventually call a parliament. He lacked support and had to grant everything proposed to him, but his enemies had no limits in what they demanded. Men became divided into different parties and the impartial do not know who to side with. The pretentions of parliament risk a republican government [what is wrong with that though?], but if not yielded to, the risk was the absolute power of the king. Roundheads and Cavaliers were not wholly one side or the other, but Roundheads were more republican and Cavaliers were more monarchist. The clergy agreed with the king's arbitrary designs and were allowed to persecute adverseries, whom they called heretics and schismatics. After many confusions, the royal family was restored, but Charles II did as his father did, instead of learning. The Whig and Tory parties arose, but it is more difficult to determine their nature than the Roundheads and Cavaliers. They both prefer passive obedience? THe Tories were enemies of oppression and arbitrary power, but less so than the Whigs. Hume characterizes their sentiment for liberty as typical of Britons, and their unwilligness to sacrifice it to any abstract principle or the imaginary right of princes. But their actions reveal an even greater love of monarchy. Hume thus arrives at this definition of a Tory: "A Tory, therefore, since the revolution, may be defined in a few words, to be a lover of monarchy, though without abandoning liberty; and a partizan of the family of Stuart." But Hume writes: "The Tories have been so long obliged to talk in the republican stile, that they seem to have made converts of themselves by their hypocrisy, and to have embraced the sentiments, as well as language of their adversaries." Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. Of the Parties of Great Britain. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at: https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/pgb Essay 10. Of Superstition and Enthusiasm. Hume begins with a maxim he is familiar with: "The corruption of the best things produces the worst." He says this is proved by the effects of superstition and enthusiasm on true religion. Hume then identifies the sources of superstition: weakness, fear ignorance, terrified credulity. "The mind of man is subject to certain unaccountable terrors and apprehensions... In such a state of mind, infinite unknown evils are dreaded from unknown agents... As these enemies are entirely invisible and unknown, the methods taken to appease them are equally unaccountable, and consist in ceremonies, observances, mortifications, sacrifices, presents, or in any practice, however absurd or frivolous, which either folly or knavery recommends to a blind and terrified credulity." Enthusiasm is different. Hope, pride, presumption, a warm imagination, combined with ignorance give rise to enthusiasm. He says, "the mind of man is also subject to an unaccountable elevation and presumption, arising from prosperous success.. In such a state of mind, the imagination swells with great, but confused conceptions, to which no sublunary beauties or enjoyments can correspond. Every thing mortal and perishable vanishes as unworthy of attention. And a full range is given to the fancy in the invisible regions or world of spirits." Supersition favours priests: the terrified superstition person trusts priestly authority. Enthusiasm does not: the enthusiastic often regard themselves as especially chosen by divine powers, Hume earlier says, but curiously does not repeat them point. He presents sects without priests: the quakers, the independents, the presbyterians. HUme goes on to contrast religions which partake chiefly in one or the other: "religions, which partake of enthusiasm are, on their first rise, more furious and violent than those which partake of superstition; but in a little time become more gentle and moderate." He presents examples of violent religions, initially: the anabaptists in Germany, the camisars in France, the levellers and other fanatics in England, and the covenanters in Scotland. "Superstition, on the contrary, steals in gradually and insensibly; renders men tame and submissive; is acceptable to the magistrate, and seems inoffensive to the people: Till at last the priest, having firmly established his authority, becomes the tyrant and disturber of human society, by his endless contentions, persecutions, and religious wars. How smoothly did the Romish church advance in her acquisition of power? But into what dismal convulsions did she throw all Europe, in order to maintain it?" Confucians of China are briefly referred to. Hume further observes, "superstition is an enemy to civil liberty, and enthusiasm a friend to it... enthusiasm, being the infirmity of bold and ambitious tempers, is naturally accompanied with a spirit of liberty; as superstition, on the contrary, renders men tame and abject, and fits them for slavery. We learn from English history, that, during the civil wars, the independents and deists, though the most opposite in their religious principles; yet were united in their political ones, and were alike passionate for a commonwealth." [The non-consensual violence of enthusiasm is not consistent with equal liberty: A's liberty is violated by B. Also superstition, based on purported correlations detected, must surely support freedom of scientific inquiry, in which others examine whether these correlations really obtain; and must oppose denials from mere priestly authority.] Hume relates his material to Whig and Tory political divides in England, and he contrasts the molinists and jansenists in France. "The molinists conducted by the jesuits, are great friends to superstition, rigid observers of external forms and ceremonies, and devoted to the authority of the priests, and to tradition. The jansenists are enthusiasts, and zealous promoters of the passionate devotion, and of the inward life; little influenced by authority; and, in a word, but half catholics... the jansenists preserve alive the small sparks of the love of liberty, which are to be found in the French nation." [Note: elegantly constructed essay, but can it be that HUme did not realize objections in previous square brackets? Writing too much?] Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. Of Superstition and Enthusiasm. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/se Essay 11. Of the dignity and meanness of human nature. Hume observes a divide between those sects which found themselves on a belief (or sentiment, his word) of the dignity of human nature and those who found themselves on a negative view of human nature. He says that whether a writer favours one or the other is based on self-interest and their respective talents: " If an author possess the talent of rhetoric and declamation, he commonly takes part with the former: If his turn lie towards irony and ridicule, he naturally throws himself into the other extreme." Hume thinks not all those who (inwardly) partake in the latter trend have bad intentions, but also that those who (inwardly) partake in the former trend help achieve virtuous behaviour: "the sentiments of those, who are inclined to think favourably of mankind, are more advantageous to virtue, than the contrary principles, which give us a mean opinion of our nature. When a man is prepossessed with a high notion of his rank and character in the creation, he will naturally endeavour to act up to it, and will scorn to do a base or vicious action, which might sink him below that figure which he makes in his own imagination." Hume thinks the actual dispute between the rival sects depends on ambiguity of expression, as with many other disputes. Hume introduces a relativism about meaning: "in affixing the term, which denotes either our approbation or blame, we are commonly more influenced by comparison than by any fixed unalterable standard in the nature of things. In like manner, quantity, and extension, and bulk, are by every one acknowledged to be real things: But when we call any animal great or little, we always form a secret comparison between that animal and others of the same species; and it is that comparison which regulates our judgment concerning its greatness." He suggests the exalters of human nature are comparing humans with one thing, or set of things (e.g. nonhuman animals), and the ridiculers are comparing humans with another thing (e.g. gods), as an elephant may be described as tall with us in mind but not with a giraffe in mind. Hume thinks that if every man were at least as a wise as Tully or Lord Bacon, we would still say that there are only few wise men, because "wise" is used to contrast a man with the level of his fellow men. Likewise is beauty used. Hume further considers that all virtuous action is for the reward of pleasure it gives. He rejects this as getting things the wrong way around: "I feel a pleasure in doing good to my friend, because I love him; but do not love him for the sake of that pleasure." He also considers that the virtuous are motivated by praise. His response is: "vanity is so closely allied to virtue, and to love the fame of laudable actions approaches so near the love of laudable actions for their own sake, that these passions are more capable of mixture, than any other kinds of affection; and it is almost impossible to have the latter without some degree of the former... Nero had the same vanity in driving a chariot, that Trajan had in governing the empire with justice and ability. To love the glory of virtuous deeds is a sure proof of the love of virtue." Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. Of the dignity and meanness of human nature. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/dm Essay 12. Of Civil Liberty. Hume says that political science is too young to specify many general truths of politics. It is not merely a problem of needing to spend more time analysing data, but a shortage of data: "We have not as yet had experience of three thousand years... It is not fully known, what degree of refinement, either in virtue or vice, human nature is susceptible of; nor what may be expected of mankind from any great revolution in their education, customs, or principles." Hume acknowledges Machiavelli as a great genius, but declares his conclusions flawed from a narrow focus: on the tyrannical governments of ancient times and the disorderly principalities of Italy. Hume gives this example of a false general claim of Machiavelli: "A weak prince, says he, is incapable of receiving good counsel; for if he consult with several, he will not be able to choose among their different counsels. If he abandon himself to one, that minister may, perhaps, have capacity; but he will not long be a minister: He will be sure to dispossess his master, and place himself and his family upon the throne." Hume counters that the princes of Europe have been governed by their ministers for the last 200 years. [Interesting, because Machiavelli's argument here seems a priori: something one can simply infer without evidence from the prince's being weak. None of these are weak?] Hume notes the importance of trade, but also "Trade was never esteemed an affair of state till the last century; and there scarcely is any ancient writer on politics, who has made mention of it"; also the [recent?] Italians. [I take him to be suggesting/implying that the science of government presented by Machiavelli and other Italians is intentionally deficit, for passing over this important topic in silence.] These are prefatory remarks, before Hume's main topic of civil liberty versus absolute government [chiefly in relation to the flourishing of the arts?]