Still cute? Some lesser essays of 2025, mostly social anthropology


Author: Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan, if that helps)


"Only the best please," some people probably think. But are there others who want lesser material. Below I collect what I judge to be lesser essays of 2025. No artificial intelligence was used in writing these essays, as understood today, despite the title of essay 11. I used Google docs, including its grammar advice, Google search, and sometimes some online paint programs (jspaint and kleki). I would like to thank those who provided this Internet freeware. At a certain point in 2025, I started providing nostalgic coding homework and solutions for anyone interested. These are in some of the essays. All of the essays were taken from PhilPapers. Some need editing - spelling or grammar corrections - which may never be done by me. And warning: some contain silly material.


Table of contents
1. A professional paper, psychiatrists: "What is the difference between yours and Alyssa Schuett's objections to the extreme female brain?"
2. On sex perception, the brain, and knowledge (Judith Butler vs. Kathleen Stock)
3. Comparison of two ridiculous fascists: Carl Schmitt and Wyndham Lewis
4. Liberalism, the Tikopia, and a shared worldview in an English village?
5. The defence is a shambles: what does that mean?
6. Undergraduate-style jurisprudence essay (of the first water?): is legal positivism correct?
7. Economics, inference, and Lewis Carroll: how can you say new stuff now?
8. Relations or not, Victorian social anthropology, and analytic philosophy: an introductory essay in response to Marilyn Strathern
9. QUESTION: update social anthropology to cope with analytic philosophy and other professions?
10. Um, er, against Bourdieu: the easy to predict habitus or "fox possession"
11. From my homemade artificial intelligence essay writer? A response to the 2010 paper "Are Psychiatric Kinds Real?"
12. What does Joseph Raz have to contribute to social anthropology? The unclever answer (And some QuiteBASIC code)
13. What does Joseph Raz have to contribute to social anthropology? Part II: a toxic anthropology based on classical rationality (Appendix: some BASIC homework)
14. What does Joseph Raz have to contribute to social anthropology? Part III: conceptual analysis  within specialist domains (And some coding homework)
15. Analytic philosophy's feminine side? A platitudes of Victoria Beckham paradox
16. Comparison of Timothy Gowers on mathematical "autism" and kinship algebra for Jeanette Edwards (and QuiteBASIC code for an assumptions detector)
17. Poetry smuggling paper: can Davidson make sense of metaphors which, when taken literally, are trivially true?
18. On the preference for first cousin marriage: Kantianism, utilitarianism, and structural-functionalism
19. The advice to specialize versus human–against-machine essay competitions
20. "Stupid", "Thick," and George Bernard Shaw
21. Now I have my own Davidson and Amerindian perspectivism paper
22. What is a formidable mediocrity? Is this a useful concept, Nabokovs?
23. Bertrand Russell on Henri Bergson on laughter: a modernist or postmodernist interpretation
24. Psychiatry as political representation and humans as social
25. A garden of buried flowers? Why does Parfit focus on making counterexamples, not paradoxes? (And appendix with code)
26. Post epistemic injustice: are Madonna's "brains" actually like Bernard Williams' brains?
27. November's other lump and statue paper: from David Liggins to David Builes
28. Salon culture: Nozickian hairdressers, functionalist social anthropology, and cultural studies audiences
29. Comparison of Marilyn Strathern's "synthesis" of social anthropology and cultural studies versus my own
30. Is social anthropology best defined by its fieldwork method? (An analytic philosophy paper?)
31. Moral intuitionism, particularism, and why there was the British empire
32. Suddenly stylish? Situationalism versus Pierre Bourdieu (and appendix with coding task done)






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A professional paper, psychiatrists: "What is the difference between yours and Alyssa Schuett's objections to the extreme female brain?"


Author: Terence Rajivan Edward
Abstract. This paper presents how Simon Baron-Cohen might defend himself from Alyssa Schuett's objection to what he says about the extreme female brain. He might appeal to the distinction between concepts and propositions, and say that there is nothing problematic about the concept of the extreme female brain but there is a problem with the proposition "We have found an example of someone with the extreme female brain." I explain that my objection targets the concept.
Date: 6th May 2025 (draft 2, apology added)


        In his book The Essential Difference, Simon Baron-Cohen asserts that males on average have brains which are more oriented to systematizing than empathizing, whereas females on average have brains which are more oriented to empathizing than systematizing. But there can be a male with a female brain, according to him, and a female with a male brain. People with autism have the extreme male brain, he tells readers. I read Alyssa Schuett's presentation of objections to Baron-Cohen with interest. (She was advised by Robert Schroer.) Her presentation has some philosophy and some anthropology and an objection to Baron-Cohen on the extreme female brain.  I wish to focus on the objection, which is different from my own.
Baron-Cohen introduces the concept of the extreme female brain. The extreme female brain is very good at systematizing but very bad at empathizing. Sorry, I mean the other way around: the extreme female brain is very good at empathizing but very bad at systematizing. He says, "In our research, we have not found anyone with the extreme female brain," or words to that effect (2003: 170). Schuett makes these three assertions:
1. Not encountered in science, just an idea he came up with.
2. The extreme female brain is not problematic, according to Baron-Cohen.
3. He cannot have it both ways.
I think Baron-Cohen can respond to Schuett's objection, or I can on his behalf. (He cannot even get a popularizer and has to write the popular "textbook" himself! How much work must he do on papers within research teams?!)
        To grasp the response, we need to distinguish between concepts and propositions. Propositions are normally presented by whole sentences, such as the sentence "Baron-Cohen is a man" and the sentence "The University of Cambridge is south of the University of Manchester." Concepts are the building blocks of propositions, in a way that is roughly analogous to how words are the building blocks of sentences. The proposition that Baron-Cohen is a man uses the concept of a man. The proposition that the University of Cambridge is south of the University of Manchester uses the concept of being south of.
        With this distinction between concepts and propositions in place, we need to distinguish between a concept's being problematic and a proposition's being problematic. A concept is problematic if, whenever you use that concept in a proposition, the proposition is contradictory. For example, the concept of a round square is problematic. Here are two propositions featuring it: (i) the maths teacher drew a round square on the board; (ii) there is a certain round square and it has a circumference of ten metres. You don't even need to know anything about the teacher before you are having a problem with accepting proposition (i) and likewise you don't need to measure anything before you are having a problem with accepting proposition (ii).
        A proposition in science can be problematic by being contradictory but it can also be problematic, even if it is not contradictory, because there is no evidence in its favour.
        Baron-Cohen can say this. The concept of an extreme female brain is not problematic. You can use it in a proposition without contradiction. There is nothing contradictory about the proposition  "Madam Odile has an extreme female brain." But the proposition "There is someone with an extreme female brain" is problematic, because there is no scientific evidence for that. Baron-Cohen can say, "My claim is that the concept of an extreme female brain is not problematic. But at the moment we have not encountered any instances of the extreme female brain. We might do in the future. Physicists sometimes introduce a concept and posit an entity and later discover instances of it, such as black holes. Why can't the psychologist medic do the same?"
I guess  Schuett will say, "Psychology and medicine are just not physics, so you cannot appeal to physics here." I think the best she is going to get from going down that line is that the concept of an extreme female brain should not be introduced in a popular book. (Experts will differ on the relationship between Baron-Cohen's disciplines and physics.)
My objection is to the very concept of the extreme female brain (Edward 2022). How can you be very good at empathizing but very bad at systematizing? If you are so bad at systematizing, you won't be able to understand all the systematizers and so you won't be very good at empathizing. I cannot see that Schuett makes this objection.


References
Baron-Cohen, S. 2003. The essential difference: men, women and the extreme male brain. London: Allen Lane.
Edward, T.R. 2022. On the very idea of an extreme female brain. Available at PhilPapers. https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWOTV.pdf
Schuett, A. (advised by R. Schroer). Cutting Edge Cognitive Science or Outdated Sexist Stereotypes: Critiques of The Essential Difference by Simon Baron-Cohen. Available at:
https://conservancy.umn.edu/items/2f34cf7a-d0c1-4d31-9537-833ef0c46cc9


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On sex perception, the brain, and knowledge (Judith Butler vs. Kathleen Stock)


Author. Terence Rajivan Edward
Abstract. Regarding Kathleen Stock, the intellectual Judith Butler tells us, "Stock claimed that the perception of two sexes is something that the brain simply does. This I did not know." I respond by attributing a partial analysis of the concept of knowledge to Butler. I also respond by denying Stock's claim from my own experience: of being affected by the one sex theory presented by Thomas Laqueur.
Draft version: version 1 (20th May 2025)


"Behold this piece of wit—
To which you must submit."


        Judith Butler's 2024 book Who's Afraid of Gender? includes a chapter on British TERFs: trans-exclusionary radical feminists. A person known to us since the early 21st century at least, namely Kathleen Stock, comes in for criticism. But not all of the criticism is explicit. Butler writes, "Stock claimed that the perception of two sexes is something that the brain simply does. This I did not know." What's the criticism Butler is making? Does Butler not fear the amusing response, "Well now you do"?! Perhaps she is planning to block this response by sheer style. "This I did not know," sounds rather professorial in English, compared to "I didn't know this." An authoritative tone. How can the native student muster a reply? In this paper, I try to interpret Butler less superficially than as trying to pull off the style of authority in order to achieve its characteristic effects. (After all, who amongst intelligent people cares for pulling off this style?) Instead I interpret her as committed to a certain analysis of knowledge. I wish to also express my agreement with her, as I interpret her, by presenting some autobiography which counters Stock's claim, as conveyed by Butler.
        Knowledge. My interpretation is that Butler is committed to an analysis of knowledge according to which a subject S knows a proposition P if and only if a set of conditions is met, one of which is the following: proposition P is true. This is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition. Further conditions must be met to count as knowing. Anyway, as I further interpret her, Butler is trying to convey by her "This I did not know" that the proposition Stock asserts – the proposition that the perception of two sexes is something that the brain simply does – is false and so Butler fails to meet the conditions for knowing the proposition. How can she meet the conditions, because if the proposition is false, it is not an appropriate object of knowledge?! ("But then should she not have said, 'This I cannot know'?" I think this is just a quibble.)
        One sex: some autobiography. In 2022, I wrote some papers responding to Kathleen Stock, starting with her response to Thomas Laqueur in her book Material Girls. Laqueur unearths an old theory of sex, according to which there is just one sex, rather than the two (or main two) that we ordinarily assume there to be. "How can there be just one sex? Are you blind, etc.?" To adopt the male point of view, the one sex theory maintains that the so-called female sexual system is just the male one turned inside out. Go and look at the diagrams. The ovaries, seated within, are the female counterpart to the testes. Much as sexual organs of one sex can vary in size, shape, and colour, they can also vary by one set of sexual organs being an inside-out version of another set. That is what the old theory maintains, anyway. ("When was this old theory held?" Before the eighteenth century.)
        Now as I was reading and writing on Laqueur, I experienced a strange effect on my mind. Let us here assume, as Stock seems to, that the mind is just the brain. Given this assumption, the strange effect was on my brain. I found that I started perceiving in terms of one sex, my sex to be precise. That is just a person of my sex with organs inverted (or whatever the right term is). I felt afraid. Would I ever return to two sex perception? I didn't want to see the world in terms of one sex. Fortunately, I did soon return! And now, reading Butler on Stock, I have found a use for my troubling experience: to contest Stock's claim that the perception of two sexes is something that the brain simply does. How can you say that it simply does this, because this my brain did not do (for a bit)!
        To spell it out clearly, my argument is this.
1. If my brain did not perceive in terms of two sexes for a while (despite the appropriate stimulus), then the perception of two sexes is NOT something that the brain simply does.
2. My brain did not perceive in terms of two sexes for a while (despite the appropriate stimulus).
Therefore (by modus ponens):
3. The perception of two sexes is NOT something that the brain simply does.


References
Butler, J. 2024. Who's Afraid of Gender? London (?): Penguin Books.
Edward, T.R. 2022. One sex or two? Kathleen Stock on Thomas Laqueur. Available on PhilPapers.
Laqueur, T. 1986. Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics of Reproductive Biology. Representations 14: 1-41. 
Stock, K. 2021. Material Girls. London: Fleet.
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Comparison of two ridiculous fascists: Carl Schmitt and Wyndham Lewis


Author: Terence Rajivan Edward
Abstract. I draw attention to four differences between Carl Schmitt and Wyndham Lewis: (A) Schmitt characterizes certain war-mongering liberals as naive and Lewis characterizes them as wicked; (B) Schmit is not aware of the thought of running an authoritarian regime with a liberal surface, but Lewis is; (C) Schmitt, unlike Lewis, allocates no role to divinity in protecting the ways of a nation; and (D) Lewis is prepared to resign himself to the end of a nation's way of life but Schmitt is not. 
Draft version: Version 4 (19th June 2025)


My dear beloved right-wing intellectual
—-A comparison of two fools perpetual!


        The fascist philosopher Carl Schmitt is increasingly being introduced to British philosophers. Someone is sure to ask, "What is the difference between him and this fascist of ours?" Below I draw attention to four differences between Carl Schmitt and Wyndham Lewis. (There may be more.) These differences mostly arise, I think, because Lewis lived in a liberal country and had slightly greater acquaintance with liberal culture.


        A. Naive versus wicked liberals. World War Two began in 1939. In a 1936 book, Lewis writes:
Peace for the next twenty-five years - there is a sensible notion now. But the man who comes along with a plan for Eternal Peace – which he guarantees he will secure for you if you only enter another world-war – just one more war (a really bad one this time – far worse than the last): you should only have one answer for that gentleman. Very short and sharp; it should be such an uncompromising answer that he would never be tempted to come 'hawking' that kind of peace again on your doorstep. (1936: 13)
Reading this, various scholars are sure to think of Schmitt. This argument for one more war is famously addressed by Schmitt. (By the way, who devised it?) He does not want a great war himself. He thinks liberalism requires such a war and criticizes liberalism for this reason. Liberals cannot settle for driving the enemy out of their nation, Schmitt thinks. Since the enemy is perceived as immoral by the liberal rather than merely different - as violating rights that any decent person should respect - a moral war to destroy or change the enemy, wherever he may be, ensues. Now our focus is on differences between Schmitt and Lewis. Schmitt portrays the liberal as naively optimistic about human nature: the immoral qualities of human beings cannot be eliminated. For Lewis, in contrast, the liberals who recommend one more war are wicked and pretending to be clever:
To assert that these people, who are doing their best to ensure the outbreak of another war, are wicked, is true: but it is beside the point. They do not pretend to be good. They pretend to be clever. (1936: 11)


        B. Dictatorship and democracy. Lewis is alive to the possibility of running a dictatorship from within a democracy:
Fascist revolution is not suited to the English people – such is the argument of the British parliamentary statesman and his henchmen. But the undeniable benefits of such an 'authoritarian' regime as that of Hitler or Mussolini can be secured without anyone being aware of the change! It is, in fact, quite surprising how totalitarian you can be without anybody so much as guessing that they are a whit less free than they were before. (1936: 61-62)
Schmitt was a Nazi. But his illiberal preferences would never be realized in Britain, Lewis suggests, because British politicians think that (i) fascist revolution is not suited to the English and (ii) they can gain the advantages of an authoritarian system while preserving a surface appearance of a liberal British state. It does not seem Schmitt is aware of this response. The fact that Lewis is aware of thought (ii) is another difference between them. (Is Schmitt even aware of (i)?)
        More precisely, we can represent Schmitt and Lewis as reacting somewhat differently to an argument which begins with two premises and infers a conclusion.
1. If authoritarian regimes have great benefits over liberal ones, then we ought to have a fascist revolution.
2. Authoritarian regimes have great benefits over liberal ones.
Therefore:
3. We ought to have a fascist revolution.
Lewis is aware of an objection to premise (1) which Schmitt does not show awareness of: we can preserve the surface of a liberal regime while being authoritarian, rather than have a fascist revolution.


        C. Divine protection. England is renowned as a literary country: a country of writers and of great literature. This is Lewis on what might happen to a generation of outstanding painters he observed:
I have experienced so much that is exceptionally tragic that, were they all gathered in the Festival Hall, by some mischance, to listen to a new symphony by Benjamin Britten, and should the hall be struck, and set on fire by a meteorite, and should they all perish in the flames, I should be horrified, but I should see that God did not mean England to have painters, and I would accept this, perhaps, as another example of those actions of the divinity which we find it impossible to understand. (1954: 6)
Schmitt does not appeal to divinity to protect the ways of a nation. He thinks the identity of a nation should sometimes be protected by suspending the law, in order to better deal with an enemy.


        D. Categorical survival versus resignation. In his splendidly written book on the English, Lewis writes:
What the conservative wants, in essence, is a prolongation of the past. He regards the society to which he belongs as something alive, and subject to laws of growth, like a tree – not an inorganic matter to be made up into any shape that the intellect may decide. He sees it evolving, more or less slowly, until, in the fullness of time it shall have to die, as have other human societies, nations, or empires, before it. (1938: 226)
As I understand Lewis, he accepts this mortal tree conception of society. But I don't think Schmitt does. The way of life of a nation is something regarding which individual members must do everything they can to ensure it survives, if it is under threat. One does not say, "Now its time is up. Just leave it to die." (I think Lewis would be prepared to say that in various circumstances.) Most famously, Schmitt thinks that the law should be suspended in some contexts to better protect the way of life of a nation, notably from an enemy to that way of life. The thought that this way of life is sure to die at some point and the further thought that it is best for it to die now are not Schmittian thoughts, as I understand the German fascist.


References
Lewis, W. 1936. Left Wings over Europe: or, How to Make a War About Nothing. London: Jonathan Cape.
Lewis, W. 1938. The Mysterious Mr Bull. London: Robert Hale.
Lewis, W. 1954. The Demon of Progress in the Arts. London: Methuen.
Schmitt, C. (translated by G. Schwab) 1976. The Concept of the Political. NJ: Rutgers University Press.
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Liberalism, the Tikopia, and a shared worldview in an English village?


Author: Terence Rajivan Edward
Abstract. Professor Nigel Rapport and Professor Raymond Firth both engage in worldview description, but Rapport presents a diversity of worldviews in a village whereas Firth does not. Is that because Firth ignored diversity, or because of the liberal character of Rapport's village, which enables diversity? Both fieldworkers are interested in conceptions to do with sex, but I propose that if Rapport had Firth's precise focus, he would have engaged in group worldview description. (Warning: this paper may not be of wider interest!)
Draft version: version 2 (19th June 2025, parenthetical remark added on necessary and sufficient conditions)


        Two anthropologists who engage in worldview description are Raymond Firth and Nigel Rapport. Firth does so quite late in his 1936 book on the remote island people the Tikopia and Rapport does so in his 1993 book on Wanet, a village in England. Both anthropologists are interested in conceptions to do with sex. But there is a major difference in how they carry out the project of worldview description. Rapport presents individual worldviews, the worldview of this individual and the worldview of that individual, whereas Firth presents a group worldview, the worldview of the Tikopia, or a portion of this worldview. Why is that? In this paper, I set aside two predictable answers and propose a third answer.
        It will be useful, before introducing these answers, to clarify some of the terms involved. A worldview consists of propositions about the world, typically highly general ones. A group is any set of individuals. And a group, such as the Tikopia, has a certain worldview if and only if all members are disposed to express a commitment to that worldview (see also Gilbert 1987).


