Summaries of essays by David Hume

Author: Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward
Draft version: version 4 (5th July; v4, 24th June 2026 - I forgot to do version updates)

Essay 2. Of the liberty of the press. He says that we have more liberty to communicate in his country (Great Britain) than in any other country whether monarchical or republican, naming France, Holland, Venice, and Spain. He says that the liberty is used often to contradict government ministers, e.g. if the ministers are intent on war, political writers say that peace is in the nation's interests. He explains why there is such liberty by saying that there is a mixture of monarchical and republican in our government. But then he seems to contradict his assessment of which nation has most freedom of speech: "In a government, such as that of France, which is absolute, and where law, custom, and religion concur, all of them, to make the people fully satisfied with their condition, the monarch cannot entertain any jealousy against his subjects, and therefore is apt to indulge them in great liberties both of speech and action." Anyway, his explanation for why a government of mixed forms produces more liberty is that ministers must uphold rule of law and only punish if there is legal proof of crime or else they themselves would be at risk of punishment (presumably from the monarchical element). He compares Britain and Rome. Tacitus says that they neither could bear total slavery nor total liberty. The English are the same but the balance is towards liberty, whereas for Romans it was towards despotism. He ends by saying that the unbounded liberty of the press is actually an evil that accompanies mixed governments.

Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1747. Of the Liberty of the Press. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at:
https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/lp

Essay 3. That politics may be reduced to science. Hume considers whether good and bad governments are totally dependent on who administers them and their characters, rather than the design of the constitution. He strongly disagrees but concedes that those who think this can cite cases where the same type of government was good when administered by one set of people and bad when administered by another, giving as an example the French government under Henry III (oppressive) and Henry IV (pleasant). Hume's argument is that a republican government is pointless if its rules do not ensure that even bad men act in the interest of the public good. The goodness or badness of republican governments depends on design. He writes, "So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers of men, that consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us." Hume gives the constitution of the Roman republic as a bad one, because it gave legislative power wholly to the people, with no representatives and no greater ability of nobles to have a negative voice. The government was "cajoled by every one that affected popularity." The cure for the Romans to the problems of this democracy was turning to the despotic Caesar. Hume asserts the possibility of forming a free government with one person having a large share of power, either a foreigner or a native. In the case of a foreigner, he writes, "The former will be ignorant of the people whom he is to govern; suspicious of his new subjects, and suspected by them; giving his confidence entirely to strangers, who will have no other care but of enriching themselves in the quickest manner, while their master's favour and authority are able to support them." The considerations from this case and the Roman case lead him to what he calls "universal axiom in politics, That an hereditary prince, a nobility without vassals, and a people voting by their representatives, form the best Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy." Hume asserts that when a monarchical government extends its territory by conquest, it soon applies the same general laws to the newly conquered as elsewhere, but when a free government does, this is not so, for the conquerors are legislators and each seeks their own advantage, by restrictions on trade and taxes. Governors also change frequently, so they will be keen to take what advantages they can while in power, to accumulate wealth. He refers to Cicero's account of Romans to support this view, and Polybius on the Carthaginians in Africa. Hume declares a claim of Machiavel [Machiavelli] to be a universal truth. A monarch may govern his subjects in two kinds of ways: one is the Eastern way of recognizing no distinction of rank between subjects, except what arises from himself [does he mean they are all equal in rank or any inequality in rank is what he has declared? I use the former interpretation]; the other is the way of European princes, to "leave other sources of honour, beside his smile and favour: Birth, titles, possessions, valour, integrity, knowledge, or great and fortunate achievements." In the latter case, if there is discord amongst the victors, the vanquished will take arms, because they have leaders amongst themselves; in the former case, no, because no one possesses sufficient authority for this. Hume then asserts that Machiaviel mixed falsehood with truth, because Machiaviel declares that a people "governed according to eastern policy, though more easily kept when once subdued, yet are the most difficult to subdue". Not sure why Hume declares this false and declares in favour of mild government always. Hume then once again asserts the importance of constitutions and rules, which make bad men behave better, referring to the stability of the Venetian government and the defects of Athens and Rome. Hume declares that the ages of greatest public spirit are not always best in terms of private virtue. Good laws may instil little humanity into the tempers of men. Refers to the poisoning during the Punic war. Hume interestingly writes, "There are enow of zealots on both sides who kindle up the passions of their partizans, and under pretence of public good, pursue the interests and ends of their particular faction. For my part, I shall always be more fond of promoting moderation than zeal; though perhaps the surest way of producing moderation in every party is to increase our zeal for the public." And "Those who either attack or defend a minister in such a government as ours, where the utmost liberty is allowed, always carry matters to an extreme, and exaggerate his merit or demerit with regard to the public."  Hume offers an interesting argument for those who go to extremes to defend a minister against the demand for change. If the constitution is good, then it will ensure the replacement is not a big problem. If the constitution is bad, then public affairs will always be bad, whoever you put in charge. Hume compares having such a constitution to marrying a prostitute. But Hume tries to resist the conclusion that the administration of  public affairs deserve no attention whatsoever, only the constitutional rules themselves. There can still be mal-administration to some extent with an excellent constitution. And he tells us that a good constitution with laws maintained allows one to judge the intentions and characters of ministers.

Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1747. That Politics may be reduced to a Science. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at:
https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/pr

Essay 4.  Of the first principles of government. It is surprising because the many who are governed have, amongst themselves, more force. Hume denies that attaining the position of governing can be based on causing fear in the governed alone: "The soldan of Egypt, or the emperor of Rome, might drive his harmless subjects, like brute beasts, against their sentiments and inclination: But he must, at least, have led his mamalukes, or praetorian bands, like men, by their opinion." [If the many elsewhere are like here, they have interests in a stable prosperous society, in which they are comfortable, and it is rational for them to submit to being governed by people who are clever in achieving this for them: by better design of legal systems, better strategy in relating to other nations, etc.] Hume distinguishes opinion of interest and opinion of right. When people are of the opinion that the government is in their interest - to their advantage - the government is secure. [He later writes of self-interest, so does he mean by interest the interest of the people in general?] What about the opinion that these people have a right to govern. Hume divides opinions as to what is right, as concerning power and property. In all nations, Hume thinks, what people feel to be right in power is the government that corresponds to their tradition. Hume says our political writers focus on right to property as the foundation of government, which he thinks is carrying the matter too far.

Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1747. Of the first principles of government.  In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at:
https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/fp

Essay 5. Of the Origin of Government. Man finds that he must live with others and that there can be no peace without a government to administer justice. Hume strangely makes a large inference from this: "We are, therefore, to look upon all the vast apparatus of our government, as having ultimately no other object or purpose but the distribution of justice, or, in other words, the support of the twelve judges." Hume considers the duty of obedience that magistrates require. If various men are unjust in the state of nature (no government) or inevitably unjust to neighbours, does the duty to obey the magistrate help, or will not the weaknesses of human nature equally cause violations of that too? And won't weaknesses prevent the role of magistrate from being carried out well? "Experience, however, proves, that there is a great difference between the cases… The love of dominion is so strong in the breast of man, that many, not only submit to, but court all the dangers, and fatigues, and cares of government; and men, once raised to that station, though often led astray by private passions, find, in ordinary cases, a visible interest in the impartial administration of justice." [After the semicolon sounds like an appeal to wearing a uniform effect, um, but Hume's next sentence...] Hume says one should choose those who decide justice by qualities of character: "valour, force, integrity, or prudence, which command respect and confidence." Hume is concerned, as in previous essays, in how many end up being ruled by few, or ought to: some distinction is made here, because real life is messier. "It is probable, that the first ascendant of one man over multitudes begun during a state of war; where the superiority of courage and of genius discovers itself most visibly, where unanimity and concert are most requisite, and where the pernicious effects of disorder are most sensibly felt." He says savage tribes are often in  a long condition of war. In all government, there is a clash between authority and liberty, with neither totally prevailing. "The sultan is master of the life and fortune of any individual; but will not be permitted to impose new taxes on his subjects: a French monarch can impose taxes at pleasure; but would find it dangerous to attempt the lives and fortunes of individuals."