. "It had been observed by the ancients, that all the arts and sciences arose among free nations..." (Loginus is given as an example of one who observes thus.) The Persians had opulence but made faint efforts towards the finer pleasures, and "when the Greeks lost their liberty, though they increased mightily in riches, by means of the conquests of Alexander; yet the arts, from that moment, declined among them..." Hume challenges the ancient view, giving modern Rome and Florence and France as examples. Regarding Rome, it "carried to perfection all the finer arts of sculpture, painting, and music, as well as poetry, though it groaned under tyranny, and under the tyranny of priests." Raphael and Michaelangelo were not born in republics. France enjoys hardly any liberty yet "the French are the only people, except the Greeks, who have been at once philosophers, poets, orators, historians, painters, architects, sculptors, and musicians." (Hume concedes the other nations may be better in one or two specific respects: the English perhaps better philosophers, the Italians better painters and musicians.) Hume characterizes the English as an unrefined (rural?) people, largely applying a quote from Horace initially directed at the Romans. "The elegance and propriety of style have been very much neglected among us. We have no dictionary of our language, and scarcely a tolerable grammar... As to Sprat, Locke, and even Temple, they knew too little of the rules of art to be esteemed elegant writers. The prose of Bacon, Harrington, and Milton, is altogether stiff and pedantic; though their sense be excellent. Men, in this country, have been so much occupied in the great disputes of Religion, Politics, and Philosophy, that they had no relish for the seemingly minute observations of grammar and criticism." [I have heard a philosophy lecturer describe Locke's writing as twee.] Hume also complains that we have no standard book to convey our findings to posterity, merely some essays. Hume moves on from the arts to discussing commerce. The view that commerce requires a free government seems to be based on stronger empirical evidence than the parallel claim about the arts. "If we trace commerce in its progress through Tyre, Athens, Syracuse, Carthage, Venice, Florence, Genoa, Antwerp, Holland, England, &c. we shall always find it to have fixed its seat in free governments. The three greatest trading towns now in Europe, are London, Amsterdam, and Hamburgh; all free cities, and protestant cities; that is, enjoying a double liberty." But Hume notes the recent commercial successes of monarchical France as a challenge. Despite the French challenge, Hume agrees: "Commerce, therefore, in my opinion, is apt to decay in absolute governments, not because it is there less secure, but because it is less honourable. A subordination of ranks is absolutely necessary to the support of monarchy. Birth, titles, and place, must be honoured above industry and riches." Moving on from commerce, Hume tells us, "all kinds of government, free and absolute, seem to have undergone, in modern times, a great change for the better, with regard both to foreign and domestic management." The internal police has also much improved. "... yet monarchical government seems to have made the greatest advances towards perfection. It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, that they are a government of Laws, not of Men. They are found susceptible of order, method, and constancy, to a surprizing degree. Property is there secure; industry encouraged; the arts flourish; and the prince lives secure among his subjects, like a father among his children." [This sudden pro-monarchical discourse is surprising, from Hume.] Hume says that there have been nearly 200 princes in the last 200 years in Europe, but "there has not been one, not even Philip II. of Spain, so bad as Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, or Domittan, who were four in twelve amongst the Roman emperors." Hume then predicts that free governments and monarchies will become more similar in time. He depicts an interesting situation in France, though short on detail. The number of taxes is not more than under free governments, but the method of imposing them discourages the industry of the poor, especially farmers and peasants. This would make sense if it advantaged the nobiity, because the nobility a"e the main supporters of a monarchical government, but it actually supports the financiers, who are opponents of nobility. A sufficiently knowledgeable prince would bring an end to this, making the monarchical society more like a free one. [In encouraging the industy of the poor, I presume.] Hume ends by drawing attention to a feature of free governments which brings them closer to monarchy, but I don't understand exactly what he has in mind here. Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. Of Civil Liberty. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/cl Essay 13. Of Eloquence. Hume observes, "the wars, negociations, and politics of one age resemble more those of another, than the taste, wit, and speculative principles. Interest and ambition, honour and shame, friendship and enmity, gratitude and revenge, are the prime movers in all public transactions; and these passions are of a very stubborn and intractable nature, in comparison of the sentiments and understanding, which are easily varied by education and example." We may be superior in philosophy, but are inferior to the ancients in eloquence. The ancients placed a high value on public speaking. Greece produces Demosthenes and Rome Cicero. Much later [a deliberate joke of a structure, given his conclusion?] Hume compares the modern approach to political speeches to specifically Attic eloquence: "calm, elegant, and subtile, which instructed the reason more than affected the passions, and never raised its tone above argument or common discourse. Such was the eloquence of Lysias among the Athenians, and of Calvus among the Romans. These were esteemed in their time; but when compared with Demosthenes and Cicero, were eclipsed like a taper when set in the rays of a meridian sun." In search of some modern counterpart, Hume tells us of Lord Bolingbroke's productions: "with all their defects in argument, method, and precision, contain a force and energy which our orators scarcely ever aim at".But Hume notes that both Demosthenes and Cicero were considered far from perfection by ancient experts, because the art of public speaking is infinite in its levels: "not only exceeded human force to attain, but human imagination to conceive." [Recalls to us Thomas Nagel!] Hume registers a puzzle: England alone has a popular government but England has produced no great orator. Political speeches have been preserved "owing to their experience, wisdom, or power, more than to their talents for oratory." Half a dozen speakers (i.e. 6) are considered equal in eloquence, which Hume takes as evidence that none are that good. Hume presents an amusing situation: "We are told, that, when Demosthenes was to plead, all ingenious men flocked to Athens from the most remote parts of Greece, as to the most celebrated spectacle of the world. At London you may see men sauntering in the court of requests, while the most important debate is carrying on in the two houses; and many do not think themselves sufficiently compensated, for the losing of their dinners, by all the eloquence of our most celebrated speakers." [British self-deprecation?] Hume notes that today we have less tolerance for bold figures of speech. Hume proposes that "The genius of mankind, at all times, is, perhaps, equal" but it is directed differently, away from oratory in our own time [or his own, the same words may well be uttered today]. But is it that ancient eloquence - skill in oratory - ought not to be aspired to today? He finds the reasons offered for yes unsatisfactory. (1) In ancient times, the laws were simple, leaving room for studying something else, e.g. oratory, unlike today. "The great statesmen and generals among the Romans were all lawyers." [Note: Arnauld was encouraged by his mother to pursue theology over law.] Hume's brief reply is that this argument is too weak: "It may banish oratory from Westminster-hall, but not from either house of parliament." (Also he gives some information: " Among the Athenians, the Areopagites expressly forbad all allurements of eloquence; and some have pretended that in the Greek orations, written in the judiciary form, there is not so bold and rhetorical a stile, as appears in the Roman.") The second reason he considers against the purusit of modern oratory is "the superior good sense of the moderns, who reject with disdain all those rhetorical tricks, employed to seduce the judges, and will admit of nothing but solid argument in any debate or deliberation." Hume's response is that our modern sense should make us more cautious about inflaming the passions of audiences, but not to avoid this altogether. (Before moving on to a third reason, Hume identifies flaws of Cicero: "He is too florid and rhetorical: His figures are too striking and palpable: The divisions of his discourse are drawn chiefly from the rules of the schools: And his wit disdains not always the artifice even of a pun, rhyme, or jingle of words.") [A question I have is whether audiences in Shakespeare's time perceived Anthony's "Friends, Romans, Countrymen" speech in Julius Caesar as typical of an ancient.] The third reason for moderns avoiding oratory is that the circumstances meriting it are absent: the horrors of life, which we find prevalant in ancient times. Hume seems to disagree: "But that this reason can have no great influence, is evident. It would be easy to find a Philip in modern times; but where shall we find a Demosthenes?" From his examination, Hume concludes that there is something accidental in which arts arise and progress in a nation and he imagines the English civil war giving rise to British Ciceros, as it gave rise to the cultivated genius of Waller in poetry. [Who? Anyway, Hume does not convince me here. I still doubt the modern