Two answers
        One predictable answer to our question is that group worldview description is impossible in a liberal setting such as England, because liberalism allows different people to develop different views and if they are allowed to do that, they will (Walpole 1757: 1; Rawls 1993: 56-57). We can call this the liberal-diversity answer. According to this answer, Firth was able to engage in group worldview description and Rapport was not, because liberalism was realized in the latter's fieldwork setting and not in the former's. (Note: there is a qualified version of this answer according to which liberalism is a sufficient condition for diverse views which prevent group worldview description but not a necessary condition.)
Another predictable answer is quite different. It says that anthropologists in the past tried to capture the worldview of a whole group, or tribe, but this involved overlooking diversity in views held. Sue Wright tells us:
Anthropologists of various persuasions were also criticized for treating 'culture' as if it were a set of ideas and meanings which were shared by a whole population of homogeneous individuals – which was empirically not the case. (Wright 1998: 8)
According to this answer, probably there was a diversity of views in the Tikopia that Firth studied, but he overlooked this diversity to engage in group worldview description; Rapport, writing after criticism of group worldview description, does not make that mistake. We can call this the old-anthropology-misrepresents answer.


A third answer: unqualified version
Although both anthropologists are interested in conceptions to do with sex, their precise interests are different. Firth is interested in whether the Tikopia accord a causal role to the father in procreation and whether any group with the same kinship system is sure to do so (Firth 1936: 479). He tells us that they do accord a causal role (Firth 1936: 479). Rapport is interested in views about the characters of males and females and also views about how any differences impact on sexual relations (Rapport 1993: 19). If Rapport had gone around asking about whether people accord a causal role to the father in procreation, what would he have found? He would have found that everyone thinks the same, according to the unqualified version of the third answer. Contrary to the two answers above, Rapport would have engaged in group worldview description if he had Firth's precise focus, says this answer. He did not because his focus was on a topic where there is greater variation in views between individuals.


Objection
        An objection is that there is likely to be diversity too in response to the question of whether the father has a causal role in procreation, even if we confine worldview description to adults (without severe psychological disabilities) in the English village of Wanet. Christians will say that a human father generally has a causal role, but allow for miraculous exceptions. Some atheists will maintain that a father always has a causal role. Some, atheist or not, will wonder whether technology is available for reproducing without a father.


Third answer: qualified version 
It is likely that Rapport would have found that all adults studied accept this thesis:
(Normality thesis) Normally procreation involves a causal role for a human father.
Some people would go beyond this and say that this is always the case, whereas other people would leave room for exceptions. If Rapport had Firth's specific interest, he could have and probably would have described a group worldview by attributing the normality thesis to all adults studied in the village of Wanet.


References
Gilbert, M. 1987. Modeling Collective Belief. Synthese 73: 185-204. 
Firth, R. 1936. We, The Tikopia. London: George Allen & Unwin.
Rapport, N. 1993. Diverse World-Views in an English Village. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Rawls, J. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Walpole, H. 1757. A letter from Xo Ho, a Chinese Philosopher at London, to his friend Lien Chi at Peking.  London: J. Graham.
Wright, S. 1998. The politicization of 'culture'. Anthropology Today 14: 7-15.
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The defence is a shambles: what does that mean?


Author: Terence Rajivan Edward
Abstract. "The defence is a shambles" is a remark used in football commentary. By football, I mean what is called soccer in North American societies. I propose and reject four definitions, before arriving at a definition I regard as acceptable. But given the definition, I worry that a commentator does not know enough to be able to reliably use this expression.
Draft version: version 1 (22nd July 2025)


        "The defence is a shambles": one hears this remark in football commentary, but what does it mean? It is difficult to say.
        Here is an initial proposal, as might be given by someone with little knowledge of English (and perhaps the sport in question too).
(PROPOSAL1) The defence of a team is a shambles if and only if:
(i) A goal was scored by the opposing team.
(ii) Better defending would have prevented this goal
But there are problems with this proposal. One problem is that you can (or one can) say that the defence is a shambles in some circumstances when a goal was not scored by the opposing team but there was a high risk of a goal being scored.
        This brings us to a second proposal.
(PROPOSAL2) The defence of a team is a shambles if and only if:
(i) There is a significant risk of a goal being scored by the opposing team.
(ii) Better defending would reduce this risk.
But there are problems with this proposal too. One problem is that condition (ii) can be true, but the only way for the team to defend better is by their players reaching the level of the best defenders in the world ever: Maldini, Baresi, Costacurta, and a fourth player. (Ryan Giggs?)
        This brings us to a third proposal:
(PROPOSAL3) The defence of a team is a shambles if and only if:
(i) There is a significant risk of a goal being scored by the opposing team.
(ii) Better defending, in a way that we can reasonably expect from this team (not the opposing team), would reduce this risk.
But there are problems with this proposal too. One problem is that the risk must not be reduced by a miniscule extent, such as 0.01%, if we can quantify this.
        This leads us quite naturally to a fourth proposal.
(PROPOSAL4) The defence of a team is a shambles if and only if:
(i) There is a significant risk of a goal being scored by the opposing team.
(ii) Better defending, in a way that we can reasonably expect from this team (not the opposing team), would significantly reduce this risk.
But there are problems with this proposal too. "Shambles" is about disorganization. It should be that the better defence involves better team organization, rather than a series of independent individual decisions that work for the best.
        This is my final proposal then (which is perhaps hasty - why did I start writing on this?).
(PROPOSAL5) The defence of a team is a shambles if and only if:
(i) There is a significant risk of a goal being scored by the opposing team.
(ii) The manager or coach has specified a way of organizing the defence which aims to reduce this risk, e.g. this defender should be tracking that attacker, etc.
(iii) The players are not organized in the specified way.
(iv) If they were organized in this way, the risk of a goal being scored by the opposing team would be significantly reduced.
(v) It is reasonable to expect the players to be organized in this way - the manager's specified organization is not unreasonable for these players.
        But we must clarify what "reasonable" means here. At least two clarifications, in broad outline, come to mind. One clarification is aimed at the player who gives priority to playing football well amongst their ends. Given their talents and this prioritized end, it is rational for them to do their part in realizing the specified organization. Another clarification is aimed at the player who gives equal or greater priority to other ends, such as having a family. But either line of clarification seems to require that a commentator knows a lot about the players before they can reliably use the remark. Is the commentator ever in a position themselves to use it? (I wonder whether the professional footballer themselves is not disposed to inwardly describe "the situation" in this way.)
        I must thank Professor Miriam Ronzoni for "suggesting" to me the idea of writing on this topic. She has a blog post entitled, "Shambles, But Make It Digital," which refers to football. I don't know anything about the professional footballer and their point of view on football, by the way, but proposal 5 above seems a good clarification of the remark.


Reference
Ronzoni, M. 2024. Shambles, But Make It Digital. Crooked Timber October 1st 2024.
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Undergraduate-style jurisprudence essay (of the first water?): is legal positivism correct?


Author: Terence Rajivan Edward
Draft version: version 1 (3rd August 2025)


        Legal positivism is a philosophy of law which was first fully elaborated by the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham (Adams and Green 2019). The leading twentieth century legal positivists are the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen and the University of Oxford philosophers of law H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz. In this essay, I shall first identify two essential theses of legal positivism. I shall then argue against one of the theses that defines legal positivism, the separation thesis. I do so by appealing to general philosophy of language, namely Donald Davidson's ideas about interpretation. I consider an objection that one cannot just apply such general considerations to law, but I reject it. I conclude that legal positivism is not an acceptable philosophy, because of this Davidsonian argument against a thesis that is essential to it.
What is legal positivism? We must first address this question; only then can we address whether legal positivism is correct. The philosophy has been espoused over centuries, by philosophers from noticeably different cultural backgrounds, which might lead one to despair over being able to define it. What can an English utilitarian of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, a leading Austrian jurist of the twentieth century, and Oxford legal philosophers, with their careful attention to legal and ordinary language, have in common? One is disposed to fear that all we can say is that the term "legal positivism" refers to a family of doctrines (Wittgenstein 1953).
But surely we can say more than this. Even if we cannot fully define the conditions a view must meet in order to fall under the heading of legal positivism, we can specify some conditions. It must be about law, for example. In the literature on legal positivism, two theses have been highlighted as necessary conditions. If these conditions are not met, then we are not confronted by legal positivism. The two conditions are commitments to two theses (Marmor 1990: 61). The first thesis is the social thesis: the fact that something is a law somewhere, in the legal sense of law, is a social fact. It is a fact about a society or a social institution. The second thesis is the separation thesis: whether something is a law or not is independent of whether it ought to be a law or not. The traditional opponent of legal positivism, the natural law theorist, holds that unjust law is no law at all.
Having specified these two theses, we are in position to partake in evaluation of legal positivism. If there is a sound argument against at least one of the theses, then legal positivism must be rejected. This is what I shall try to achieve below. 
In order to achieve this, I shall appeal to the philosophy of Donald Davidson, an esteemed American philosopher. Davidson does not refer to the law in his writings, to the best of my knowledge, but his classic paper "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" is relevant to assessing legal positivism. Davidson asks us to imagine a person visiting a tribe. The visitor knows our language, English, but does not know anything of the tribe's language. She must learn the language from scratch, by observing when the natives assent to and dissent from sentences. She is, in Davidson's jargon, a radical interpreter. Now some of the sentences will, presumably, concern native law. "Do not do that. It is prohibited by law," the native says in their own tongue, when the visitor sits on a sacred object, let us imagine. How can the visitor understand the native? According to Davidson, the visitor must interpret charitably, as must we all. To interpret charitably, put crudely, is to do this: if there are two interpretations of what a native sentence means which the visitor is choosing between, prefer the one which is more likely to express a truth given the visitor's beliefs. Exceptions can be made when there is a good explanation for why the native is making a mistake, that is to say, a mistake by the visitor's lights. The visitor cannot rationally make progress in interpreting the native unless they proceed charitably, Davidson thinks (1973-4: 19).
But given this requirement to interpret charitably, the visitor must, in some possible circumstances, take into account what the law ought to be when identifying what the native law is. For example, consider these two interpretations of a native sentence: "Do not cast your eyes upon the sky for it is against native law to ever do so"; and "Do not cast your eyes upon the sky for the Sun is shining brightly and you will damage your eyes." Surely no legal system ought to prohibit ever looking at the sky. Thus one rules out the first interpretation as too unlikely. But then one's assessment of what the native law is depends on one's assessment of what it ought to be.
        I anticipate an objection to this argument. The objector maintains that the law is a specialized institution, consisting of its own kind of reasoning and its own kind of norms, and therefore one cannot apply considerations from Davidson's general philosophy of language to law. The question of what general considerations apply to the law is debated between legal titans H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz (see Diamond 2025). Unfortunately, I do not have space to enter into the details of this debate. What we can say here is that it is not enough to say that the law is a specialized institution. The objector must appeal to a specific quality which prevents the application of Davidson's general philosophy and I can see no specific quality which prevents this. Surely we must apply some general considerations, such as that sentences are composed of words, to legal language too. And Davidson's considerations also apply.
        It is now time to conclude this essay. Drawing upon the jurisprudence literature, I have identified two theses which a legal theorist must commit themselves to in order to count as a legal positivist. One of these theses is the separation thesis: whether something is a law or not is independent of whether it ought to be a law or not. I have argued against this thesis by appealing to Davidson's principle of charity: an interpreter choosing between interpretations must prefer the interpretation which is more true, by their lights. They cannot identify what the law is without taking into account their beliefs about what it ought to be. I have therefore argued against legal positivism. The answer to the title question is: legal positivism is not a correct philosophy of law.


References
Adams, T. and Green, L. 2019. Legal Positivism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter 2019. Available at:
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/legal-positivism/
Davidson, D. 1973-4. On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47: 5-20. 
Diamond, A. 2025. Law in Society: Defending Hart. Forthcoming in Res Publica.
Marmor, A. 1990. No Easy Cases? The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 3 (2): 61-79.
Wittgenstein, L. 1953 (translated by G. Anscombe). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
________________
Economics, inference, and Lewis Carroll: how can you say new stuff now?


Author: Terence Rajivan Edward
Abstract. In my experience, various postgraduate students and sometimes lecturers think about the history of ideas in a certain way. There is a question within a field and there are (or is) a certain number of answers worth considering, not very many, 4 let us say. Each contributor is interested in making a new contribution and pursues this goal rationally. So contributor number 1 offers one of these answers, contributor number 2 offers a second answer, number 3 offers a third answer, and number 4 a fourth answer. All the positions are soon taken. This is a simple rational actor model, like those used in economics. But does actual history correspond to the model? I shall focus on one case, in the field of logic, concerning the question of why not treat the inference to a conclusion as a premise. In this case, actual history is different.
Draft version: version 1 (5th August 2025).


        Introduction. I have had conversations with many people over the years, but my experience of life is still quite limited. A lot of these people were postgraduate students at the University of Manchester. Nevertheless, some material from this narrow range of experience may be of wider interest. If you say that you are working on a certain author, renowned for centuries (or even one more recent with a sizeable secondary literature), you will probably hear the question, "Isn't everything on this author said already?" Certain topics, which are not author-focused, prompt an analogous question: "Isn't everything on this topic already said?" Perhaps such a question will not be raised to some people, professors with an air of authority and impressive insignia, but certainly to me. And that is, I suspect, how the questioner thinks: they think some project of mine is a waste of time, though the question does not literally say this - it is merely a question. I have heard such questions from more than seven different people, concerning more than seven topics altogether, over the course of 21 years or more.
        The inquirer works with a simple rational actor model of the history of ideas, which I am disposed to call the musical chairs model after the children's game. Here is the model. A question arises in a field. There are (or is) a certain number of answers worth considering, not very many, 4 let us say. Each contributor addressing the question is interested in making a new contribution, given the rewards that this will bring, and pursues this goal rationally. So the first contributor offers one of the worthwhile answers, the second contributor offers another, the third contributor offers a third worthwhile answer, and the fourth contributor offers a fourth. All the positions that can be taken up in the literature are thus taken up. It happens soon enough and there is nothing both new and worthwhile that a latecomer such as myself can say.
        The musical chairs model applies to various questions pursued in various fields, as diverse as literature, history, and physics. If you say, "I am working on why there are all these jokes in King Lear" or "I am working on why did the Nigerian civil war begin" or "I am working on how did the moon end up orbiting the Earth," the model applies. "Why are you wasting your time on that?" the inquirer wants to ask. It is a general model. But does the model apply to itself? More fully, here is a question for anyone who relies on this model: who in the literature discusses this model, which is so commonly and widely relied on and I guess has been for decades, centuries even? (And where is the discussion?) In my experience, those who rely on the model never think about this matter without prompting. I have asked.
        Furthermore, have they looked into actual history of ideas and what happens there? They seem to simply assume the model is correct. We must all make assumptions and perhaps mine are worse given my aims, but below I wish to look in more detail at an actual case in the history of ideas. The case does not fit well with the model, though I rely on the model to some extent too. (Can one not?) Below I shall identify three problems for the musical chairs model, in order of importance.


        The question. Imagine that you are teaching logic. You are teaching modus ponens, let us imagine. A modus ponens type of argument is one with this logical form: "If P, then Q. P. Therefore Q." P and Q are replaced with propositions in an instance of this argument, such as the proposition "my child is a soldier" for P and the proposition "my child must go to war" for Q. Using these, here is a modus ponens argument.
(Premise 1) If my child is a soldier, then my child must go to war.
(Premise 2) My child is a soldier.
Therefore:
(Conclusion) My child must go to war.
With this argument, there are two premises, a conclusion, and there is also an inference from the premises to the conclusion, represented by "Therefore." (The argument is valid, by the way, which here means that if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true as well. In logic, the description "valid" is neutral on whether the premises are true and is about the reasoning from premises to conclusion.) Now imagine a student who thinks that this inference should be a further premise, and that inferences in general should be premises. But logicians do not follow that recommendation. The question is, why not?


        The Lewis-Carrollian Answer. Lewis Carroll is world-famous as the author of children's books about a character called Alice. I shall draw on Lewis Carroll's much less famous 1895 paper, entitled "Achilles and the Tortoise," published in 1895 in the philosophy journal Mind. Recall the argument presented in the previous section. This is an attempt to put the inference in the argument as a premise, namely the third premise.
(Premise 1) If my child is a soldier, then my child must go to war.
(Premise 2) My child is a soldier.
(Premise 3) If the following two propositions are true, then my child must go to war: "if my child is a soldier, then my child must go to war" and "my child is a soldier."
Therefore:
(Conclusion) My child must go to war.
But there is still an inference in this argument, represented by "Therefore." Shall we also try to turn this inference into a premise? In order to avoid an infinite task of turning inference into premises, one must accept that there are inferences which are not premises.


        Are there other worthwhile answers? I think there are, but they do not emerge until the 21st century, to my knowledge. That does not fit well with the model, as I understand it. I assume that the model is supposed to apply in such a way that all these answers are sure to appear within about 20 years of Carroll's 1895 contribution. That is my first problem for the musical chairs model: with the question we are focusing on, other answers do not appear for more than a century. Why don't they appear? I am not sure. I guess, to make a bit of progress with this matter, you have to imagine a logician or logic teacher faced with the question "Why is the inference not a premise?" from a student. Their response is to refer to Carroll's paper, which they take to be a conclusive proof that this turn-the-inference-into-a-premise project is not doable. They do not start thinking, "Are there other proofs?" or "Are there other arguments against the project, even if not proofs?" Or most of them do not. And perhaps that is a good thing for the future of logic.


        The Boghossian-Wright-Broome Answer. Paul Boghossian, Crispin Wright, and John Broome are distinguished professors of our day, with expertise in logic and philosophy. They and less famous others have been discussing the issue of what an inference is, in papers since the second decade of this century. I am not properly acquainted with this literature, I confess. To my knowledge, the literature does not explicitly address the question we are focusing on: why an inference is not a premise? And it does not explicitly refer to Lewis Carroll. But I think that these astute and experienced professors are very aware of the question. I interpret them as aiming to offer an alternative answer, independent from Lewis Carroll. By appealing to various non-Carrollian considerations, they hope to resolve the issue of what an inference is. And then it will be easy enough to argue that such a thing cannot be a premise, because a premise is a proposition and an inference is not a proposition. This brings us to a second problem with the musical chairs model, as I understand it: it assumes that all contributors to the question explicitly answer the question, but this is not what is happening in this literature. I suspect the professors named can be confident of being interpreted as addressing it, in any contemporary review, hence they do not feel an incentive to explicitly address it. But note this: when the question is not explicitly discussed, it is rational to expect less contributors. "I would have contributed if aware of the question." And it becomes easier to explain why someone such as myself is able to make a novel contribution after the model predicts.
        Now there is a person, a scientist probably, who will think, "This debate between the distinguished professors will never be resolved, like so many other debates of philosophers." Perhaps. But  note this: the model of the history of ideas that we are considering is an economics model, a rational actor model where the individuals within it respond rationally to incentives, and there is an economic reason for pursuing the Boghossian-Wright-Broome approach. There is a market for it. "I don't want to be forced to a conclusion by a piece of children's literature. I want to have a grown-up discussion," a kind of student thinks. The professors address this market. Boghossian says, "I think an inference is this..." (Well, this is the much discussed claim of his, we are told: "Inferring necessarily involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of that fact." Hlobil 2014) And Wright says, "I think an inference is this..." And Broome says, "Me, I think an inference is..." In practice, all this is in writing. Such a student probably only ever ends up in verbal discussion with someone such as myself.