Reference. David Hume. 1777. Of the Origin of Government. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at:
https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/og

Essay 6. Of the Independency of Parliament. Hume says that according to political writers, when designing a constitution, one should assume that every man is a knave: his actions are oriented towards private interest. The aim is to set up rules which produce better behaviour from the assumed knaves. [Note: I have read, more recently, that political constitutions are supposed to be vague, which seems to allow for exploitation by knaves.] Hume raises a puzzle: why assume this, if it is false in fact. I am not sure what Hume's response to this puzzle is, but he suggests  most men are not knaves, because honour is a great check on mankind. "But where a considerable body of men act together, this check is, in a great measure, removed; since a man is sure to be approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of adversaries." Taking this into account, Hume's proposal, regarding constitutions which distribute power to several distinct institutions, is to ensure that by any one of these institutions following their interests, the public's interests are also met. This proposal has the support of both ancient and modern thinkers on the subject, he says, as well as most experience. In light of this, Hume says that it would have surprised a genius such as Cicero or Tacitus that there is a constitution within which one rank of persons can swallow up another rank and have the whole power of the constitution. It's surprising because such constitutions don't seem to take into account the natural ambition of men. [They go against Hume's proposal.]  The constitution Hume has in mind is the British one: "The share of power, allotted by our constitution to the house of commons, is so great, that it absolutely commands all the other parts of the government. The king's legislative power is plainly no proper check to it. " The crown merely has executive power; furthermore, this costs money and the house of commons has the sole right to grant money. Hume raises the puzzle of why the house of commons does not simply swallow up the other ranks. His answer: "the house of commons stretches not its power, because such an usurpation would be contrary to the interest of the majority of its members." The details of this answer seem to be: the crown has so many offices and it would be too much work for any individual in the house of commons to cover the allocated tasks in a collective attempt to extend power. Hume's thought is that the British system invites take over by the house of commons - it is powerful, men are ambitious, no rule stops this - but contingent empirical factors are a barrier: the sheer number of offices whose work one must do in a take over and [my addition?] the preferences of individual members, for a bit more rest in this life, for having a family, etc. Hume ends by saying that with a republican government, one can safely make generalizing assumptions about what the many individual members will do, but with a limited monarchy one cannot: much depend on what the characters and desires of the monarch and their ministers are. [Note: I found this essay difficult to follow.]

Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. Of the Independency of Parliament. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at:
https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/ip