aversion to florid / bombastic oratory is accidental! Who offered these 3 reasons initally?] He gives as another example to illustrate the accidental aspect what the Romans and Renaissance Italians did with the Greek heritage: "I doubt whether a very satisfactory reason can be given, why ancient Rome, though it received all its refinements from Greece, could attain only to a relish for statuary, painting and architecture, without reaching the practice of these arts: While modern Rome has been excited, by a few remains found among the ruins of antiquity, and has produced artists of the greatest eminence and distinction." Hume interestingly says that when a false taste for poetry or eloquence develops amongst a people [a taste for poetry which presents falehoods?], it is rarely preferred to true poetry, with knowledge. The preference develops when there is ignorance. [Interesting. It is rational for we who understand politics little to admire a Boris Johnson in our own day, because of his literary skills?] Hume also introduces this principle of oratorial evaluation: "Whoever, upon comparison, is deemed by a common audience the greatest orator, ought most certainly to be pronounced such, by men of science and erudition." [But what about the ancient argument that oratory has infinite levels?] HUme puzzlingly concludes saying, "even though our modern orators should not elevate their stile or aspire to a rivalship with the ancient; yet is there, in most of their speeches, a material defect, which they might correct, without departing from that composed air of argument and reasoning, to which they limit their ambition. Their great affectation of extemporary discourses has made them reject all order and method..." [Everything before suggests he is keen on rivarly, or at least greater proximity to ancient moving speeches.] In a footnote, HUme says, "The orators formed the taste of the Athenian people, not the people of the orators." [Note: this is an incredibly astute / fortunate choice of topic, given the invention of recording technology centuries later: radios, television, the Internet! It is also a puzzling essay: is it a merely comical piece? But does not difficulty with determining this matter affect his reputation?!] Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. Of Eloquence. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/elh Essay 14. Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences. Hume draws attention to the importance of distinguishing between what arises from chance and what from causes in human affairs. With chance, there is nothing more one can say. Hume implies that scholars have self-interest in finding causes, because it extends what they can write about and their ability to distingush themselves from the vulgar. Hume suggests distinguishing between chance and cause is largely intuitive, but proposes this general rule: "What depends upon a few persons is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to chance, or secret and unknown causes: What arises from a great number, may often be accounted for by determinate and known causes." He gives 2 reasons for accepting it: an analogy with physical matters. If you suppose a dice to be biased, " this biass, though, perhaps, it may not appear in a few throws, will certainly prevail in a great number." And: "Those principles or causes, which are fitted to operate on a multitude, are always of a grosser and more stubborn nature, less subject to accidents, and less influenced by whim and private fancy, than those which operate on a few only. The latter are commonly so delicate and refined, that the smallest incident in the health, education, or fortune of a particular person, is sufficient to divert their course, and retard their operation; nor is it possible to reduce them to any general maxims or observations." Hume thinks English history, influenced by trade and industry, is easier to causally account for than Spanish or Frnech history, in which the whims of influential individuals play a larger role. And Hume thinks a government should encourage commerce rather than learning. Commerce is the outcome of a common passion, subject to predictable laws. Learning is not, hence Holland has produced hardly any eminent writers, despite study and application. [Does this contradict Hume's previous essay, according to which the quanity of mankind's genius is the same from age to age?] "We may, therefore, conclude, that there is no subject, in which we must proceed with more caution, than in tracing the history of the arts and sciences; lest we assign causes which never existed, and reduce what is merely contingent to stable and universal principles." Hume asserts that although the contributors to these are few, there is a relation to the mass: "The mass cannot be altogether insipid, from which such refined spirits are extracted." [Heinrich Heine and later Wyndham Lewis proclaim the opposite about the English - the universal geniuses are so different from the rest.] Hume's first observation for explaining the different achievements of different nations is: "That it is impossible for the arts and sciences to arise, at first, among any people unless that people enjoy the blessing of a free government." FINISH LATER! Essat 15. The Epicurean. Hume opens with the implication that the meanest productions of nature are better than what man's art and industry can do. "Art may make a suit of clothes: But nature