        My Answer. My answer was actually developed as a response to the problem of how to keep students from putting the inference in the conclusion. Recall: a modus ponens argument takes the form of "If P then Q. P. Therefore Q." The conclusion is whatever Q is. The conclusion is of the form "Q," not "therefore Q." My solution to the problem is feeble perhaps. One goes through a series of examples and asks questions and thereby establishes that intuitively the inference is not part of the conclusion. To illustrate, here are our two example premises again:
(Premise 1) If my child is a soldier, then my child must go to war.
(Premise 2) My child is a soldier.
The logic teacher asks, "What follows from these?" Answer: my child must go to war. Or the logic teacher asks, "What can we conclude from these, assuming both premises are true?" Answer: my child must go to war. Or the logic teacher asks, "These two premises, therefore?" Answer: my child must go to war.
        A comparable approach for the question of why not turn the inference into a premise is: go through examples and establish that intuitively the inference is not a premise. One presents only premise 1 or only premise 2 and asks what follows. No answer. Then one presents both premises and asks this question. The answer given is: my child must go to war. So, intuitively, these two premises are enough to infer a conclusion, without a further premise.
        Now one reason for why my answer might be regarded as particularly feeble is because of the question "What if a cunning strategist shares my reactions but pretends not to: gives some other answer instead, for example?" I am relying on honest reactions to establish what I and my audience share, in terms of what we find intuitive, but a cunning strategist may seek to subvert this reliance. I shall have to work on this challenge, I suppose. (Other challenges they are sure to set, that they actually set in fact: what if we start using "valid" for sound, because that is in line with ordinary usage even if it does not fit with the language of professional logicians?)
        Another reason for regarding my answer as feeble is that my answer relies on intuition, but cannot our shared intuitions simply be wrong? Maybe I shall say, "Unless we have a special reason to think otherwise, we should rely on these shared intuitions." Anyway, mine is a third answer. In an actual classroom situation, I probably would not think of anything else to say to such a student, apart from "I will get back to you next week."
        Now here is some crucial information for our evaluation of the musical chairs model of the history of ideas. My answer emerged not from wanting to contribute to the question "Why not turn the inference into a premise?" It emerged from thinking about how a prominent logician should engage with researchers in jurisprudence. He should check whether they know the premise-inference-conclusion distinctions, because various sources suggest a poor grasp of these. But it would be unwise for me not to connect it back to this question, given (currently) normal ends of recognition and intellectual property. I am not in a position, like Lewis Carroll and the astute respected professors, where someone is going to say, "You surely had this question in mind." Anyway, here is a third problem for the musical chairs model of the history of ideas, as I understand it: the model assumes that contributions to answering a question arise from focusing on that question.


        Conclusion. I have considered a simple rational actor model of the history of ideas. A question arises in a field. There are a certain number of worthwhile answers, not very many, 4 say. Each contributor offers an answer, to gain the rewards of having a novel contribution. Soon everything worthwhile has been said. I have examined actual history, specifically material addressing a question in logic: why not turn the inference into a premise? The model faces these problems at least when this piece of history is our focus, in order of importance:
* the long delay between Lewis Carroll's 1895 response and the next efforts, from Paul Boghossian and commentators;
* the model's problematic assumption that contributors explicitly address the question - if they do not, as happens in this literature, it is easy to explain why there is room left for novel contributions (some people who can contribute, and would if aware, are unaware of the question).
* the model's assumption that contributions arise from consciously working on the question, which is wrong in my case.


References
Boghossian, P. 2014. What is inference? Philosophical Studies 169 (1): 1-18.
Broome, J. 2014. Comments on Boghossian. Philosophical Studies 169(1): 19-25.
Carroll, L. 1895. What the Tortoise Said to Achilles. Mind 4 (14): 278-280.
Edward, T.R. 2025. "What hostile implements of sense!": better things for Professor Timothy Williamson to say to jurisprudence? Available on PhilPapers.
Edward, T.R. 2025. "beechtown/ the rise and fall of/ sandcastles": the habitus of Lewis Carroll, I suppose... and Kimberley Brownlee. Available on PhilPapers.
Hlobil, U. 2014. Against Boghossian, Wright, and Broome on Inference. Philosophical Studies 167(2): 419-429.
Wright, C. 2014. Comment on Paul Boghossian, "What is inference" Philosophical Studies 169 (1): 27-37.
________________
Relations or not, Victorian social anthropology, and analytic philosophy: an introductory essay in response to Marilyn Strathern


Author. Terence Rajivan Edward
Abstract. In numerous works, Dame Professor Marilyn Strathern has written of the concept of a relation in her discipline, social anthropology. This paper was prompted by Strathern's 2025 description of how, as a student, she needed to be told by Esther Goody that societies in conflict are in a relationship: a relationship of enmity. I present an attractive thesis on the Victorian debate between evolutionism versus diffusionism, according to which only the latter always requires the concept of a relation in all its explanations of shared features. I then introduce how relations are normally understood in contemporary analytic philosophy. If we work with this normal understanding, the thesis must be rejected.
Draft version: 2 (6 January 2026 grammar edits; version 1 21st September 2025)
"Writing this is an ache
Beside a tree and near a lake"


1. Introduction
        Dame Professor Marilyn Strathern has written a number of works which tell us about the concept of a relation in social anthropology. When did these works begin to appear in her long career? Was it in her 1995 book that her public writing about the concept first appeared, in a little pamphlet entitled The Relation: Issues in Complexity and Scale? There is an online copy which tells us that this is the text of the inaugural lecture given before the University of Cambridge, on the 14th October 1994, by the William Wyse Professor of Social Anthropology. Also when did she move from the Victoria University of Manchester back to Cambridge? 1993 according to Wikipedia. In 2020 she published a book entitled Relations: An Anthropological Account. In 2025, she is still writing about relations. Meanwhile, I am still digesting her output while she was based in Manchester, which I confess I am more impressed by: all her now classic works were written here, no? I wonder if she thought: "What is it going to take to dislodge the late stage Manchester school structural-functionalism? ALL THIS!" Anyway, this theme of the relation seems to be the most prominent theme of her Cambridge years. "What research did you do when you returned to Cambridge?" I imagine the 1001th keen interviewer asking. "I have researched  the concept of the relation in social anthropology," she replies. (I don't think there is any greater danger in writing of the concept of the relation rather than the relation here.)
        Why this concept, I don't know. "I attend to the linguistic and metaphysical inquiries of analytic philosophers much more than you do"? Anyway, I am stimulated by her uncharacteristically accessible 2025 book chapter extract, which I can read online, using Google Books. In the next part of this little essay, I draw attention to the material which awakened my interest and make some critical comments on it. In the third part, I present a thesis on the relation in Victorian social anthropology, which I believe Strathern will accept. In the final part, I present how relations are understood in analytic philosophy, which does not cohere with this thesis.


2. Stimulus and critique
        The social anthropologist Esther Goody passed away in 2018. She lived to 85. In 2025, a book was published entitled Building Social Worlds: Thinking forwards with Esther Newcomb Goody. The first chapter is by Strathern and enchantingly titled "Sisters into Wives, Wives into Sisters". It contains this paragraph, which I can view on Google Books. After introducing a question at the end of the previous paragraph, she writes:
The question is prompted by one of the lessons I learnt from Goody and her colleagues in the Cambridge Department of Social Anthropology: that as far as anthropological analysis is concerned, negative relations are still relations. People may be in a state of war, but that does not imply an absence of relation: on the contrary the relationship is that enmity. Rites of separation at funerals may seek to despatch the deceased so it will not bother the living, but we could well regard these as rites of transformation; one kind of relation with the deceased becomes another. There is a concealed problem here: why it should have been necessary to become explicit in the first place. I suspect it was because the lesson goes against the grain of English vernacular usage. Hostile or distant relations can easily be imagined as an absence of relation, as 'no relations' at all. This usage no doubt arises at least partly from the way the very concept of relation is loaded with positive connotations. (2025)
So Strathern is wondering why does she need to be told: (a) that enmity is a relation; (b) that warring tribes are in a relationship, a relationship of enmity; and (c) that there are such things as negative relations, for example of enmity; and (d) that negative relations are relation too. Her explanation is that the lesson, or the four lessons, go against the grain of English vernacular usage. She adds detail to this explanation by saying that the very concept of a relation is loaded with positive connotations.
        I am not confident about this detail. Think about how a child learning English learns the concept of a relation, or a typical way (or what I imagine is a typical way!). "Your relations are coming to visit," says a parent. "What are relations?" asks the child. How is the parent going to explain? (I am going to be politically incorrect and set aside cases of adoption, please forgive me.) The parent says, "They are people you share ties of blood with. Mummy and Daddy you share ties of blood with. And also Mummy's sisters and Daddy's brothers and… But your best friend at nursery: no relation." The concept which the child is being taught applies whether or not there is a bond of love. But the child learns the concept in the context of loving relations. The relations, or the relatives, are coming to visit. And if you ask people to imagine relations, they may well not only conceive ties of blood but also imagine loving bonds. If you ask English speakers to draw a picture to illustrate the concept, I suspect a family gathering will be depicted, such as at a picnic. But a loving bond is not implied by applying our ordinary concept itself and one would not count as having mastered our concept if one does not allow for the possibility of a-positive-social-bond-but-no-relation AND ALSO the possibility of a-relation-but-no-positive-social-bond. So why say that the very concept of relation is loaded with positive connotations. Is Strathern not conflating the content of the concept with standard images to illustrate the concept, etc.?


3. The relation in Victorian social anthropology
        In Victorian social anthropology (as every student of the discipline knows?), there was evolutionism and diffusionism. They both sought to explain the distribution of societal features. Why does society A have this ritual (or this type of ritual) and why does society B also have it? Evolutionism relies on the concept of stages of progress which a society passes through, with some societies still being at earlier stages. Evolutionists devised or detected sequences of stages, such as the stage of magical belief, the stage of religion, and the stage of science (Frazer 1894). Societies A and B have this type of ritual because they are at the same stage and this type of ritual is a feature of this stage. Or society A has this ritual because it is a remnant from a previous stage it was in and society B has it because it is still in that stage, etc. Diffusionism, in contrast, explains shared features in terms of one society doing what another does. The ritual of getting very drunk when the white man appears was invented by society A and society B decided that it is a good idea too!
Here is a perspective on the Victorian debate which I believe Strathern will accept, even now that she has learnt to count more things using the concept of a relation. "Evolutionism allows one to explain shared features when there is no relation. Society A and B have had no contact with each other, nor is there any intermediary society (e.g. M learnt from society A and society B learnt from M)  and the same ritual exists in both. Diffusionism, in contrast, requires the concept of relation in all its explanations of shared features." Call this the Victorian anthropology relational difference thesis or VARD.


5. The relation in analytic philosophy
The concept of a relation, as normally used in analytic philosophy, will not allow one to accept VARD. "How is it normally used?" It will take a while to explain. To begin with, here is a general but false thesis about the structure of all sentences. All sentences have a subject-predicate form. "Subject-predicate form: what is that?" Here are some example sentences to help grasp this form:
(i) Fido is a dog
(ii) My book is heavy.
(iii) Marilyn Strathern is a professor.
In sentence (i) the subject is Fido and the predicate is "is a dog". In sentence (ii), the subject is "my book" and the predicate is "is heavy". In sentence (iii), the subject is Marilyn Strathern and the predicate is "is a professor". The subject picks out a thing and the predicate attributes a property to the thing.
But some sentences do not take the subject-predicate form or they are a problem for the general thesis that all sentences have this form. Amongst these are sentences which attribute relations. Below are some examples of sentences attributing two-place relations.
(iv) Fido is barking at Kitty.
(v) My book is next to my bed.
(vi)  Michael Jordan is taller than Marilyn Strathern.
A simple sentence which attributes the relation is-barking-at has two places, one for the barker and the other for the barked at. It has this form: "___ is barking at ___." We say that it attributes a two place relation. A simple sentence which attributes the relation is-next-to also has two places, one for each thing which stands in this relation. It has this form: "___ is next to ___." You can extend the pattern for sentence (vi) by yourself.
        Sentences can also attribute three-place relations, for example this one:
(vii) E.E. Evans-Pritchard is between Marilyn Strathern and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown.
The relation of being between is a three place relation because there are three things, the thing which is between the other two things. And a simple sentence which attributes this relation has this form: "____ is between ____ and ____."
        One must be careful to distinguish between the predicate and property. The predicate is a feature of the sentence and the property, if it exists, is a feature of the world represented by the sentence. Likewise one must distinguish between the relation attributed by a relation sentence and the relation itself, which may not even exist if the sentence (or the proposition conveyed by the sentence) is false. (But we seem to classify actual relations, or types of relation, on the basis of sentence forms used to represent them, such as two-placed and three-placed and more. )
        Now in analytic philosophy, the evolutionist cannot say that two societies which have had no contact nor any intermediaries lack a relation, not for this reason anyway. The evolutionist who says that the two societies share the same type of ritual because they are in the same stage and this stage involves this type of ritual attributes the following relation: being in the same stage as. Society A is in the same stage as society B. So the analytic philosophers cannot accept the VARD thesis as they normally understand relations, though it seems intuitively correct to me.


References
Frazer, J.G. 1894. The Golden Bough, Volume 1. New York: Macmillan. (I might need to use volume 2 for the magic, religion, science sequence.)
Strathern, M. 1995. The Relation: Issues in Complexity and Scale. Cambridge: Prickly Pear Press.
Strathern, M. 2020. Relations: An Anthropological Account. Duke University Press.
Strathern, M. 2025. Sisters into Wives, Wives into Sisters. In B. Bodenhorn, A. Fentiman, and M. Goody, Building Social Worlds: Thinking forwards with Esther Newcomb Goody. Berghahn Books.
________________
QUESTION: update social anthropology to cope with analytic philosophy and other professions?


Author's name (parents' draft): Terence Rajivan Edward (now Doctor)
Dialogue on names (fictional): "Now why do you want a name?" So that my works can be identified - that is one reason. "You need a number really."
Author's name (my first draft): 0161__Rajivan
Abstract. This paper proposes that a British anthropologist who came to analytic philosophy and tried to describe it would have problems given the emphasis of traditional functionalism on the function of social institutions, roles, and practices and also given "Strathernism's" emphasis on contrasting worldviews, understood as composed of propositions. It seems to me that one needs an emphasis on identifying types of "move" - I was going to use the word "trick," as we speak of tricks in sport or in a magic show, but the word will bring unwanted suggestions to some readers: there probably are some philosophers who do not pursue analytic philosophy as a kind of sport. 
 Draft version: version 1 (October 2nd 2025, quite raw version, because Internet is flickering so much)


Even if we are poemless tonight
Look at this question I've brought to light


        British anthropology in the 1920s developed its famous method of fieldwork, or that is what disciplinary legend says: immersion in the way of life of a people, usually imagined as an isolated faraway people on an island, faraway from where we are anyway. As often happens, the development of an iconic method comes to define the discipline.  You can do anthropology in urban settings of the Western world (apparently). Amongst analytic philosophers though? Analytic philosophy is a tradition of philosophy founded by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore according to disciplinary legend, which has a strong hold on elite university departments in the Anglo-Saxon world - the name is because of the value it places on conceptual analysis, definition for short. If you try to describe the society and culture of analytic philosophers, I think you will have to go beyond the emphases of traditional functionalism (1920s-1960s) and Strathernism (1970s onwards?). In part one… Nevermind. Functionalism, inspired by Durkheim, emphasizes the function of institutions, either to meet individual needs (Malinowski) or to maintain social structure (Radcliffe-Brown). Marilyn Strathernism emphasizes describing a worldview and contrasting it with another worldview: dramatic contrasts usually, such as these people believe that babies are new persons and these other people believe that babies are old persons reborn.  A worldview is composed of propositions, typically general propositions, such as a baby is a new person. Propositions, as shall be understood here, can be true or false. "Paris is the capital of France. True or false?" True. "Paris. True or false?" This does not make sense, because it is a name not a whole proposition. Now in describing the world of analytic philosophy, it seems to me that one has to go beyond the emphases of both to describe general types of things which analytic philosophers do (and other perhaps rarely or never do). I sometimes call them tricks, thinking of a sport, but that is not an ideal word. It may suggest that analytic philosophers all partake in this field with the motivations we standardly associate with a sports person: winning, climbing up the ranks, etc; or that magic is involved, for we speak of magic tricks too.. Some may simply find the rules of analytic philosophy good for achieving better knowledge about certain topics.
        These are moves or ticks I have seen, some of which have no general name, to my knowledge. The names I give to some of them are not polite, I am afraid. Please forgive me.
        Rule f*ck. A set of things are being evaluated, such as solutions to a paradox or accounts of what something is, and an author says, "These are requirements that must be met by an adequate thing in the set…" Then they say that thing 1 does not meet this requirement, thing 2 does not, thing 3 does not, etc., sometimes stopping later and sometimes earlier. An example will be helpful here. Crispin Wright considers the argument that we do not know a lot of things because we could be dreaming, specifies some requirements an adequate response must meet and then proceeds to examine responses.
        Flipflop. Flipflop is when you take a thesis that an author has advanced, say that it is actually ambiguous, distinguish two versions of it (two thesis really), and then you say that one version is trivially true and the other version, the exciting one, is false. For example, Donald Davidson would accept as a trivial truth that the total set of concepts possessed by individual A and individual B may be different. But it is false that human A speaks a language which is in general untranslatable into the language of human B, because the concepts associated with A's language are different and cannot be presented in language B. Davidson does not explicitly flip flop (E.g. use words like "This thesis is ambiguous because…"), but various authors do: this is a famous example though.
Definition-revision loop. This is when you propose a definition of a term (or a specification of a thesis or argument), then object to it, then propose another definition, then object to it, then another definition… And hopefully arrive at a final definition. Derek Parfit in On What Matters considers several specifications of Kant's categorical imperative.
Inconsistent triad (not my term, this one). This is a combination of three propositions which are inconsistent, usually with each being attractive/plausible. Which, if any, are we to give up?
Premise-by-premise reconstruction. Not really my term. Also called a rational reconstruction. This presents an argument as premises (or one premise) and an inference to a conclusion. Sometimes there are earlier inferences involved. A classical example:
1. All men are mortal
2. Socrates is a man
Therefore:
3. Socrates is mortal
After you have done the reconstruction, you often examine each premise and the inferences involved, or sometimes.
Branded counterexample. Someone proposes something and you say, "What about this example?" What you then present (hopefully) is a counterexample. Analytic philosophers sometimes neatly set off their counterexamples, giving them names and making them easy for a browser to detect.
ANYWAY: my general question for Strathern is don't you have to go beyond her (Frazerian?) emphasis on contrasting worldviews and the traditional functionalist emphasis to describe the culture of analytic philosophy? Whether or not the working analytic philosopher has the concepts of types of move labelled (I suspect they do, apart from some extreme cases), the culture itself forces you to emphasize types of philosophical or textual move. Or it forces a sensible person with my background and probably yours too. A number of professions or crafts or trades probably have general types of move which a sensible anthropologist would identify. (In comedy, tell one-liner joke, make pun, etc.) But the established frameworks seem well-established for good reason. You try anthropology and you tend to end up using one or the other.