Essay 7. Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic. Prudent men, even if confident of their principles, avoid prediction: "A physician will not venture to pronounce concerning the condition of his patient a fortnight or month after". Refers to the falsified prediction of a Harrington. [Who?]  Hume will try to predict though: "Whether the British government inclines more to absolute monarchy, or to a republic; and in which of these two species of government it will most probably terminate?" Hume considers the maxim "the balance of power depends on the balance of property." This seems to mean or entail the following: if group A and group B are opposed groups, for there to be a balance of power the total amount of property owned  by A and B must be the same (necessary condition at least - see later for meaning of "property"). Hume denies this. "It is evident, that much less property in a single hand will be able to counterbalance a greater property in several; not only because it is difficult to make many persons combine in the same views and measures; but because property, when united, causes much greater dependence, than the same property, when dispersed." This explains for Hume why there is jealousy of the rich in free governments. Gives the historical examples of Crassus, "able, by means of his riches alone, to counterbalance, during his lifetime, the power of Pompey as well as that of Cæsar" and how the wealth of Medicis made them masters of Florence. How did the British maintain their liberty despite a monarchy which owns much property? Hume thinks one is disposed to make much of the British spirit and love of liberty, but he warns that increase of the crown's property will be a threat to this situation.  3 million a year, he says, at disposal of the Crown. [From his examples, he sounds as if he means income sometimes by "property".] Hume presents the argument that a republican government with an individual with the income of the crown would justly cause much jealousy, but this is avoided with the crown because it is "joined to the dignity of first magistrate, and to many other legal powers and prerogative". [Not sure if he subscribes to the argument.]  Amongst other things, such a republican individual experiences this: "His enemies provoke his ambition, with his fears, by the violence of their opposition." It is like with sects. Hume describes how new sects spread, attracting extremes of opposition or defence, and benefit from opposition. And "Such is the nature of novelty, that, where any thing pleases, it becomes doubly agreeable, if new; but if it displeases, it is doubly displeasing, upon that very account." Hume describes the situation for the old order with the progress of learning in the last 50 years: "The clergy have much lost their credit... The mere name of king commands little respect; and to talk of a king as GOD's vicegerent on earth, or to give him any of those magnificent titles, which formerly dazzled mankind, would but excite laughter in every one." Hume ventures that the tide is only just beginning to turn towards monarchy. He says that it is well-known that death is unavoidable for the political as much as the animal body, but is it preferable to die a monarchy or republic for Britain? [This seems different from his original question of what will happen.] He prefers a monarchy, surprisingly. Sure, we can imagine a more perfect republican government, but what is its likelihood if the monarchy is dissolved? Hume's argument seems to be this: if a single person is powerful enough to dismantle the current constitution, he must himself be an absolute monarch [i.e. it is contradictory, for Hume, to think monarchical government itself can be dismantled like this] and will not yield this power; however, if the house of commons dissolves the monarchy, the country will be ruled by a faction, subdivided into factions, and civil war will soon result.  [From their disputes with one another or the people governed?] Absolute monarchy is the easiest death, ends Hume.

Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at:
https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/bg

Essay 8. Of Parties In General. (Hume means factions by "parties.") Hume's opinion is that first place amongst people with memorable achievements goes to legislators and founders of states. He says that inventions in arts and sciences may extend further than wise laws, but the benefits of the latter are "more sensible." Speculative sciences improve the mind but these improvements only reach a few. And, regarding art, he says that it is well-known that men's happiness does not arise from an abundance of this mainly, rather the peace and security required to enjoy art. And moral behaviour does not arise from philosophy or even religion, rather an education in virtue during youth. Against Francis Bacon, Hume says antiquity was unjust to rank legislators below artists in honours. Hume says in turn factions and sects ought to be hated [as I am sometimes disposed to!]. They act against laws and cause fierce animosity between individuals of one nation. Hume thinks they arise more easily in nations with free governments and are difficult to uproot. Factions are founded on personal friendship or else are referred to by Hume as real factions. Personal factions arise most easily in small republics. Hume gives these examples: "The Neri and Bianchi of Florence, the Fregosi and Adorni of Genoa, the Colonesi and Orsini of modern Rome, were parties of this kind." Trivial things cause divisions into factions, owing to human nature: "What can be imagined more trivial than the difference between one colour of livery and another in horse races? Yet this difference begat two most inveterate factions in the Greek empire, the Prasini and Veneti," which ruined that government, as sects often do. Hume gives a Roman example, of opposed sects for 300 years: The Pollia and Papiria. He observes that rival sects founded on different non-personal interests (real factions) continue rivalrly after the difference is lost: "the Guelfs adhered to the pope, the Ghibbellines to the emperor". Hume interestingly says we laugh at rival groups of Moroccans: "The civil wars which arose some few years ago in Morocco, between the blacks and whites, merely on account of their complexion" (though these are sects of real interest, using Hume's classifcation). Even more absurd are the religious conflicts of Moors, based on unintelligible religious precepts. Hume divides real factions into interest-based, principle-based, and affection-based. The first are the most reasonable and excusable. They naturally arise from selfishness when two groups have distinct authority in relation to government, e.g. nobles and the people. It takes a skill comparable to magic even to prevent factions from arising in this situation. In despotic governments, such factions do not appear though, because powerful oppresses weaker with impunity. In England, there has been an attempt to divide the landed and tradiing parts of the nation, but to no success, because their interests are not distinct. Factions based on principle are a modern phenomenon, says HUme, giving the example of some men thinking one family only have a right to rule and other men thinking another family only do so. He refers rhetorically to the situation of principles - presumably vague - which allow each to follow in their own way. [Is it that strangely there are rival factions, each with such a principle? They don't realize the behaviour of the other faction is compatible with their own vague principle?] He writes of how the human mind is disturbed by what is contrary, even in speculative matters. Hume has this puzzle: this seems to explain religious wars, but as it is a universal tendency of the human mind, why are religious wars a modern thing? He writes that things were different in ancient times: "Most religions of the ancient world arose in the unknown ages of government, when men were as yet barbarous and uninstructed, and the prince, as well as peasant, was disposed to receive, with implicit faith, every pious tale or fiction, which was offered him. The magistrate embraced the religion of the people, and entering cordially into the care of sacred matters, naturally acquired an authority in them, and united the ecclesiastical with the civil power." Christianity brought with it change. Christians clarified their doctrines more, to the point where it became easier to detect opposition, and severe religious wars ensued. Beyond interest and principle, Hume writes, "By parties from affection, I understand those which are founded on the different attachments of men towards particular families and persons, whom they desire to rule over them. These factions are often very violent; though, I must own, it may seem unaccountable, that men should attach themselves so strongly to persons, with whom they are no wise acquainted, whom perhaps they never saw, and from whom they never received, nor can ever hope for any favour."
Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. Of Parties in General. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at: https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/pg