must produce a man." Even in what is classed noble art, nature is mainly responsible for the attraction, e.g. "To the native enthusiasm of the poets, we owe whatever is admirable in their productions." Art merely embellishes what is natural. Hume declares the aim of producing rules to achieve happiness is ridiculous. "For on my original frame and structure does my happiness depend." It is a physical thing: "When by my will alone I can stop the blood, as it runs with impetuosity along its canals, then may I hope to change the course of my sentiments and passions." Of ancient philosophers' efforts, "Why did none of them claim the reward, which Xerxes promised to him, who should invent a new pleasure? Unless, perhaps, they invented so many pleasures for their own use, that they despised riches..." Rules can merely achieve a misleading appearance of happiness to the ignorant vulgar and pride leads one to pursue that. [Hume suggests he is good at reading emotions!] Some strange paragraphs, literary parody? [Who is this Celia? You?] Useful advice within? "Words are too faint to describe my love; and if, alas! you feel not the same flame within you, in vain shall I endeavour to convey to you a just conception of it." Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. The Epicurean. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. At: https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/ep Essay 16. The Stoic. Brute creatures - nonhuman animals - have many of what they require for survival provided by nature and also they have a greater instinct, to guide their efforts. Man is different: he rises slowly from a helpless state, owing to long parenting. Nature has supplied less; skill and industry have a larger role. But she has supplied plenty of intelligence. [Seems a paradox: nature has supplied less, one may argue and more, one may alernatively argue.] Hume advises us industry and application, even to those lavishly gifted by nature: "The richest genius, like the most fertile soil, when uncultivated, shoots up into the rankest weeds; and instead of vines and olives for the pleasure and use of man, produces, to its slothful owner, the most abundant crop of poisons." Contradiction with previous essay or not? "The great end of all human industry, is the attainment of happiness. For this were arts invented, sciences cultivated, laws ordained, and societies modelled, by the most profound wisdom of patriots and legislators. Even the lonely savage, who lies exposed to the inclemency of the elements, and the fury of wild beasts, forgets not, for a moment, this grand object of his being." A ranking: " But as much as the wildest savage is inferior to the polished citizen, who, under the protection of laws, enjoys every convenience which industry has invented; so much is this citizen himself inferior to the man of virtue, and the true philosopher, who governs his appetites, subdues his passions, and has learned, from reason, to set a just value on every pursuit and enjoyment." [Is this consistent with Hume's philosophy? What could ground the ranking?] "...every man, however dissolute and negligent, proceeds in the pursuit of happiness, with as unerring a motion, as that which the celestial bodies observe, when, conducted by the hand of the Almighty, they roll along the ethereal plains. But if mistakes be often, be inevitably committed, let us register these mistakes; let us consider their causes; let us weigh their importance; let us enquire for their remedies. When from this we have fixed all the rules of conduct, we are philosophers: When we have reduced these rules to practice, we are sages." Hume does not believe in easy but valuable pleasures: "every enjoyment soon becomes insipid and distasteful, when not acquired by fatigue and industry." Play hard to get? "Laborious man disdains so easy a purchase. He seeks for a prey, which hides itself from his search, or flies from his pursuit, or defends itself from his violence." Hume writes: "But surely the instability of fortune is a consideration not to be overlooked or neglected. Happiness cannot possibly exist, where there is no security; and security can have no place, where fortune has any dominion." [Not a person who enjoys dangers?] Of the sage, Hume asks, "Does he constantly indulge this severe wisdom, which, by pretending to elevate him above human accidents, does in reality harden his heart, and render him careless of the interests of mankind, and of society? No; he knows that in this sullen Apathy, neither true wisdom nor true happiness can be found. He feels too strongly the charm of the social affections ever to counteract so sweet, so natural, so virtuous a propensity." He opposes a strictly stoic approach and also avoiding society in general, as mistakes. ["But not irrational, given a certain uncommon temperament," it seems he should say.] Hume seems to regard the patriot as being as sensible as the sage: "In the true sage and patriot are united whatever can distinguish human nature, or elevate mortal man to a resemblance with the divinity." But what is the reward for virtue? Glory: "...immortal fame among all the sons of men." In the final paragraph Hume declares there is surely a God, but is he not an atheist? A literary parody? Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. The Stoic. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at: https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/sto