References
Albarello, J.G.G. 2025. Contra Carl Schmitt: A play-centered alternative to his
existentially distorted concept of politics. Philosophy and Social Criticism. Forthcoming?
Davidson, D. 1973-4. On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association  47: 5-20.
Parfit, D. 2011. On What Matters, Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, C. 1991. Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon. Mind 100 (1): 87-116.
________________
Um, er, against Bourdieu: the easy to predict habitus or "fox possession"  


Author's name (parents' draft): Terence Rajivan Edward (now Doctor)
Dialogue on names (fictional): "Now why do you want a name?" So that my works can be identified - that is one reason. "You need a number really."
Author's name (my first draft): 0161__Rajivan
Abstract. This paper challenges Pierre Bourdieu's claim that successful people's career dispositions cannot be specified. After presenting how I approached stand-up comedy, I consider philosophy, a field on which Bourdieu has written. I present some dispositions of some successful people in philosophy, e.g. "Do not get involved with really really fine details, such as the difference between the word "error" and the word 'mistake.' Maybe there is some difference, but hardly anyone outside of Oxford cares and you need to appeal to the average philosopher." But then I consider two objections, one of which I regard as more of a problem: they seem to do something different when an authority tells them to and this can be quite surprising, such as suddenly working on trans-rights. In the appendix, there is some material about Juliette Binoche and Virginia Woolf.
Draft version: 1 (October 3rd 2025, early draft)


Binoche, Juliette
This is not a good bet


        Pierre Bourdieu has his concepts, one of which is the concept of a habitus. What is a habitus? It is a set of dispositions which one brings to a field, a discipline, an area, an arena, a profession. That is how I usually explain it, but the careful explanation is more detailed. Anyway, I started doing some stand-up comedy in December 2024 and my dispositions were these: "Do a lot of one line jokes and good ones; they don't know you there and so they are going to stop listening unless it is good and straightaway; any long discourse and they will surely get bored." Here is one such joke, in my opinion anyway:
        Why did the snake see a psychoanalyst? Because it was hiss-sterical.
Eventually I did some other material, not one-liners, but there are comedians who rarely use my one-line approach, including ethnic minorities who talk about how they work in really safe scientific fields. Presumably, they work in those fields because (they think) there are black-and-white tests to get in: you can prove your talent by doing the maths or the coding, etc. - essay assessment and the like seem too open to assessment by opinion. That is a puzzle to me: why these brown, yellow, and black people, etc., don't use my comedic strategy but they keep depicting themselves as safe strategists in their main careers? If you do what I do well, whoever runs this field has to let you have your big chance then, isn't it?! Good one, good one, good one, good one… it is pure statistics!
        Bourdieu does not talk about the stand-up comedy field though. He talks about philosophy, which might be important for explaining his academic success. One of his points is that the dispositions involved in success cannot be specified as a set of rules you can follow. If they could be, then someone would surely think: "I really want to succeed in this field and I can master the rules - practice, practice, practice - and then succeed." You are a postgraduate and you have a conversation with a lecturer and you have that way of talking and the conversation flows and you get invited to contribute to an edited collection, etc. Or your writing has that "magical" touch. These dispositions cannot be specified as rules to follow, but they play a crucial role in success apparently! Interesting, but it seems to me that there are plenty of people in philosophy whose dispositions can be specified. Here are five dispositions lots of people probably have:
* Pick a topic which is going to last. Don't pick a topic which is here today and gone tomorrow. Try Hume on what is causation, or is it rational for us to experience fear (or other emotions) in response to works we know are fictional? Etc.
* Do not get involved with really really fine details, such as the difference between the word "error" and the word "mistake." Maybe there is some difference, but hardly anyone outside of Oxford cares and you need to appeal to the average philosopher.
* Publish in journals of high repute: people are not impressed by high quality work in itself; it also needs a stamp of approval from a recognized authority. And you are competitive and what is competition without a system for measuring success?
* Be stable. No one wants to work with unstable types. Unstable talent just shines brightly and then explodes and nobody wants to clear up the mess.
* Publicly respect the local tradition, whatever you privately think. It is what it is: you can depart from it somewhat - each generation does their own thing - but you won't be able to suddenly turn it into something else, very different.
Dispositions like these are across fields, by the way. "Who is going to distinguish between these two psychiatric cases? Hardly anyone," etc. "Focus more on patients of long-term significance." "Rare disorders are worth more." So my argument is this: I can represent the dispositions of some philosophers easily. (I have parents, believe it or not.) Now it is time to consider objections. I shall consider two: not in order of importance to me.
Objection 1. The ghost of Bourdieu might reply: "These are not people I am interested in. They come in, do some work, and leave. I am interested in a higher level than this. In France: Derrida and Foucault. In England: P.F. Strawson and A.J. Ayer. Surely with Strawson an unteachable touch of elegance is unlocking doors." England is famously clubby, so there might be some truth in Bourdieu's perspective, but Strawson's style: someone could explain "rules" for doing it to me at age 21 and then I can do the style. (And if I can, definitely Carrie Jenkins and Amia Srinivasan can and probably Helen Beebee and Joel Smith and maybe Ann Whittle and maybe Kathleen Stock. I suspect so. Whatever she did afterwards, her paper in an early 2000s conference impressed me amongst many competitors. It is a bit harder to be fooled thenceforth.) But someone might deny that these are rules, for example, "Do more abstract with a bit of concrete material, instead of loaded with colourful counterexamples, like a Parfit or Wittgenstein." Anyway, run a merit-based system and probably "everyone" can do this trick.
Objection 2. This objection, I feel, is more of a problem. I noticed various philosophers doing their solid work on well-established topics who suddenly turned to work on trans-rights. Doctor Kathleen Stock is the most prominent example, from my standpoint. Another philosopher I am personally acquainted with is Rebecca Reilly-Cooper. Suddenly she left her Rawlsianism: Rawls is a safe bet, no? Mary Leng: a philosopher of mathematics. Holly Lawford-Smith: she was writing these papers with Stephanie Collins. I suspect an instruction from someone regarded as an authority was issued: go and work on this instead of what you would sensibly choose to work on. The problem for my response to Bourdieu is when you add this disposition:
* Always listen to the expert authority.
These people then potentially become unpredictable. It's "fox possession," if I may misuse a term from psychiatry! You can still present their habitus, I suppose, but if what you are after is prediction, it is a problem if you don't get the authority's message.


Appendix: some autobiography and a Binoche sketch and VIrginia Woolf sketch
I was reading The Guardian and I saw a list of the best films of Marion Cotillard. Then, feeling competitive, I decided to present a comedy sketch idea featuring Juliette Binoche, on my Instagram account. Then I came up with another one. And I already have a new one. She apparently refused to work with Stephen Spielberg because she is interested in the human heart (and he doesn't understand that; BUT you may find that what you count as someone who understands is relative, like whom you count as your friend; "I am not being friends with you any more… Oh no, these people are even worse"). She is in a heart-shaped spaceship. It is shaped like an iconic cartoon heart. She is captain of the ship. Some disturbance occurs. She instructs, "To the upper chamber" and a set of Binoche-alikes move there.
I have got a highbrow sketch for you, by the way. Virginia Woolf addresses philosophers who have never been to the movies in her famous essay: The Cinema. Imagine some of them wanted to sample the new entertainment but "fans" of the new medium queued first, because "We don't want you to write THE PHILOSOPHICAL CINEMA ESSAY. We want Virginia Woolf to!" Have-your-cake-and-eat-it liberalism strikes again. Why is Binoche not a philosopher, by the way? I would bet that some of these philosophers have work which is attended to longer and she is probably interested in long-term success. Can she not do it or could she never? Wikipedia says, "Binoche was born in Paris, the daughter of Jean-Marie Binoche, a director, actor, and sculptor, and Monique Yvette Stalens (born 1939), a teacher, director, and actress." Someone must be of the opinion: "try to clear away the Bourdieusians please; don't produce new ones and then struggle to clear them away!" I am in so much trouble!


References
N.a. n.d. Juliette Binoche. Wikipedia.
Dandre. 2013, A philosopher's guide to Pierre Bourdieu. Available at:
https://recollectingphilosophy.wordpress.com/2013/04/20/a-philosophers-guide-to-pierre-bourdieu/
Hoad, P. 2025. Marion Cotillard at 50: the actor's best films - ranked. Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/film/2025/oct/02/marion-cotillard-at-50-the-actors-20-best-films-ranked
Woolf, V. 1926. The Cinema. Available at: https://sabzian.be/text/the-cinema


Also compare
Juliettebinoche. 2025. Flotilla post. https://www.instagram.com/reel/DPB_feMk-Ki/
Vineeth_sri. 2025. Whatsapp when I try to send voice notes.
https://www.instagram.com/p/DC9KBn5vCdC/
(It looks like the room I once rented at Plymouth Grove.)
________________
From my homemade artificial intelligence essay writer? A response to the 2010 paper "Are Psychiatric Kinds Real?"


Author's name (parents' draft): Terence Rajivan Edward (now Doctor)
Dialogue on names (fictional): "Now why do you want a name?" So that my works can be identified - that is one reason. "You need a number really."
Author's name (my first draft): 0161__Rajivan
Abstract. Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary clarify the question "Are Psychiatric Kinds Real?" as "Do psychiatric concepts refer to natural kinds?" our preliminary understanding of a natural kind being a set of things which form a kind regardless of human belief or interest.  I propose that they need to distinguish between these two questions: "Are psychiatric kinds real?" and "Could psychiatric kinds be real? Is it possible for them to be real?"  They start with the former question but sometimes sound as if they are addressing the latter question. Also I think they need to distinguish between a person who addresses the question while accepting that physics, chemistry, and biology identify natural kinds and a person who does not: one of their arguments against what I call "a natural account of natural kinds" is that it is incompatible with recent accounts of what a species is, but categories like schizophrenia show a long-term robustness and seem to merit a less fashionable defence (put crudely). They use an account which emphasizes explanatory value and predictive success as indicators of a concept which picks out a natural kind but they ignore the existence of multiple psychiatric diagnostic systems, even within Western culture. They want to support the DSM system, it seems. But an explanation for why the National Health Service does not use psychoanalysis, say, is that it is simply too expensive, not that something epistemically-compelling favours the current DSM. The diagnostic system recommended by the UK government is probably the outcome of considerations which do not guarantee its being better than other systems as "pure science." Put snobbishly, it is for the poor.
Draft version: version 1 (6th October 2025)


        I shall respond to Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary's paper "Are Psychiatric Kinds Real?" Do psychiatric concepts carve reality at the joints, to use an ancient metaphor? On the one hand, the paper provides me with useful information and therefore I am glad that it was published. When one approaches the question as a reasonably talented amateur, one fails to realize the mountain that professionals have climbed up. (I suppose the more one has this experience, the more one concludes: always turn to the professionals. But I feel amateur input is important.) On the other hand, I find its position strange in the confidence it has in  the contemporary diagnostic system and more. Does any psychiatrist have this level of confidence or does the working psychiatrist regard it as a changeable thing and the outcome of various considerations? I seem to be encountering numerous people who have, or pose as having, utmost faith in authority: irresponsible levels even.
        There are four points I wish to make, but the first one is a preliminary point, I suppose. Preliminary point: strange assumption. This will take some paragraphs to introduce. Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary start with the question "Are Psychiatric Kinds Real?" They clarify this question using the concept of a natural kind: are psychiatric kinds natural kinds? What is a natural kind? Let us start with an example they give of something which is not a natural kind: a ravcat. Something is a ravcat if it is either a cat or a raven. "Why would anyone have this term and associated concept," you may wonder, "if it even is a concept?" No explanation is given, but I can imagine its having some practical use. Ravens and cats are both regarded as pests in a certain neighbourhood and so are racoons, but one person is good at getting rid of ravens and cats and the other at getting rid of racoons, so one shouts, "Ravcat" when a raven or cat is spotted to call the first person. If our words for raven or cat were much longer, this would be even more practical. "So what are natural kinds?" Here is a natural starting point: a natural kind consists of a set of things which form a kind regardless of whether we believe they form a kind and regardless of our aims.
We are not yet at my first point though. Here is their question:
Are psychiatric kinds real, i.e. are psychiatric kinds natural kinds?
We are familiar with psychiatric terms, such as "schizophrenia" and "autism." These terms are associated with the concepts. The term "schizophrenia" is associated with the concept of schizophrenia. Another term could be associated with this concept, it seems and let us assume this is possible here. For example, the term "splithead" could be slang for schizophrenia. Both this term and the term "schizophrenia" are associated with the same concept then. Now apart from the concept associated with a term, there is what the term refers to. The simple way of thinking about this distinction, for people in our society, is that when an individual uses a term, the concept they associate with it is within their mind, whereas the thing the term refers to is (usually) not. For example, when I use the term "cat" in the sentence "Take your cat away from me," the term is associated with a concept in my mind, the concept of a cat, but what I refer to with it is beyond my mind and myself: it is your cat. (This is the sensible philosophical starting point in our society, even if one wants to erode it in many ways. Professionals in different fields have climbed up their different mountains and I suspect one has to climb back down somewhat sometimes.) Similarly, when a psychiatrist uses the term "schizophrenic," it is associated in his mind with a concept, but it serves to refer to something beyond himself.
The authors of this paper seem to assume this:
(Psychiatric kind assumption) A psychiatric term such as "schizophrenia" refers to a psychiatric kind, either a natural kind or some other kind.
Thus their question: does it refer to a natural kind? But won't various people, including various philosophers, think that if it does not refer to a natural kind, then it simply does not refer? Anyway, I am going to grant this assumption and suppose, with the authors, that there is such a thing as a conventional kind. Psychiatric terms are associated with psychiatric concepts and refer to psychiatric kinds, but these may be conventional kinds rather than "real." I suspect the authors are attempting to somehow start with metaphysics rather than philosophy of language in this paper, but is it doable?
        Two questions.  Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary need to distinguish between these two questions:
1. Are psychiatric kinds real, i.e. are psychiatric kinds natural kinds?
2. Could psychiatric kinds be real, i.e. is it possible for psychiatric terms to refer to natural kinds? (Is there a possible world in which psychiatric terms refer to natural kinds, even if it is not our actual world? If reality were different, could psychiatric terms refer?)
They slide between these at various points. Consider these quotations:
"…whether certain mental categories (Tourette's, schizophrenia, and so on) are natural kinds is distinct from the question…" (2010: 13)
"…our main aim in this paper is to argue that at least some psychiatric categories can in principle be natural kinds." (2010: 13)
The first quotation is about question (a) whereas the second quotation says that they are addressing question (b), contrary to their title.
        Consider an argument for moral error theory, which I don't want to endorse. "The best explanation for differences in moral norms across societies is that moral discourse - sentences attributing moral properties to things, such as "What you did is morally wrong" - is simply false. People who make this argument are not usually interested in whether it could be true, whether moral properties are even possible: whether there could be things with the properties, qualities, features of being morally wrong or being right, etc. Some would reply, "If there were God, there could be actual moral qualities, but there is not. And I am interested in our reality." I think most people who doubt there are psychiatric kinds, or doubt that they are natural kinds , are interested in (a) not (b). They are often moved by similar considerations to the moral error theorist, e.g. "Before we took homosexuality to be a disorder and now we do not and the best explanation for such cultural changes is that psychiatric terms do not refer to natural kinds." This is a consideration which the authors themselves refer to (2010: 24).
        Second point: anti-intellectualism? Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary argue against an account of what a natural kind is which I find a sensible elaboration given our starting point, that a natural kind consists of a set of things which form a kind regardless of whether we believe they form a kind and regardless of our aims:
Thus we might stipulate that natural kinds are kinds that (i) are not relative to human interests, (ii) are not vague, (iii) are not stipulatively defined, and (iv) share an underlying 'real essence'.
(Why is this confusingly called "the stipulative account"? I would have called it our natural account. Nevermind.) Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary argue that this account is unacceptable because it prevents biological kinds from counting as natural kinds:
The stipulative account rules out species as natural kinds on either view of species essences… That a given animal is descended from animals that occupy a particular position on the evolutionary tree is not an intrinsic feature of it, and so cannot constitute the essence of any natural kind to which the animal might belong. (2010: 17)
There are lots of readers who will be interested in the question of whether psychiatric terms refer to natural kinds, readers who do not assume the correctness of contemporary biology and its accounts of what a species is. These include readers coming from the direction of social science thought according to which psychiatry is about producing docile subjects, which I suspect is what most psychiatrists believe anyway. But they probably also include some less suspicious anthropologists and historians, who wonder whether all peoples identify what we call schizophrenia as a distinct disease, even if these people have other accounts of what causes it. After all, schizophrenia is a term that long pre-dates contemporary evolutionary biology.  Crucial question: an argument for the term as picking out a natural kind should not turn on such recent considerations, because we are probably going to use the concept whether these considerations turn out to be false or not? "Each generation will have its own defence"?
Third point: NHS authority? Beebee and Sabarton-Leary rely on an account of natural kinds which emphasizes explanatory value and predictive success: it seems a development of the thought that a concept which has lots of explanatory value and can figure in lots of successful predictions probably refers to a natural kind. I have some trouble understanding it in detail. An obvious problem with arguing that psychiatric kinds are natural kinds in our reality is "There are multiple diagnostic systems, even within Western society, and furthermore multiple systems regarded as respectable by people who cannot be described as amateurs." I suspect the authors, as philosophers, would end up having to accept Jacques Lacan. In Lacan's system, there are three types of people: psychotics, the perverse, and neurotics. Diagnosis of type is based on language use. One can be a type without the stereotypical symptoms: one can be neurotic without a Woody Allen persona, say. Diagnosis is based on language use. The system is simple and elegant and seems a natural successor to a Victorian or Victorianish system which distinguishes between insanity, moral insanity (heinous crimes, no delusional metaphysical beliefs), and neurosis. (By the way, the continental philosophy of language foundation for Lacan looks as if it can be replaced. Also, by the way, regarding multiple frameworks of diagnosis, I asked a psychiatrist of mine, a fourth psychiatrist in such short time, what school she belongs to and she said, "We don't have schools like in the old days. The Freudian school, the Jungian school…" then a long pause, then "I am BIOSOCIAL!")
Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary refer to the DSM: the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder. They sound as if they want to defend the NHS system. But why do the National Health Service use the DSM rather than psychoanalysis, say? Do Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary think the best explanation for its use is that it is the most scientifically-grounded? I asked a psychiatrist about Kierkegaard's case of a man who shouts facts with little attention to social norms, having been released from a mental asylum, whom the great Dane regards as failing to convince anyone that he is not mad. He asked me, "Is he a threat to other people? Is he likely to break the law?" The NHS system reflects a number of considerations, including money (if you are wealthy enough, then use something else), what system of diagnostic classification the average psychiatrist can use (the average being nowhere near the level of Doctor Biosocial, I believe - "I know this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this, this… about Winnicott"), and what is a problem for society, especially the ruling class. "Considerations": one might well speak of forces here, a set of forces the outcome of which is the NHS system.
The message I would take from the 2 months I spent in the NHS in 2023 is: "If you are wealthy enough, then go elsewhere; and if you are not wealthy but have clever people in your social network, which you should do, then get one of them to read up and sort you out." It is worth contemplating that Lacan, with his no-medication approach, was the doctor of choice for legendary modernists, such as Salvador Dali and Picasso. Even if one detests continental philosophy, what really is the best explanation for that? Crude answer which will do under pressure: the NHS for the poor, not for these types.
        
References
Baron-Cohen, S. 2017. Neurodiversity – a revolutionary concept for autism and psychiatry. The Journal of Psychology and Child Psychiatry 58(6): 744-747.
Beebee, H. and Sabarton-Leary, N. 2010. Are psychiatric kinds 'real'? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6(1): 11-27.
Roudinesco, E. 1999. Jacques Lacan. New York: Columbia University Press. 