Essay 9. Of the Parties of Great Britian. The British government combines monarchical and republican parts, in a delicate balance, so any attempt to assess its value is sure to divide men. Those who favour peace and order will feel that the republic part is too much. Those who are lovers of liberty, and regard slavery as the worst of evils, will feel that the monarchical part is too much. All reaasonable men agree to keep both parts, but the division is there amongst them too. A good administration will lead the passionate lovers of liberty to accept the court for now. But the two parties will still persist. The adherents of a party are not only due to different principles, but also different interests. A person whose ambitions are thwarted by the monarchy will support a party opposed to monarchical power. Priests have always been enemies of liberty, for it is fatal to priestly power, and so established clergy support the party of court, of monarchy. Hume tells a brief history, of how the English constitution before the great rebellion, before the English civil war, was in a state of confusion. But various nobles possessed various privileges by birth-right. An ambitious prince arose who regarded these as concecessions of his predcessors, which he could revoke as he wished, and he did so. Necessity caused him to eventually call a parliament. He lacked support and had to grant everything proposed to him, but his enemies had no limits in what they demanded. Men became divided into different parties and the impartial do not know who to side with. The pretentions of parliament risk a republican government [what is wrong with that though?], but if not yielded to, the risk was the absolute power of the king. Roundheads and Cavaliers were not wholly one side or the other, but Roundheads were more republican and Cavaliers were more monarchist. The clergy agreed with the king's arbitrary designs and were allowed to persecute adverseries, whom they called heretics and schismatics. After many confusions, the royal family was restored, but Charles II did as his father did, instead of learning. The Whig and Tory parties arose, but it is more difficult to determine their nature than the Roundheads and Cavaliers. They both prefer passive obedience? THe Tories were enemies of oppression and arbitrary power, but less so than the Whigs. Hume characterizes their sentiment for liberty as typical of Britons, and their unwilligness to sacrifice it to any abstract principle or the imaginary right of princes. But their actions reveal an even greater love of monarchy. Hume thus arrives at this definition of a Tory: "A Tory, therefore, since the revolution, may be defined in a few words, to be a lover of monarchy, though without abandoning liberty; and a partizan of the family of Stuart." But Hume writes: "The Tories have been so long obliged to talk in the republican stile, that they seem to have made converts of themselves by their hypocrisy, and to have embraced the sentiments, as well as language of their adversaries."
Reference. David Hume. 1741, 1777. Of the Parties of Great Britain. In Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Part 1. Available at: https://davidhume.org/texts/empl1/pgb