________________


What does Joseph Raz have to contribute to social anthropology? The unclever answer (And some QuiteBASIC code)


Author's name (parents' draft): Terence Rajivan Edward (now Doctor)
Dialogue on names (fictional): "Now why do you want a name?" So that my works can be identified - that is one reason. "You need a number really."
Author's name (my first draft): 0161__Rajivan
Abstract. Professor Joseph Raz, one of the leading political philosophers of our time and its uncrowned jurist even, died in 2022. I am a specialist in philosophical issues from social anthropology, but I have long admired Raz. Here I focus on The Morality of Freedom. Raz's conception of human nature and his conception of human flourishing inform his political vision, which seems a maximally difficult update of fellow Balliol man F.H. Bradley's 1876 Ethical Studies. His conception is for a society that has experienced industrialization but it quite naturally (for us anyway) leads to an old-fashioned kind of social anthropology, if not strictly entails it: one will be describing roles in a society and how they fit together. ("That is basically structural-functionalism again." Yes, I suppose so.)
Draft version: version 1 (8th October 2025)




"Into its waters I shall wade
This QuiteBASIC that someone made"




        You are a big thinker and all the workers in all the fields, the specialists, the disciplines, the areas, the arenas, ask,  "What do you have to contribute to my field?" Joseph Raz died in 2022. I shall address the question as if social anthropologist and also white woman I suppose (a reference to yesterday's political news, sorry) Professor Jeanette Edwards were asking it: I doubt she is very impressed but she wants to know, insofar as I know her, from memories really. I shall focus on The Morality of Freedom. In chapter 14 of that book, Raz writes:
In western industrial societies a particular conception of individual well-being has acquired considerable popularity. It is the ideal of personal autonomy… The ruling idea behind the idea of personal autonomy is that people should make their own lives. The autonomous person is a (part) author of their own life. The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives. (1986: 369)
This may be a strange passage to many, after youth at least. Doesn't one find oneself forced into this, that and the other, if not by legal coercion then by some other means, finding a few scraps of free choice here and there? The cost of resistance to the pressures is so large. Anyway, let us continue.
        Raz thinks that autonomy requires valuable options in life. If one's only option in life as a youth is becoming a lawyer much like one's hard-hearted father or starving, what choice really is that? Some choices in life are not valuable and the state should discourage them, such as counting grass all day. But it should ensure that individuals have valuable options. Raz seems to think of valuable options as roles in a society. From doing these roles well one can gain the satisfaction of social recognition, which is important for human flourishing. He writes:
There is nothing to stop a person from being both an ideal teacher and an ideal family person. But a person cannot normally lead the life both of action and of contemplation, to use one of the traditionally recognized contrasts, nor can one person possess all the virtues of a nun and of a mother. (1986: 395)
I probably don't quite accept Raz's vision of flourishing in recognized social roles, but anyway let us continue. 
How does one turn Raz into social anthropology, which describes the lives of different peoples? A natural step for us, if not strictly required by cold logic, is  to describe the roles available in different societies, or even within officially one society. As an ancient Greek, one could have led the life of contemplation, or some posh people then could. ("I HATE that word." Sorry.) It was a recognized and valued kind of life. I am not sure if it makes sense for anyone in Manchester, in its pure form. ("There is nobody here. I am just contemplating"?) In the University of Oxford, there is probably a role for providing an updated version of F.H. Bradley, which Raz ended up in and P.F. Strawson before him. Bradley's 1876 Ethical Studies was locked in the attic, metaphorically speaking, by Cambridge fellow Henry Sigwick. What are the features of this strange role? I propose these, not in order of importance.
1. One must write in a fancy way, e.g. lyrically in the case of Raz, elegantly in the case of Strawson. (How do you describe Bradley's own style? Flamingly good? I have not aped that.)
2. One must write in a way that echoes Bradley's Ethical Studies.
3. One must nevertheless evade all charges of plagiarism.
4. One's writings must gain recognition by the intellectual descendants of Henry Sidgwick.
Given the last three conditions, the question arises of whether Sidgwick was wrong in his attack on Bradley. (What can we say though? We are basically tutors for the Sidgwick family!)
        This anthropological project sounds like old-fashioned structural-functionalist social anthropology. One describes the roles of institutions and roles within them and how they all hang-together in a neat self-sustaining system.




Appendix
I set homework, for anyone interested, to generate a lottery ticket winner with eight digits. This is how I did it using an online Basic interpreter I found, called QuiteBASIC. (It generates each of the eight digits randomly. You have to generate the random number differently in various other Basics.)




10 PRINT "WINNING TICKET GENERATOR"
20 PRINT "The winning ticket has these eight digits"
30 LET X = 0
40 LET N = RAND (9)
50 LET N = INT(N)
60 PRINT N;
70 LET X = X + 1
80 IF X < 8 THEN GOTO 40


References
Bradley, F.H. 1927 (second edition). Ethical Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
QuiteBASIC. https://www.quitebasic.com/#
Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sidgwick, H. 1876. Critical notice of Ethical Studies by F.H. Bradley. Mind 1(4): 545-549.
Strawson, P.F. 1963. Freedom and Resentment. Available at:
https://people.brandeis.edu/~teuber/P._F._Strawson_Freedom_&_Resentment.pdf
________________
What does Joseph Raz have to contribute to social anthropology? Part II: a toxic
anthropology based on classical rationality (Appendix: some BASIC homework)


Author's name (parents' draft): Terence Rajivan Edward (now Doctor)
Dialogue on names (fictional): "Now why do you want a name?" So that my works can
be identified - that is one reason. "You need a number really."
Author's name (my first draft): 0161__Rajivan
Abstract. Should philosophers have something to say to others or should they converse amongst themselves? It is a more difficult question than it may seem: "Obviously they should…" This is the second installment in my Joseph Raz and anthropology series. I examine Raz's support for a classical doctrine about value and rationality: that a rational action is one which aims at something objectively valuable. The Enlightenment doctrine of rationality, from Hobbes and Hume, seems much better for doing social anthropology. This is not a clever paper, by the way.
Draft version: version 1 (8th October 2025)


"So we are in the age of Internet
But it will not be so different, I bet"


I suspect some of these Oxford philosophers: they think that if you need philosophical help, we should help you. You are experiencing a crisis in your worldview or you are a worker in another discipline facing problems of a foundational nature. But I know you: you will listen to them and then end up obliquely communicating discontent by means of an article which approximately realizes their recommendations: "Look, this is not what we are after." Then what? Let's do some repetition from last time, changing whom "You" refers to, I believe. You are a big thinker and all the workers in all the fields, the specialists, the disciplines, the areas, the arenas, ask, "What do you have to contribute to my field?" Joseph Raz died in 2022. I shall address the question as if social anthropologist Professor Jeanette Edwards were asking it: I doubt she is very impressed but she wants to know, insofar as I know her, from memories really.


Repetition over. I shall focus on his essay collection Engaging Reason. There Raz argues for a classical position on value: an action is rational if and only if it aims at something objectively valuable. (Knowing Raz, are there some subtle qualifications? They shall be left aside here.) Valuable activities include playing in an orchestra, joking about experiences with friends, reading a rewarding novel, maintaining one's health by means of playing sport, doing charitable work, helping people learn about the nation's heritage, drafting a law to reduce littering, and more. Counting the number of grass blades all day is not an activity which aims at anything objective valuable, it seems. By the way, we live in a time of plentiful grass, people of the future. The classical doctrine is a problem for social anthropology, I think, given its attempt to make sense of different societies. A question about the doctrine is: what do we make of these people who do not seem receptive to anything we find valuable? We experience certain activities as valuable and others as not so, but what is going on with them? 


If one tries to combine social anthropology with the classical doctrine, one might draw attention to how other cultures are sometimes receptive to things of value that we fail to recognize as valuable. Our own literary history will do as an example. It seems the dominant view in the early 19th century was that nature is objectively valuable and industry was an evil, destroying it. But the modernists were more receptive to the beauty of the industrial world and machines and more. Here are some lines from a poet I like ("We are taking this faux schoolbook poetry away"?), from a poem entitled "A Bird Speaks":
You think I am a pretty little bird, don't you,
Poised here on the tip of the room,
A delicate silhouette for a limpid sky
Recklessly speckled with the fingerprints of the sunset.
A dainty picture.
Perhaps you will walk home thinking of me
And write a little poem:
A pretty little bird
Delicately poised
Against the sky…
Just so,
You are human,
And hence sentimental…
I beg your pardon, Madam,
But I prefer a little dust pile on Catherine Street…
Oh yes, it is a good dust pile! One society is receptive to one set of things which are valuable and another society, or a later stage of the same society, is receptive to a non-identical set: dustpiles and urban streets and more. One can enter into their receptivity perhaps. (I wonder if this poet actually hates dust piles and thinks, "Stupid bird.")


But the anthropologist who assumes the classical doctrine will soon run into puzzles, I think. What is the objective value that these people who spend all their time in a video game arcade aim at? One imagines Kathleen Stock singing a variation on Pulp's Common People: they are wasting away their time in immediate gratifications, to forget about the deal they have got in life. In some cases, the classically-driven anthropologist may become very interventionist: these are young people whose lives can be turned around ("As long as they don't come into our space"?). The old accusation that anthropology is the handmaiden of colonialism is likely to rear its head. (The top level of anthropology in the past could probably make it all work, but what about the rest?)


I remember in 2019 I took a course in Early Modern Philosophy. Professor Jeanette Edwards had to approve my outside unit choices, and she said that will be a good course for you, you can learn about things which are at the foundation of modern social anthropology, or similar words to that. This is what I know, though it might not be from that academic year. In the Enlightenment, a new doctrine of rational action emerged. According to this doctrine, in its simple form, any action which realizes your desires is rational. Are your desires for the objectively valuable: this is irrelevant for assessing rationality. The doctrine is associated with Hume and sometimes, further back, with Hobbes. The Enlightenment doctrine greatly reduces the risk of saying, "Why are they doing this? Are they rational?" But normally a rational action will involve sensible choices for satisfying one's desires. If your desire is to win the approval of as many philosophers as possible and your evidence is that releasing essay A will do this but you release essay B, then you are not acting rationally. While the Enlightenment doctrine prevents saying, "Why are they aiming at these stupid ends? They are
irrational," it does not clearly protect against "These people are irrational because they take insensible means towards satisfying their desires." Sir James Frazer spent a lot of effort addressing this charge of irrationality.


Whoever runs social anthropology is likely to find the classical doctrine to be toxic: it leads to some kind of anthropology but a maximum toxicity kind? When the disciplines interact, they are likely to trouble each other considerably. "You are making this assumption, which I disagree with": how are we supposed to function without that? I am not sure if social anthropology has developed a doctrine of rational action which suits its level of liberalism and anti-imperialism, because even the Enlightenment doctrine risks "You need to be more scientific." Some peoples might say, "Why would we trust you? We are already quite messed up from your interventions. We used to roam around freely." Remember how I used to roam freely all over the school of social sciences and anywhere else in the university really.


Appendix
I was discussing with a philosopher how some critics of economics want economics in
words, not in maths. And he said, "Mathematical symbols are words." Who but a
philosopher would say this, I thought. This is some coding homework if you are
interested. You can use QuiteBASIC. Can you write a program which detects how many
words there are in a sentence? Numbers count as words too, in this context. My a-bit
paranoid view of analytic philosophers who do not justify the right-hand margin (as I
have not done in this appendix) is that it is nothing to do with the famous English love of
the irregular: instead they imagine someone such as myself wrote the code which
makes it straight.


References
Bourgois, P. 2003 (second edition, first edition 1996). In Search of Respect: Selling
Crack in El Barrio. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bradley, F.H. 1927 (second edition, first edition 1876). Ethical Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(Raz is updating this. See an appendix to his essay, "Pleasure for pleasure's sake." Out with the
old and in with the new is of the essence of the West? )
Hume, D. 1739-40. Of the influencing motives of the will. In A Treatise of Human Nature.
Available at:
https://davidhume.org/texts/t/2/3/3
Pink, T. 2004. Free Will. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pulp. 2011 (originally 1995). Pulp - Common People. Available on YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yuTMWgOduFM
QuiteBASIC. https://www.quitebasic.com/#
Raz, J. 1999. Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
RIding, L. 1992. A Bird Speaks. From First Awakenings: The Early Poems. (Eds, E.
Friedmann, Alan J. Clark and Robert Nye). Manchester Carcanet.
("You should write a will." Do I need to find posthumous editors or is it irrelevant? What a mess!)




________________


What does Joseph Raz have to contribute to social anthropology? Part III: conceptual analysis  within specialist domains (And some coding homework)


Author's name (parents' draft): Terence Rajivan Edward (now Doctor)
Dialogue on names (fictional): "Now why do you want a name?" So that my works can be identified - that is one reason. "You need a number really."
Author's name (my first draft): 0161__Rajivan
Abstract. Professor Joseph Raz died in 2022. He was cast as a big thinker and in more practical disciplines compared to pure metaphysics, such as legal philosophy, so people in the social sciences are sure to ask, "Does he have anything to contribute to my field?" I focus on social anthropology and presented a third contribution. Raz argues against analysing political and legal concepts by examining how they are used by ordinary speakers, rather he focuses on how they are used in specialist discourses. I am not sure if this is useful for social anthropology in its typical contexts, but it is useful for anthropology at home when focusing on the culture of a profession. I use economics as an example. Warning (for University of Cambridge only?): not yet a clever paper but my cleverish gist example reappears when discussing economics!
Draft version: version 1 (10th October 2025, EE wifi having a "tantrum")


        This is the third part in a series. What happened on previous episodes?  Some repetition. You are a big thinker and all the workers in all the fields, the specialists, the disciplines, the areas, the arenas, ask,  "What do you have to contribute to my field?" Joseph Raz died in 2022. I shall address the question as if social anthropologist and also white woman I suppose Professor Jeanette Edwards were asking it: I doubt she is very impressed but she wants to know, insofar as I know her, from memories really. I shall focus on The Morality of Freedom. Repetition over.
Philosophers have long been associated with projects of definition, taking some word we ordinarily use but associated with a general concept and investigating definitions of it. Oxford philosophers of the mid-twentieth century were famous for focusing on the subtleties of ordinary language use. They would consider examples of how a word is used and (sometimes) consider whether it can be defined. In The Morality of Freedom, Joseph Raz argues against this focus. He takes the word "freedom"as his example. He presents four examples of its use, rejecting one as irrelevant to projects of political and legal philosophy. Here is an example of a relevant use:
A gunman forces a person to hand over his money by threatening his life. He has no choice and his choice is not a free one. Nor would we say that he acted out of his free will or freely when he handed over the money. Nor was he free to do anything else. (1986: 15)
This is the sort of use which I think Raz thinks is irrelevant:
I want to go to the party tonight. There is no legal restriction on doing so and it would be irrational for there to be. But you say that I should help grandma tonight and you have made a good argument for why this is morally required of me. I am not free now!
But there is nothing wrong with this as a piece of ordinary discourse. Furthermore, who has not encountered people who become extremely disagreeable in the face of moral requirements one cannot obtain an enforceable legal contract for? As I understand Raz, to avoid getting wrapped in developing definitions which cover irrelevant uses which are nevertheless acceptable within ordinary discourse, we should focus on specialist discourses, for example how the concept of freedom is used in legal and political discourse: in constitutions, by lawyers, by the tradition of political philosophy.
        Is this of use for social anthropology? The societies that social anthropologists famously study involve far less specialization than in contemporary industrialized societies and there are far fewer people, quite often scattered over a large territory. This gives rise to a question of whether Raz's contribution is useless for most anthropologists. I suspect it is! But it is useful for social anthropologists doing fieldwork in industrialized societies.
A case study. I had a desk in economics for almost seven years at the University of Manchester. During that time I did research into an axiom relied upon by the mainstream neo-classical school and also certain other schools (the Austrian school uses it, I believe): that a rational person who prefers option A over option B and option B over option C also prefers option A over option C. This is called transitivity of preferences and is an area of interest between philosophy and economics. There are well-known counterexamples, where ordinarily we think that someone is rational but they do not meet the transitivity requirement. Also there is this attempted counterexample by me from a paper which I deleted; it does not work I suspect. Transitivity of preferences, more fully, requires transitivity of indifference: if you are indifferent between options A and B and also between B and C, then rationality requires you to be indifferent between A and C. I gave this counterexample. A reader of essays (academic papers or newspaper articles or magazines, etc.) is gist-oriented. They don't care about fine details, just the gist: the big picture, the main message, the take home point, the essence. They compare essays A and B and are indifferent, because the gist of these is the same to them. They compare essays B and C and are indifferent, because the gist of these is the same to them. But they are not indifferent between A and C. In a choice between these two, they prefer A. I propose that this can be rational by our ordinary standards, but economists assume it is irrational, because it violates transitivity of indifference. (I have another one; I submitted it to a fancy Greek philosophy of science journal some years ago. It's good )
I asked various postgraduates (PhD students) what they thought of standard counterexamples to transitivity of preferences. One encounters answers which are little known to philosophers interested in the topic. One which I have reported before is: we cannot do the utility function without this axiom. Another reaction, from an overseas Chinese student, was: this is how we use the concept of rationality in economics. This fits better with Raz's approach: "Maybe there is a conflict with how the word 'rationality' is ordinarily used but economics is a specialist discourse and this is the definition within that discourse." I imagine a lot of postgraduates in economics would be attracted to this response. If you tried to do social anthropology in various specialist fields in the West, you would find Raz useful: because he anticipates this kind of reaction and proposes that you proceed with conceptual analysis.


Appendix
Some homework, if you are interested. You can use QuiteBASIC, if you want. Take a sentence as input. Identify if a sentence is missing a full stop (a period, in North American English), a question mark or an exclamation mark or a closed quotation mark. If it is, then tell the user.


References
Edward, T.R. Last revision, 2021? Transitivity of preferences and well-known counterexamples. Available on academia.edu (and PhilPapers):
https://www.academia.edu/38868273/Transitivity_of_preferences_and_well_known_counterexamples
Edward, T.R. 2022. Is mainstream economics against common sense? Problems of scale and transitivity too. Paper I deleted from PhilPapers. Contained the gist example.
Imbruglia, N. 2009. Natalie Imbruglia - Torn (Official Video). (The man is various official/dominant Internet systems?) Available on YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VV1XWJN3nJo
QuiteBASIC. https://www.quitebasic.com/#
Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
________________


Analytic philosophy's feminine side? A platitudes of Victoria Beckham paradox
Author: Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. According to Guardian journalist Lucy Mangan, a documentary about global fashion and music superstar Victoria Beckham is extremely boring. It is three hours of platitudes. (Here A platitude is an obvious truth not worth saying in conversation.) Why does she not make sparkling quotes like Marilyn Monroe? She could say, "I always look moody because then people will never know when I'm actually moody." I consider three solutions: (a) Earlier celebrities did not have sufficient evidence of the robustness of non-literary work, whereas now they do. (b) Any quotable lines would be credited to someone else – a Jan Narvesonlike problem. (c) It would cause a counter-reaction without quote misattribution.
Draft version: version 1 (9th October 2025, quick version, to avoid counter-reaction)


We live in an age of celebrity, or we did. Is it disappearing with the impact of technology? Celebrities are mainly famous film actors, popular music performers, and some television actors (and actresses – I am including them under the heading). Perhaps once upon a time, things were different. The celebrities were bright young things: a clique of posh minor literary figures. Behold Edith Sitwell: is that not a celebrity from a previous era? Was she the Victorian Beckham of that day? I suspect her talent levels are much much higher, but I don't want to devalue anyone. Anyway, in a British newspaper called The Guardian, Lucy Mangan says, "This documentary was a golden opportunity to show VB at her drily entertaining best. Instead, we get three hours of platitudes. What a maddening waste of her personality." Platitudes: obvious truths? By the way, Victoria Beckham made her name as a member of a musical band called The Spice Girls, then she became even more famous by marrying football star and poster boy David Beckham, since which she regularly the subject of newspaper articles. She then added a fashion range to her achievements. She is nicknamed Posh Spice, so I may well not need to defend her having a paper devoted to her on this database.
Celebrities from times past came up with clever quotes, didn't they? For example, Marilyn Monroe said, "Hollywood is a place where they will pay you 1000 dollars for a kiss and 50 cents for your soul." Why doesn't Victoria Beckham? She presumably wants as much fame as possible and the rational way to get that is surely to add some quotes to her productions. It is a paradox.
(a) Victoria Beckham wants to be as famous as possible.
(b) The rational way for her to pursue this end is to make quotable lines, as well.
(c) She does not make quotable lines.
Why not? I shall present three solutions.
Medium confidence solution! A solution to the paradox is that celebrities from times past were unsure of the robustness of the non-traditional mediums they worked in, such as film. Is this going to last? They decided to try to force themselves into the literary world somehow, making quotes and the like. Beckham, in contrast, has been provided with evidence that the mediums she works in are robust: her long-term future is safe. But still, if she wants to be as famous as possible, can she not be more famous by making some quotable lines. This solution does not work.
Quote misattribution solution. A second solution is that the quotes will be attributed to someone else. She will have a Jan Narveson problem. He came up with this argument against Rawls's difference principle. "What's that?" you ask. The difference principle, put simply, says that in a choice between two economic systems, economy A and economy B, we should prefer the economy which is better for the worst off. For example, if the worst that one can get in economy A is $10 a week and the worst in economy B is 11$, then we should prefer economy B. The difference principle, as normally interpreted, will allow us to pay talented people more if it benefits the worst off. A person is interested in gardening or being an inventor and slightly prefers the former but one pays them more to be an inventor, because that is necessary to produce a greater benefit for the worst off. Now the difference principle is advocated in the name of greater equality, but why can you not say: "Look talented person, why don't you just be an inventor anyway, without a higher salary, because you care about equality? It is only necessary, because you don't care, but this society is meant to involve a commitment to equality"? Narveson put his objection in a fun dialogue: he probably realized it was important. G.A. Cohen quotes it in chapter one of his book Rescuing Justice and Equality: the opening. But it has strangely become associated with Cohen. Cohen is more famous in political philosophy than Narveson, but this area is largely about achieving social justice and is the misattribution social justice? (Narveson was a bad man and they are vigilantes? Judge these people by what they do, not what they say? They are essentially in the erasing business and happen to argue for this political position…) For example, Jonathan Quong discusses the argument as if Cohen invented it. But Cohen has taken strong measures to ensure that readers associate it with Narveson. Maybe Victoria Beckham believes that this will happen to any good quotes she produces: they will be attributed to someone else, to G.A. Cohen perhaps. This solution gets involved in complicated ways with proposition (b). It is not rational for her to produce quotable lines for the end of achieving fame if she has sufficient evidence that this will not achieve that end. (But why not risk a few quotes still?)


Counter-reaction solution. The counter-reaction solution is that Victoria Beckham would be subject to a counter-reaction which does not involve quote misattribution. For example, her family would irritate her or irritate her more than usual. [Have you seen the video for this song Torn (viewed as the average viewer would view it, should I add)?] By the way, my Internet access flickered while I was using another online word processor and it was difficult to return to where I was. Back to google docs?




References
Cohen, G.A. 2008. Rescuing Justice and Equality.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Imbruglia, N. 2009. Natalie Imbruglia - Torn (Official Video). Available on YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VV1XWJN3nJo
Mangan, L. 2025. Victoria Beckham review – meticulously constructed … but extremely boring. The Guardian 9th October 2025. Available at:
https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2025/oct/09/victoria-beckham-documentary-review-netflix
Quong, J. 2010. Justice Beyond Equality. Social Theory and Practice 36(2): 315-340.
(I went to a restaurant in Chinatown yesterday. A young Chinese colleague of mine had told me that the Chinese food here is good but not good enough. I asked the waiter what would happen if you increased the level.  I received an orange bag which said PanAsia. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7… 10!)
________________


Comparison of Timothy Gowers on mathematical "autism" and kinship algebra for Jeanette Edwards (and QuiteBASIC code for an assumptions detector)


Author: Terence Rajivan Edward (or 161__Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. Professor Timothy Gowers, in his very short introduction, to mathematics tells us that he encounters young maths students with raw mathematical powers, brains that seem to work simply differently to normal. "Have they got autism?" we are sure to ask. Anyway, he stresses that this is not crucial for success in mathematics and numerous mathematicians achieve without it. Meanwhile, Professor Jeanette Edward remembers a youth of dry kinship diagrams and prefers a different kind of kinship. I suspect she is privately keen on anthropologists with a raw power for anthropology, i.e. no kinship-algebra-loving autistics. I argue that she is making a (slight) mistake. Interaction with other disciplines today requires having some "formal skills": you go to economics and the economist says, "You have worked in a formal language. We can talk," even to someone such as myself. The average logician, the average computer scientist: they share this view. It is a scientific age!
 Draft version: version 1 (11th October 2025)


        Some experience. Once a student told me, this is just clever stuff, when it was Parfit week in ethics, back in 2012. That is important for us: we find it difficult to realize that Parfit is clever! ("Terence, I am a grown-up now; I will do classic Walt Disney as you sensibly recommended, but there are limits: I cannot accept Parfit is clever!") I mentioned Timothy Gowers to a Russian in economics who switched from mathematics and how Gowers has a Fields medal: he said that Gowers must be really good at mathematics then. And my fourth psychiatrist said that I was clever, which might have been a message for the third person in the room. Believe it or not: this patient is clever.
A comparison. I read some of Timothy Gowers' introduction to mathematics until I got wrapped up with his rational reconstruction. Earlier he talks about students with a raw power for mathematics. Their brains seem to simply work differently. "Do they have autism?" we are sure to ask. Anyway, he says that it is not crucial for mathematics. People without that are welcome and do well. He referred to hard-working strategist Andrew Wiles.
But what about Jeanette Edwards in social anthropology? Jeanette Edward remembers the dry kinship diagrams of her youth and prefers a different kind of kinship study, all about the lived experience of people, or their descriptions of it, and a touch of analysis: the assumptions underpinning their descriptions. I like that too. I suspect her private preference is for anthropologists with a raw power for social anthropology: raw power's being good social skills. One problem with this is that disciplinary isolation is a problem; and to overcome it you probably need to talk with others who work in a formal language: a formal system of symbolism. In the school of social sciences, University of Manchester, these include economists with their mathematics and philosophers with their symbolic logic. It matters a lot to the average logician or average economist that you too have struggled with a formal language: "We can have a conversation."
I would warn Professor Jeanette Edwards that some of the anthropology in words is probably going to be turned into some kind of formal language. I look at this and think: this probably needs to be formalized. BUT if you ask me to do it, I might learn normal mathematics instead!
Please don't take some toxic option faced with this probable mathematical direction. I know someone and if you say to her, you have to do what that person does, she might well say, "I will become a beggar instead."


Appendix
Some code in QuiteBASIC to detect assumptions. You can recode slightly for other BASICs. Add $ signs, remove "Let" maybe.


10 PRINT "Computers make existential assumptions explicit."
20 INPUT "What is your sentence?"; S
30 PRINT "Imperfect attempt to specify assumptions, okay."
40 PRINT
50 LET X = 0
60 LET A = 1
70 LET L = LEN(S)
80 PRINT "Assumption "; A
90 PRINT "There is ";
100 LET C = MID(S, X, 1)
110 PRINT C;
120 IF C = " " THEN GOTO 160
130 LET X = X + 1
140 IF X = L THEN END
150 GOTO 100
160 LET A = A + 1
170 LET X =  X + 1
180 PRINT
190 GOTO 80


References
Edwards, J. 2000. Born and Bred. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gowers, T. 2002. Mathematics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
https://www.quitebasic.com/


________________


Poetry smuggling paper: can Davidson make sense of metaphors which, when taken literally, are trivially true?


Author: Terence Rajivan Edward (or 161__Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. This paper tries to present Donald Davidson on metaphor in a way which appears more systematic than his own celebrated essay. On this interpretation, he uses his principle of charity to make sense of metaphors: taken literally, a metaphor is patently false or trivially true, but because there is normally no reason to utter such a statement and because we must assume fellow speakers to have largely true beliefs, we take it as a metaphor. I consider the concern that Davidson's principle is much better for processing metaphors which are patently false, when taken literally, rather than trivially true. We must interpret charitably and charitable interpretation requires us to treat speakers as having largely true beliefs by our lights and the best way to meet this requirement when faced with some patently false statements is treat them as not intended to be taken literally. But what is the situation with metaphors which, when taken literally, are trivially true? I give an example where Davidson's system can cope with this. The interpreter must consider why a trivially true statement was uttered and charity requires preferring some other explanation to: the uttered falsely believed that you did not know this.
Draft version: version 1 (11th October 2025)
Advertisement: coming soon, hopefully, my own system on metaphor!


        I suppose everyone thinks Davidson has a system, but when you read his papers you often have to think: how does this topic he is now treating, and what he has to say about it, relate to his system. I want to present Donald Davidson on metaphor as a development of his system and then address a concern.
        Davidson is against the view that what the words of a person mean is determined by what they intend for it to mean. Sentence meaning is something public and Davidson develops this idea as follows: the meaning of a sentence is the meaning that a radical interpreter would attribute to it. (See Talmage 1996.) A radical interpreter knows one language and learns another from scratch, observing when native sentences are assented to and dissented from, and making proposals about what they mean. For example, the interpreter observes that a certain sentence is so far used by speakers only in the presence of a rabbit. The interpreter attributes the meaning: there is a rabbit.
        In order for the radical interpreter to proceed with their project of scientific language learning, they must assume that native speakers have largely true beliefs, by the interpreter's lights. For example, if the radical interpreter regards these speakers as potentially hallucinating that there is a squirrel whenever they face a rabbit, she would have to entertain the hypothesis that this sentence used only in the presence of a rabbit actually means "There is a squirrel." The interpreter will make no progress with language learning unless they exclude such hypotheses and to do so they must assume that the people being interpreted do not suffer from such delusions, and more generally have largely true beliefs, by the interpreter's lights.
Davidson characterizes the requirement to interpret others as having largely true beliefs as a requirement to interpret charitably. Now he thinks that metaphors when taken literally are either patently false or trivially true. An example of the patently false is: ice - the sleep of winter's waters. Can a radical interpreter attribute the belief that ice literally is the sleep of winter's waters to a native? A belief is not just attributed as an individual item but as a part of a whole set of beliefs. One of the other beliefs involved in taking the native as speaking literally and sincerely here is that water can sleep, and why would anyone think that? Davison as radical interpreter will surely regard this as false, as patently false. (Let's assume all radical interpreters are the same here!) And you cannot regard this as patently false without regarding the ice definition statement when taken literally as patently false. The rational move then, given the requirement to interpret charitably, is to interpret the statement as not intended to be taken literally, in this case intended as a metaphor. One can then further interpret what the metaphor is trying to convey or simply does convey: a task which Davidson thinks goes on forever.
Now Davidson thinks that some metaphors, when taken literally, are not patently false, rather they are trivially true. Consider visiting a museum displaying sharks; the guide makes a cutting remark, to which your friend says, "This is indeed a shark museum." It seems a metaphor to you, describing the guide as a shark. But why does Davidson's radical interpreter take this to be a metaphor? Taken literally, it is true and she must attribute largely true beliefs to the native in order to learn the language (must interpret charitably) and one true belief cannot be attributed without attributing many others (holism). Everything is fine, it seems. Here one might introduce this: the interpreter must also consider the best explanation for why a truth was said and if she takes the best explanation to be "to inform you that this is a shark museum" she will have to attribute false beliefs, such as that the utterer of the truth does not believe that you believe that it is a shark museum, and the radical interpreter should not do that if there is alternative explanation available. An alternative explanation is that the utterer intends to convey something else than the trivial truth that this is literally a shark museum. 
        By the way, we sometimes think that a metaphorical statement has a literal and a metaphorical meaning. But Davidson thinks that metaphors have simply a literal meaning; but they prompt us to think of other things than the literal, though the number of other things we can sensibly associate with a metaphor is endless, he thinks.


References
Davidson, D.  1978. What Metaphors Mean. Critical Inquiry 5(1): 31-47.
Edward, T.R. 2022. Poetry smuggling in a liberal society. Available at PhilPapers:
https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWPSI.pdf
Talmage, C.J.L. 1996. Davidson and Humpty Dumpty. Noûs 30(4): 537-544.
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On the preference for first cousin marriage: Kantianism, utilitarianism, and structural-functionalism


Author: Terence Rajivan Edward (or 161__Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. This paper responds to an interesting government news video which begins with British politician Lucy Powell but then considers a debate about whether to ban first cousin marriage, which a community or set of communities in the United Kingdom show a preference for: there is a suggestion that the preference spread through migration from rural Pakistan. The video contrasts the scientific recommendation of Richard Holden (ban it on grounds of health risk) with the empathetic recommendation of Iqbal Mohammed (be sensitive to entrenched community practice and perspectives and introduce genetic screening for couples at risk). I contest the adequacy of this contrast, because of values involved in justifying Holden's approach (valuing health risk reduction above giving greater free choice of partner) and the scientific research involved in justifying Mohammed's approach, including social science (learn their perspectives, use genetic screening). I suspect utilitarianism allows for Mohammed's approach. Mohammed's approach seems closer to social anthropology, but I introduce structural-functionalist social anthropology, which does not depend on community explanations for why there is the preference. It is not empathetic. A structural-functionalist would raise the puzzle of how a society which implements this preference can maintain a coherent social structure given the health risk, and address it: obvious options being deny that there is such a health risk or identify a compensatory value for maintaining the social structure (e.g. binding an extended family together, ensuring they do better as an economic unit).
Draft version: version 1 (14th October 2025).


A parliamentary debate
        This morning I watched a video about a debate within the United Kingdom government, amongst other things. Within the debate, it is suggested that a preference for first cousin marriages has spread from rural Pakistan to communities in the United Kingdom. A politician, Richard Holden, proposes to ban first cousin marriages on grounds of health, whereas another politician, Iqbal Mohammed, says that we need to understand why the practice continues and be sensitive to the entrenched ways of a community and proposes genetic screening for couples at risk. The video characterizes Holden's approach as scientific and Mohammed's as empathetic. I don't agree with these characterizations, but shall only say a little about this here. Regarding Holden as scientific, one cannot validly move simply from scientific evidence of health risk to health policy. Values are involved, as we know from Hume, and probably controversial values: "If I want to marry my cousin, it is my choice, even if it is unhealthy," someone might say. "Are you saying that science is value free?" If the policy is the outcome of applying controversial values within the United Kingdom, then it cannot qualify as science I think (that is sufficient for it not to qualify): there is an ingredient of science, let's concede, but controversial values play a role. The video later shows awareness of a likely charge of paternalism directed at Holden. Regarding Mohammed's thinking, a government policy based on it must nevertheless be based on reliable research about community thinking, which is science in a broad sense. And in a narrower sense, genetic screening is an application of science, no? So it is misleading to say that this is the empathetic approach, in contrast to Holden's scientific approach. But it is a brief news video in need of attention: what else to do but make the striking contrast?
        Political philosophers will probably engage with the debate by considering how Kantianism, especially in its modern formulation of Rawlsianism, and utilitarianism apply to it. Kantianism emphasizes autonomy and therefore consent, but how does this help? On the one hand, with Holden's recommended ban, one does not get to marry whoever (or whomever!) one consents to marry, even if they are willing. Even if you consent to marry your first cousin and they are willing, you cannot. That seems a mark against consent and autonomy: being the author of one's life (Raz 1986). On the other hand, a child born from a first cousin union is at a higher risk of having a disorder and they did not consent to this and we should assume a disorder will reduce their autonomy. Kantianism is struck with conflicting considerations, given its core value. Utilitarianism, in its classical version, tells us to favour the policy which most increases total happiness. That is surely Mohammed's recommended policy. One allows people the happiness that comes from greater liberty, communities the happiness that comes from continuing with their entrenched practices, and there is genetic screening to prevent disorders from first cousin unions. But presumably tax payers have to stump up money for genetic screening. That is a cost to overall happiness, I assume. "Introduce a ban instead, if it is cheaper," someone will surely think. The practice would simply go underground, I suspect. So it seems utilitarianism overall favours no ban; but can the government spend any more money? It asked me for an extra £30 recently. ("I assume it cannot do that: the council tax is fixed in March." Whatever! What about "It is better for long-term integration to have a ban"? These white non-Pakistani non-Muslims look as if they are the outcome of close unions to me!) I am not convinced one can do government policy without utilitarianism, and crude simplifying assumptions to avoid objections such as "How can we measure overall happiness?" although the people at Harvard surely intended their updated Kantian political philosophies to be applied to debates such as this.
Anyway, I don't want to take sides in this debate. I want to present a way of doing social anthropology which attends less to the perspectives of people involved on why there is this first cousin marriage preference. It is old-fashioned but it is interesting.


Structural-functionalism again
British social anthropology has been associated with intensive fieldwork since the 1920s, when it became compulsory. The anthropologist, as iconically portrayed, visits a small exotic society and participates in the way of life there for an extended period - a year at least - and reports back on their customs and beliefs. The 1920s also brought new theoretical frameworks to the forefront, where they remained until the 1960s, or at least one of these did. There was Malinowski's functionalism, according to which all societies must meet the same human needs but have different institutional arrangements for doing so. And there was Radcliffe-Brown's structural-functionalism inspired by Durkheim, which was certainly dominant for decades, according to which the institutions in a society form a coherent structure and each functions to ensure that the structure is maintained. Functions are attributed based on their effects on social structure, regardless of whether an individual involved in an institution says that this is the function: e.g. psychiatry functions to maintain social order by turning dangerous individuals for our society into docile ones - such a function may well be attributed regardless of how psychiatrists characterize their work. (The apt word "docile" comes from French historian-philosopher Michel Foucault, but the idea that psychiatry has this effect was surely around earlier.) The potential disregard for the views of individuals involved makes this NOT AN EMPATHETIC approach.
Structural-functionalism addresses puzzles such as how does a certain society maintain its social structure given pervasive witchcraft accusations: why does it not fall apart into conflict? (Evans-Pritchard 1937; Jarvie 1967) A structural-functionalist observing a society in which a preference for first cousin marriage is prevalent would ask: how does this society maintain its cohesive structure over time, given the health risks of this practice to future generations? Won't people rebel or leave? Three answers suggest themselves immediately:
(A1) The health risks are simply not that high to trouble the social structure itself. (The number of unhealthy offspring from such unions is low, much lower than UK news reports suggest.)
(A2) The health risks are significant but there is a high compensatory value for maintaining the social structure.
(A3) A hybrid approach: the health risks are between what A1 and A2 say and there are compensations for maintaining the social structure but lower than A2.
What the social anthropologist who accepts A2 will do is identify a compensatory function of the practice for maintaining social structure regardless of what members of the society think: they may or may not believe in this. For example, first cousin marriage strengthens ties between parts of a family and thus enables them to work better as an economic unit, which is necessary given how this society is organized. The structural-functionalist is not surprised if a variety of justifications are given for a practice, from a variety of individuals. One person emphasizes the strengthening of family ties as something good in itself ("Families should be close-knit"); another person emphasizes economic gains; a third person emphasizes religious reasons (says, "We are Muslims," as if it were a holy order to marry one's cousin); and a fourth person anti-imperialism ("We are not a Western family; and we do not want to open ourselves up to marrying the white man"). The structural-functionalist makes no appeal to God and works with the assumption that social practices contribute to maintaining social structure and then addresses the puzzle. (Interestingly, the structural-functionalist who pursues A1 or A3 is likely to get involved with biology too.)
        I am presenting this approach mainly to correct an assumption. The assumption is this: what social anthropology will have to say is surely empathetic, i.e. it emphasizes the perspective of those studied. That sounds good for disciplinary identity: "These people are all about biological facts, whereas we actually empathize!" But it is misleading. (Also from my experience, a fieldworker amongst one of the communities with the first cousin marriage preference is likely to encounter other justifications from individuals involved apart from the well-known justifications and some of these may be of interest.)


References
Daily NEWS. 2025. Watch Lucy Powell HUMILIATED by the Reform UK leader in front of thousands right in Parliament! Available on YouTube:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V2Q3fRr57qA
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 1937. Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jarvie, I.C. 1967. On Theories of Fieldwork and the Scientific Character of Social Anthropology. Philosophy of Science 34(3): 223-242.
Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.
Raz, J. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rawls, J. 1999 (revised edition). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
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The advice to specialize versus human–against-machine essay competitions


Author. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. Since the Enlightenment, most famously in the writings of Adam Smith, we have been advised to specialize. And specialization is recommended within a field too. One "man" deals with metaphysics, another with the foundations of political constitutions, etc. But it is predictable that with the rise of essay writing machines (or software), that there will be human versus essay writing machine competitions, and it is a disadvantage for the human competitor to be specialized by our standards. Also fields in which specialization is strictly imposed, or whole universities, will shamefully have no competitor to put forward. Who will the University of Myopia's person be?
Draft version: version 1 (26th October 2025)


"By the light of the machine, our flowers do not grow
And the kind that do we would rather not know"


        Specialization has been recommended since the Enlightenment at least. And not just one man specializes in one field, making tools say, and another man specializes in another field, hunting say. Even within a field, specialization is recommended. The recommendation is most famously associated with Adam Smith. Remember his pin factory example. One man makes the head of the pin, another man joins the head of the pin with the rest, and another man…: by several people doing several different tasks, pin-making is more efficiently done. Smith also recommends specialization in philosophy. (Today his economist "descendants" imagine islands with two people on them, Robinson Crusoe and Man Friday, and argue that it is rational for them to specialize and trade.)
But is such specialization always a good idea? We now have essay writing machines, or essay writing software, and it is improving, the most famous being ChatGPT. Is it not likely that man versus machine (or woman versus machine) competitions will arise? The machine will be set a random topic and will produce an essay on it. You have 2 hours to produce your essay and beat the machine.
        Essay writing machines have been anticipated since the late 19th century at least (Gissing 1891: chapter 6). And much closer to our own time, we know of computer versus human competitions in various games, such as chess and Go. Maybe there are people who were advised to prepare for competition some years ago: "This is surely going to happen in your lifetime." But the thought of a competition only occurred in the last month really, despite what low hanging fruit this paper will be described as. Maybe I can still do the competition though, if I work very very hard at preparing!
What a shame if your discipline (field, area, profession, arena) or university has no serious candidate to send forward into such competitions! Surely to have such a person is a great trophy. But my experience at a university which scrapes into the top 50 is that people are extremely myopic (though I have not been employed there in this decade). Any really good advisory system would anticipate this competition yet the social pressures staff and students put on you belong to a world in which it is unlikely. Or are you planning to send someone else forward instead?
A good question: at what level of university is this issue of forthcoming competitions common knowledge? Probably everyone at Yale is aware of this issue. I only realized this issue and my plausibility as a competitor recently, and I doubt the extent of my laziness is even conceivable to many on here.


Appendix: daydream
An economist is introducing specialization at Harvard University to first year students, or freshmen or whatever they are called. He introduces Adam Smith, of course. Then the Robinson Crusoe-Man Friday island scenarios, or whatever awful substitute he has. Then at the end of the lecture, he says, containing his disgust, "By the way, there is this paradox. If we recommend specialization, then you should prefer a lecturer who is a specialist on specialization. But how can you be a specialist on specialization, since specialization is so widespread? Someone came up with this problem." And students think: yes, this is Harvard!


References
Edward, T.R. 2022. Chapter one's dreams: the paradox of the specialist on specialization. Available on PhilPapers.
Gissing, G. 1891. New Grub Street. Available at:
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1709/1709-h/1709-h.htm#link2HCH0006
Smith, A. 1904 (originally 1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: Methuen.
________________
"Stupid", "Thick," and George Bernard Shaw


Author. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan)
Abstract. I wonder whether the introduction of the word "thick" was influenced by an essay by George Bernard Shaw, in which he presents a difficulty with conveying a new idea to some people: head solid like a billiard ball. But an objection to introducing a term for what he describes is that we already have the word "stupid." The objection can be overcome by appealing to the value of the metaphor for anyone who experiences the difficulty. But if it was actually overcome like this, that seems an extremely foxy term introduction: shrewd, cunning. I would probably not bother myself, given the objection.
Draft version: version 1 (26th October 2025)


On my door there knocks
An even foxier fox


        Do you ever read the essays of George Bernard Shaw today? Amongst other things, I have been and am struck by these words:
There is no such thing as an empty head, but there are heads so impervious to new ideas that they are for all mental purposes solid, like billiard balls. (1928: 3)
I imagine that someone read this and thought there needs to be a single word for this. And introduced the word "thick." But here is some dialogue related to this introduction, with me fictionally back in time.


Term-maker: Have you read Bernard Shaw's essay? "There is no such thing as an empty head, but there are heads so impervious to new ideas that they are for all mental purposes solid, like billiard balls." There needs to be a single word for people with such heads, or minds.
Me: We already have a word: "stupid"!
Term-maker: I like Bernard-Shaw's metaphors. It really feels like one is encountering something solid into which the new idea cannot enter, when you talk to such a person. So I am going to introduce: "thick." Such a person is thick!


I don't know how "thick" actually got introduced, but it is a really foxy term introduction it seems to me, IF introduced in the face of such an objection. I would not even have selected these words of Bernard-Shaw's as apt for replacement by a single term, let alone overcome the objection. (Perhaps the term is evidence of the sheer drive there was to erase Bernard-Shaw. See Edward 2022.)


References
Edward, T.R. 2022. George Bernard Shaw's essays versus folk culture. Available on PhilPapers.
Shaw, G.B. 1910. A Treatise on Parents and Children. Available at:
https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/908/pg908-images.html
________________


Now I have my own Davidson and Amerindian perspectivism paper


Author. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. I argue that Amerindian perspectivism poses a problem for Davidson on alternative conceptual schemes. Davidson thinks that what a sentence means is determined by what meaning a radical interpreter would attribute to it and that radical interpretation involves interpreting charitably: taking others to express beliefs which are largely true by our lights, whenever plausible. Thus others cannot have a radically different system of beliefs or concepts. Elsewhere Davidson argues that the non-human animals we are acquainted with do not have beliefs. But Amerindian perspectivism, a worldview described by some anthropologists who study South American tribes, says that each type of animal has its own intelligent perspective on the world, presumably composed of beliefs. How can a Davidsonian radical interpreter who shares Davidson's beliefs about animals ever attribute such a worldview?
Draft version: version 2 (6th December 2025, version 1 on 31st October 2025)


A master threw a stick
And I doggily wrote this quick


        Donald Davidson is not only a philosopher who argues against other philosophers but he also argues against empirical researchers and he does so from the comfort of his armchair, metaphorically speaking. He in effect says, "Given my system, what you claim must be wrong." One of Davidson's most famous system-based arguments is against the possibility that others have an alternative conceptual scheme, whether understood as a radically different system of concepts for processing the same sensory experiences as we have, the same evidence, the same data, or a radically different system of beliefs which fit with this data. In this paper, I shall argue that Amerindian perspectivism poses a challenge for Davidson's system overall.
Davidson's argument against alternative conceptual schemes, or the one I shall focus on (with various technical material removed, I should warn), begins with opposition to the claim that what a sentence I utter means is whatever I intend it to mean. Instead Davidson proposes that meaning is something public and social and, importantly, clarifies this idea by reference to a radical interpreter. A radical interpreter is a person who knows a language and must learn another language from scratch. The radical interpreter frames hypotheses about the meaning of this or that sentence and tests them. The meaning of a given sentence is the meaning that a radical interpreter, with sufficient evidence of the conditions in which sentences are used, would attribute to the sentence: Davidson's system has this premise instead of the premise that the sentence means whatever the utterer intended it to mean (Talmage 1996).
Davidson thinks that the radical interpreter can only make progress with learning another language by interpreting speakers charitably: by interpreting them as having largely true beliefs by the interpreter's lights and expressing true beliefs by their sentences whenever it is plausible to interpret them this way. For example, a radical interpreter finds that a certain sentence is generally used only in the presence of a rabbit. They could interpret speakers as having delusions and meaning "There is a squirrel." But they will not make any progress with language learning unless they interpret speakers as also reliably observing reality and observing a rabbit when one is present. Thus they prefer the interpretation of the sentence as meaning "There is a rabbit." Davidson does not think that interpreting charitably entails there are no disagreements. There are disagreements, but they happen against a background of largely shared beliefs, beliefs which are often too obvious to state. Thus Davidson denies that others have an alternative conceptual scheme. Sentence meaning is determined by what meaning a radical interpreter would attribute; a radical interpreter must interpret charitably - must take the native to have largely true beliefs by the interpreter's lights and to express true beliefs whenever plausible - and so the radical interpreter would never interpret others as having an alternative conceptual scheme.
But this whole argument depends on the assumption that if others did have an alternative conceptual scheme, this system would be expressed in their language. Can there not be non-linguistic creatures which have some other system of concepts or beliefs? Davidson's famous paper "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" assumes otherwise without argument, but in another paper, "Rational Animals," Davidson argues that the non-human animals we know of do not have beliefs. For our purposes here, we can take the argument to be this. "A belief does not come in isolation, rather it is a part of a whole set of rationally related beliefs. For example, a person who believes that the cat is up a tree also believes that a cat is a type of animal, a cat can possibly be up a tree, a tree is a type of thing, and many more beliefs. There is no whole set of rationally related beliefs that we can sensibly attribute to a non-human animal that we know."
Now philosophers disagree over whether animals have beliefs, some philosophers thinking they obviously do. Davidson does not prohibit either party from being in the role of the radical interpreter, but what happens if we imagine a radical interpreter who shares Davidson's belief that animals do not have beliefs and is interpreting a tribe who go much further than us in attributing beliefs to animals? As I shall understand it here, Amerindian perspectivism is a worldview which anthropologists think various South American tribes have. According to this worldview, each type of animal has its own perspective on the world. This perspective, let us suppose, consists of beliefs. A most interesting belief flagged is that as we believe we are humans and the jaguar is but an animal, so the jaguar believes it is human and we are but prey (Viveiros de Castro 1998; Severo 2014). Each non-human animal has its own metaphysics even, which shamanism enables a human to enter into.
The conflict with the Davidsonian radical interpreter who also has Davidson's beliefs about non-human animals is severe here. "Animals cannot have beliefs because beliefs come as a whole and what whole can you attribute to an animal?" thinks this more fully Davidsonian radical interpreter, whereas these Amazonians think, "There are such wholes: this be what we know of the whole system of this type of animal; and this be what we know of the whole system of this other type of animal."  A problem for Davidsonians is: how can a Davidsonian radical interpreter even converge with the empirical findings of the anthropologists, because would not such a radical interpreter be too reluctant to even attribute Amerindian perspectivism to the natives? The radical interpreter takes others to have largely true beliefs, by the interpreter's own lights. I suspect Davidsonians will end up saying that the interpreter is encountering a type of fiction, but taking the fictional discourse to express genuine beliefs.


References
Davidson, Donald. 1973-4. On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47: 5-20.
Davidson, Donald. 1982. Rational Animals. Dialectica 36(4): 317-327.
Severo, Rogério Passos. 2014. Are there empirical cases of indeterminacy of translation? Grazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1):135-152.
Talmage, Catherine J. L. 1996. Davidson and humpty dumpty. Noûs 30 (4):537-544.
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 1998. Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 36(4): 317-327.


  

________________


What is a formidable mediocrity? Is this a useful concept, Nabokovs?


Author. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. In a 1965 interview, the Russian-American aristocrat writer Vladimir Nabokov tells us that various renowned novelists are nothing but formidable mediocrities. But what is a formidable mediocrity, or what is a formidable mediocrity in the novel anyway? The concept is new to me and sounds paradoxical (and maybe even an offence to our taste for simple vocabulary): how can a mediocrity be formidable? I think of it as follows: a formidable mediocrity in the novel displays no more talent than your slightly above average short story writer at any literary club, but they produce volumes and volumes of this level of material in comparison to the occasional short story writer, and they do so from sheer hard work. Perhaps I would use this concept if I were a 19 year old looking in at various writers. But my experiences in philosophy suggest to me that there is a mistake in the naive theory of how this volume is achieved.
Draft version: version 1 (2nd November 2025)


"A term and a fiddle
For this ton of middle"


        Vladimir Nabokov, the Russian aristocrat and also American novelist, if this combination makes any sense: what does he have to say to us today? In a 1965 interview, he characterizes various renowned novelists as formidable mediocrities. But what is a formidable mediocrity? I am not acquainted with this concept. Furthermore, it sounds paradoxical. A mediocrity is of the medium level and is like lots of others, but formidable is something strong, a tower of strength even. How can there be this combination?
        I can imagine being a 19 year old and attracted to this concept when evaluating certain writers, although I am not sure if even my 19 year old self would use it. You go to a writing club and a slightly above average writer manages to produce a decent short story from time to time. Then you read a certain esteemed person who writes large texts but you think of them as having no more talent than this slightly above average writer. They produce a much larger amount of material at this level, from sheer hard work. Maybe some people will say that hard work is a talent, but setting this aside there is no greater capacity with words or with insight into human motivation and the like. That is what you call a formidable mediocrity!
        From my experiences in philosophy (if not beyond), I am not convinced by this "model" of how the large volume is achieved. Here is a very fictional scenario to help you understand. Tim Crane tells us, "the paradox is that the more analytic philosophy became dominant in the universities, the more it became removed from the concerns of the average person with philosophical interests." Let us suppose I challenge Jonathan Quong to a competition to make other paradoxes of analytic philosophy's increasing dominance. He comes up with one. I come up with three. The next time we meet I am destroying him completely: I have got seven or eight now and he only has one more. Before I just stared into space and thought "What paradoxes are there?" and so did he. But later I developed a system of rules for detecting social science paradoxes and applied them. These are my rules, which I presented yesterday. First, list a series of qualities of the thing, e.g. analytic philosophy values logic, analytic philosophy dominates in the English speaking world, etc. Second, look for any combinations of qualities on the list that are puzzling. Third, look for any quality that is puzzling in itself, e.g. its location, and try to specify another quality besides which it is puzzling. And then say: how can there be this combination? Fourth, take qualities which are not immediately puzzling and try to make puzzles out of them. For example, take analytic philosophy values logic. Add hardly anyone can do logic properly and yet analytic philosophy is increasing in dominance.
        Imagine you don't know about my system. You might tell Jonathan Quong, "You need to work more at it. Ignore your girlfriend, quit your job, and simply think about this issue. And you can compete." A bad coach indeed! I feel Nabokov with his term "formidable mediocrity" provides neat words to articulate the point of view of a clueless youth looking in at literature, but he does not help them get beyond this perspective to a more accurate impression of what is going on. Does anyone? "We know you have this puzzle. Here is the solution and why it is the solution."


References
Crane, T. 2025. "Bloodless Pedantry". The Ideas Letter October 16th 2025:
https://www.theideasletter.org/essay/bloodless-pedantry/
Edward, T.R. 2025. How to find social science paradoxes? A simple method. Available at PhilPapers.
Maxim D. Shrayer. 2023. Nabokov in Montreux: 1965 Interview. YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V8OwyqvSh2g
________________


Bertrand Russell on Henri Bergson on laughter: a modernist or postmodernist interpretation


Author. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. This paper contests the humanist interpretation of Bertrand Russell's brief 1912 review of Henri Bergson's book Laughter, an Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, an interpretation which is offered by Andreas Vrahimis. Vrahimis takes Russell to be offering counterexamples to Bergson, against the claim that he has identified a necessary condition for something's being funny or a sufficient condition. Vrahimis reads Russell as objecting that Bergson's formula would require regarding a man falling from a scaffolding as funny. Vrahimis's Russell is the typical work of a humanist philosophy professor who has added some literary panache. I offer a reason for doubting this depiction of Russell's text: instead I interpret Russell's review as a modernist or even postmodernist text. It is a sequence of pastiches: a comedy skit and schoolmaster's exercise, an imitation of Charles Lamb responding to chimney sweepers, a Bradleyan nationalist final paragraph, until the Cambridge philosopher's reflexive touch.
Draft version: version 1 (4th November 2025)


        Henri Bergson, a Parisian philosopher who was the height of intellectual fashion at the turn of the twentieth century, versus Bertrand Russell, the logician, philosopher, and aristocrat: what to say about this now? I wrote a couple of papers on Bergson on laughter and then I wondered what Russell had to say on the matter. I found a text by associate professor Andreas Vrahimis. It presented Russell as if he were a skilled humanist philosophy professor evaluating Henri Bergson. Vrahimis helpfully identifies the article of Russell's I was after: The Professor's Guide to Laughter, which I read afterwards. I interpretation this text very differently to Vrahimis though and I wish to argue for my interpretation below.
        In his article, Russell quotes this thesis:
(Bergson's laughter thesis) "The attitudes, gestures and movements of the human body… are laughable in exact proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine."
Vrahimis says that Russell argues against this thesis interpreted as a necessary condition for laughter and as a sufficient condition. It is not necessary for laughter, because there are things which cause laughter that do not meet this condition. It is not sufficient for laughter, because there are things which meet the condition and are  still not funny. At least that is what Vrahimis's Russell says. Vrahimis's Russell offers this counterexample to its being a sufficient condition: a man falling from a scaffolding and breaking his neck. This is not funny but if Bergson's thesis identified a sufficient condition, it would count as funny and furthermore as funnier than someone's slipping on an orange peel. Vrahimis's Russell makes other points, including the clever one that if humour could be captured in a formula and this is it, then the formula itself should produce laughter: because we laugh as if we were machines who react in a certain way to a certain input.
        Russell, in his article, does not use the language of necessary and sufficient conditions and the thesis that Russell quotes cannot be straightforwardly interpreted as specifying a necessary or sufficient condition for when something will cause laughter. Assuming "laughable" means causing laughter rather than meriting laughter, the thesis is about the proportion of laughter caused, rather than simply when something causes any laughter. Anyway, this is not my main point: this is a sort-of big picturish paper by me I suppose, though not as big picture as inquiring into whether man is becoming increasingly machine-like. (Well, I feel in almost every field, people have best worked out how to pursue standard ends and you only need to follow their rules or guidance, with some little space for your own decision-making! For example, "Should I reduce my papers to quotations or not?" Someone knows about this and maybe they are in your social network.)
        I can imagine a professor writing an article for a professional journal which is like Vrahimis's Russell. But they would surely object to the thesis quoted on the grounds that there is no exact measure of the extent to which human behaviour is machine-like and we do not inwardly possess a (Rabelesian) instrument for evaluating this matter: this is a striking absence from Russell's text, interpreted as the work of a humanist philosophy professor. Would they go on after making that point? I suppose any talented analytic philosopher today who really thinks about Bergson on laughter without reading Russell would realize Russell's final point or something very like it: we supposedly laugh when people are machine-line and our laughter itself is machine-like, in Bergson's eyes, for it is governed by a formula. Maybe they would also identify the clever contrast between normal slapstick humour and even more unpleasant events involving the human body as machine that do not make us laugh. I don't know. ("He is a Parisian philosopher, so I personally would not retain my analytic skills in this situation. I would become unreasonably aggressive. I don't simply apply the skills wherever or I would never have got married, would never stay married, or have a job or…"???)
        I think there could be a professor like Vrahimis's Russell. But is Russell himself like that, at least in this particular text? It opens like this:
IT HAS LONG been recognized by publishers that everybody desires to be a perfect lady or gentleman (as the case may be); to this fact we owe the constant stream of etiquette-books. But if there is one thing which people desire even more, it is to have a faultless sense of humour. Yet, so far as I know, there is no book called "Jokes without Tears, by Mr. McQuedy". This extraordinary lacuna has now been filled. Those to whom laughter has hitherto been an unintelligible vagary, in which one must join, though one could never tell when it would break out, need only study M. Bergson's book to acquire the finest flower of Parisian wit. By observing a very simple formula, they will know infallibly what is funny and what is not; if they sometimes surprise their unlearned friends, they have only to mention their authority in order to silence every doubt.
On the surface, this is a comedy sketch idea. Some middlebrow people who do not laugh learn from Bergson when it is appropriate to laugh and if they laugh in some situations to the surprise of others, they can quote the authority of Bergson. Russell sounds highly satirical, as if you should simply laugh when you find something funny and not according to a guide. But then he is not in a good position to say that falling off a scaffolding and breaking your neck is not funny. Some people do laugh at unpleasant things, very unpleasant even, and given his earlier satire, he must not introduce his own guide regarding when to laugh and when not to. In line with this coherence requirement, Russell himself never explicitly says that this is not funny. He writes:
When an elderly gentleman slips on a piece of orange peel and falls, we laugh, because his body follows the laws of dynamics instead of a human purpose. When a man falls from a scaffolding and breaks his neck on the pavement, we presumably laugh even more, since the movement is even more completely mechanical. 
It is doubtful that Russell wants to be taken as actually laughing at this, but that does not entail that he wants to be taken as objecting to Bergson: as implying that this is sufficient for laughter that when it is not. So I am not convinced by Vrahimis's humanist interpretation, because it makes Russell inconsistent. He is now in the business of offering his own guide, having satirized anyone who would use one.
Russell's opening is rather unlike that which we expect from an analytic philosophy professor. Vrahimis has to take Russell as more or less a philosophy professor with a thick coating of literary panache. I PROPOSE that Russell's text is instead a sequence of imitations, of pastiches: it is a modernist artwork or even postmodernist. The opening paragraph is also probably a logic and disambiguation exercise. Here is one reading
For all x, if x has the property of being a woman, then x has the property of desiring to be a perfect lady.
For all x, if x has the property of being a man, then x has the property of desiring to be a gentleman.
Now can we put universal quantifiers in here? Is it like this?
∀(x) W(x) → F(x)
∀(x) M(x) → G(x)
(My brother-in-law, when we first met, asked me if I did any symbolic logic. I was going to ask him for his help with this task, but I don't want to ever find out that he is not as good as he sounded in conversation. I have two logic textbooks in my apartment and one of them seems weak on the universal quantifier while the other is unfortunately in the other room. Bring it in for a book battle?!)
        Soon Russell starts talking about the nineteenth century English essayist Charles Lamb. Who can forget Lamb on young chimney sweepers? They are our Africans, in a homegrown negritude, says Lamb! Russell keeps asserting that Bergson approaches matters with a Latin instinct. How long was this after the Dreyfus affair? Bergson would have been regarded as a Jew! And Russell is imitating Lamb addressing a white English chimney sweeper as our African, by referring to the Latin instincts of Bergson. (The reference to Lamb seems apt because he is apparently exactly the kind of highbrow intellectual who can sit and laugh with the common man, and he seems very unlike Bergson, but who knows whether Lamb was actually like this and who even cares? We are within a network of texts within a network of texts.)
Then there is some nationalist talk in the manner of the Scot F.H. Bradley living in England:
The truth seems to be that the comic differs with the individual, the country, and the age. Latin wit is different from Teutonic humour; the laughter of the Parisian is different from the laughter of the Londoner. For this reason, it would seem to be impossible to find any such formula as M. Bergson seeks.
The article ends with a Cambridgey flourish. This text is but a melange of styles I propose: literary modernism enclosed in the post for the Parisian avant-garde.


References
Lamb, C. 1823. Essays of Elia. Available at:
https://www.angelfire.com/nv/mf/elia1/chimney.htm
Russell, B. 1912. The Professor's Guide to Laughter. The Cambridge Review 33. Available at:
https://users.drew.edu/~jlenz/br-on-bergson1.html
Vrahimis, A. 2019. Draft of Russell Reads Bergson. Available at PhilPapers:
 https://philarchive.org/archive/VRARRB
________________
Psychiatry as political representation and humans as social


Author. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan)
Abstract. A politician in a democracy, or even an authoritarian state, may well try to represent the views of a group of people regardless of whether he (or she) believes these views. Similarly, one can take people's intuitive assessments of what is mad and try to develop a psychiatric system which is in line with these, or largely in line. Many people would think that a human being who does not have social aims, such as being friends with others or achieving status, is mad. They say, "Humans are social," but mean humans without severe mental disorders. However, what people intuitively count as beyond the social human beings can vary considerably: you pursue a social aim rationally but in a way that differs from the norms of your community ("mad"), you do not seek to become a member of group which clearly demarcates members from non-members by style or skill ("mad"); you do not walk away when it seems unlikely you will get status for your work ("mad").
Draft version: version 2 (5th December 2025; version 1 on 9th November 2025 - maybe too exuberant, to borrow P.M.S Hacker's description)
Software used (freeware): Google.com, Google docs, kleki.com


I shall sow a gown for London Town
That it may wed our boy with crown


        A politician may not necessarily believe the views which they publicly espouse. In democracy, and probably in some authoritarian societies, a politician may well examine a group of people and try to provide a representation of their views: hopefully they will nod along to these views or say words to the effect, "Yes, that is what I think." I suspect some political philosophers engage in representation regarding other matters. Professor Ingrid Robeyns gives advice on how to write a popular political philosophy book but it seems to be the advice of a novice: make the writing accessible and enjoyable, use arguments and not simply rhetoric, etc. Is she a novice or is she simply trying to represent the perspective of a novice? She does not say things like "Bertrand Russell surely wrote in a way that involved a mathematical sequence, to interest the mathematically-minded."
        You may not believe this, but a psychiatrist might also do much the same. Some psychiatric concepts, such as "madness" and "delusional," are part of our ordinary repertoire of concepts, rather than being exclusively specialist concepts. (Were they taken from specialists, as "autism" and "psychopath" were?) The psychiatrist might try to present a system of diagnosis which corresponds with our folk perspective, e.g. the old Victorian classification  of insanity proper (paranoid delusions, split minds, etc.), moral insanity (e.g. serial killers, no delusions), and us normal people.
        Imagine that a person merely lives in a society for certain material benefits and cares not for friendship, social status, or any other social goals. One day he leaves the society and lives on an island by himself. Some people will say that this person surely has a mental disorder. Some people will say, "Human beings are social beings," and in response to the case propose that this applies to normal human beings and not to human beings with severe mental disorders.
        But what does it mean to be a social being? Some people will say that all humans with any social end, such as having and maintaining friendship, achieving social status, and more, are social beings and leave the issue at that. But others will probably draw the line more strictly, or draw more lines.
`(a) It could be "If you are uninterested in badges of social prestige, such as being a professor or a consultant psychiatrist, there is something wrong with you. You are not a properly social being." Or "If you are prepared to sacrifice this interest rather easily, then you are not a properly social being." The popular singer Madonna sings, "If they don't give me proper credit, I just walk away." What if you stick it out in an institution which is not giving you proper credit and there is little reason to think it will?
(b) It could be "If you do not seek to become a member of a group which clearly demarcates members from non-members by style or skill, then you are mad." Perhaps this is better presented as a view of human beings normally as cultural animals, rather than social ones. Anyway, "Is this not the same as the previous one?" It seems similar, but there are various differences. (Maybe ask a "fully-fledged analytic philosopher" about this!)
(c) It could be "If you pursue a social aim that we have but not in the way of our community, then you do not count as a properly social being. It does not matter whether the measures you take are rational or not." For example, you would like your philosophical papers to be read in the long-term and by wide audiences, and you start adding poems and presenting your ideas as one liners. "Who does that? We don't do that. You must be mad."
        Systematizing folk psychiatry: is this a good idea or not? Given how easily some judge others mad, perhaps not for actual diagnostic purposes. Also given variations in what is regarded as mad, with some accepting one of the stricter lines above and others not.


References
Hacker, P. 1996. On Davidson's Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. The Philosophical Quarterly 46: 285-305.
Madonna. 2017 (originally 1985 - songwriters Peter Brown and Robert Rans). Madonna - Material Girl [Official Video]. YouTube. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6p-lDYPR2P8&list=RD6p-lDYPR2P8&start_radio=1
Robeyns, I. 2013. What makes a popular philosophy book a good book? Available on Crooked Timber, July 15th 2013:
https://crookedtimber.org/2022/07/04/how-to-write-a-good-public-philosophy-book/
Robeyns, I. 2022. How to write a good public philosophy book. Available on Crooked Timber, July 4th 2022:
https://crookedtimber.org/2022/07/04/how-to-write-a-good-public-philosophy-book/
  

________________


A garden of buried flowers? Why does Parfit focus on making counterexamples, not paradoxes? (And appendix with code)


Author: Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward
Abstract. As professional philosophers, when we are presented with a book such as On What Matters (or set of books), we are disposed to respond to its arguments and set aside the inner psychology of the person: why they write what they do. Do they write it because they believe that this is the approach that best contributes to knowledge, or some other official aim of the academic discipline, or do they write it for some other reason? I observed pencil jottings on the University of Manchester's volume 2 of On What Matters, which criticized Parfit's attempt at metaethics: questions of whether there can be objective ethics, questions of what we can know of moral truth, questions of the nature of moral discourse. "Shame," it patronizingly said. But I have other questions, leaving aside how well he does as a skilled philosopher slightly outside of his home territory: "can he match the specialist here?" the scribbler presumably wonders. One of my questions is why he does not offer paradox after paradox, instead counterexample after counterexample. I consider four solutions. (i) He cannot do that. I doubt that. (ii) He is responsive to a history of paradox deletion. The paradoxes just before the French revolution and the paradoxes made by the bright young things of the early 20th century were deleted. (iii) The counterexamples are valued more by literature departments. These little hypothetical fictions are accorded higher literary value. (iv) There are paradoxes but they are hidden.
Draft version. version 1 (12th November 2025)
Word processors: editpad.org -- I can't find yidword, as I call it - and google docs.


Sham sham, curly lamb,
Can't pass an easy exam


As professional philosophers, when presented with a philosophical book such as On What Matters - it is actually three volumes - we react by evaluating its arguments. Is this a good argument? Is that a good argument? Parfit goes into territories which he has less specialist knowledge in, such as metaethics. The professional metaethicist is likely to consider whether he is any good as a metaethicist. By the way, if you do not know what metaethics is, it concerns questions of whether moral values really exist, whether we can know moral truth, and the nature of moral discourse (does it present propositions or does it express emotions, etc.?). But other members of the humanities faculty, or arts faculty, which is where philosophy is usually located, may well read it differently, and so too may some of us. They look at the choices Parfit has made and wonder why these choices and not others. Even if we turn to a discipline that seems out of place in the faculty - economics - there will be questions of this kind. Parfit's text is a strategic object aiming at an end, but why this strategy rather than some other strategy.


The analytic tradition of philosophy, with its focus on logic and argument, values paradoxes as puzzles to look into. Why does Parfit not offer paradox after paradox? I myself was advised to do this, as my best chance in this competitive field, in which I was a dutiful member of an underrepresented group. But Parfit does not? Instead he offers hypothetical counterexample after hypothetical counterexample. Against this thesis, this counterexample. Against that thesis, that counterexample. Or if not counterexample, then example. Here is one:
The train is headed for the five, but there is no other track and tunnel. I am on a bridge above the track. Your only way to save the five would be to open, by remote control, the trap door on which I am standing, so that I would fall in front of the train, thereby triggering its automatic break. (2011: 218)
Why not offer paradox after paradox? Also je seems as if he has tried to make a fun book too and there are lots of fun paradoxes he can devise, such as "Why are there utilitarian philosopher professors, since utilitarianism (aiming for the greatest total happiness, of good sensations over bad, as the ultimate moral end) requires shutting down the philosophy department and giving the funds to others, who help people more?" (And are not paradoxes accorded a higher value than counterexamples? And does he not love paradoxes more? And…)


One we doubt: inability. One answer is that he cannot do this. It is easier to find paradoxes now that I have made public some steps that occurred to me for doing so, steps which only occurred to me after formulating many paradoxes from inspiration (more than hundred probably) or keeping a metaphorical eye out. But I shall presume Parfit did not know of these steps, though they have presumably occurred to someone and his background is one of privilege: Eton and then the University of Oxford. I suspect Parfit can do this, but I cannot be totally confident


Two we think: historical knowledge. Another answer is that Parfit is influenced by knowledge of what happened to previous paradox makers. In a prize winning essay of 1750, Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes:
…tell us what we should think of that crowd of obscure writers and idle men of letters who are uselessly eating up the substance of the state. Did I say idle? Would to God they really were! Our morality would be healthier and society more peaceful. But these vain and futile declaimers move around in all directions armed with their fatal paradoxes, undermining the foundations of faith, and annihilating virtue. (1750: 15-16)
What happened to all these paradox makers? What happened? Were they any good? We do not know of them. Here is a guess at one. "My name is Henry Marie. My paradox is: if the royal family is dead, then we shall be fed." The royal family are supposed to take care of its people and yet this conditional is true apparently! By the way, they are not the only multitude of paradox-makers to be beyond the knowledge of reasonably knowledgeable people such as ourselves. Consider this quotation, from H.M. Tomlinson, in 1920:
Cleverness, anyhow, is the level of mediocrity today; we are all too infernally clever. The first witty and perverse paradox blows out the candle. Only the sick in mind crave cleverness, as a morbid body turns to drink.
Whether they are mediocre or not, paradoxes are useful to look into. We improve our knowledge and even our wisdom by looking into paradoxes and solutions. "Two sets of deleted or marginalized paradox-makers. I am not doing that again."


Three: we wonder. Perhaps there are other communities which prefer Parfit to focus on making hypothetical examples rather than paradoxes. Are they accorded more literary value? They are a good choice in the age of flash fiction, no? (But have you seen how boring a lot of flash fiction is?) This is one of mine that got rejected:
Once there was a boy from a poor family, with mushrooms strangely growing on his head. The family decided to cook the mushrooms. The boy did not eat, because it disgusted him to eat what came from his own body. The mushrooms turned out to be poisonous and the rest of the family died.


Four: we diagnose. "Has Parfit hidden the paradoxes in his text? If you examine the text carefully, you can extract them? He's the highest genius of Oxford! Joe Horton took an example from Parfit and produced a puzzle, didn't he?" This proposal is what merits time with the psychiatrist?


Appendix
You know how some secretaries, when you give them your name, they spell it out with each letter associated with some word which starts with that letter. For example, you say "Helen" and they say: is that H for happy, E for easy, L for love, E for easy, and N for nap? I asked people to write code which does that. It takes an input and spells it out. Here is some code for QuiteBASIC which does this.


10 INPUT "What is the name IN CAPITAL LETTERS (uppercase)"; N
20 LET X = 0
30 LET L = LEN(N)
40 LET C = MID (N, X, 1)
50 GOSUB 1000
60 LET X = X + 1
70 IF X < L THEN GOTO 40
80 END


1000 IF C = "A" THEN PRINT "Is that A for Always?"
1010 IF C = "B" THEN PRINT "Is that B for BupaDentist?"
1020 IF C = "C" THEN PRINT "Is that C for Chow?"
1030 IF C = "D" THEN PRINT "Is that D for Drunk Desires?"
1040 IF C = "E" THEN PRINT "Is that E for Esoteric?"
1050 IF C = "F" THEN PRINT "Is that F for Flower?"
1060 IF C = "G" THEN PRINT "Is that G for genetic grandma?"
1070 IF C = "H"  THEN PRINT "Is that H for haiku or handmaiden?"
1080 IF C = "I"  THEN PRINT "Is that I for I?"
1090 If C = "J" THEN PRINT "Is that J for Joy?"
1100 IF C = "K" THEN PRINT  "Is that K for Kafkaesque?"
1110 IF C = "L" THEN PRINT "Is that L for lazybones?"
1120 IF C = "M" THEN PRINT "Is that M for Magginoodles?"
1130 IF C = "N" THEN PRINT "Is that N for noodle?"
1140 IF C = "O" THEN PRINT "Is that for O for order received?"
1150 IF C = "P" THEN PRINT "Is that P for please?"
1160 IF C = "Q"  THEN PRINT "Is that Q for quixotic questions?"
1170 IF C = "R" THEN PRINT "Is that R for rectitude?"
1180 IF C = "S"  THEN PRINT "Is that S for sugar?"
1190 IF C = "T" THEN PRINT "Is that T for two?"
1200 IF C = "U" THEN PRINT "Is that U for undeterred undergraduate?"
1210 IF C = "V" THEN PRINT "Is that V for viola?"
1220 IF C = "W" THEN PRINT "Is that W for waves?"
1230 IF C = "X"  THEN PRINT "Is that X for xylophone?"
1240 IF C = "Y" THEN PRINT "Is that Y for yawning?"
1250 IF C = "Z"  THEN PRINT "Is that Z for zany?"
1260 IF C = "1" THEN PRINT "The number one in your name?"
1270 IF C = "2" THEN PRINT "Two? Are you serious?"
1280 RETURN




References
https://www.quitebasic.com/
Horton, J. 2017. The All or Nothing Problem. Journal of Philosophy 114(2): 94-104.
Parfit, D. 2011. On What Matters. Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. 2011. On What Matters. Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rousseau, J.J. 1750. Discourse on the Arts and Sciences. Available at:
https://www.stmarys-ca.edu/sites/default/files/2023-03/arts.pdf
Tomlinson, H.M. 1920. Old Junk. Available at:
https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/25523/pg25523.txt
________________


A garden of buried flowers? Why does Parfit focus on making counterexamples, not paradoxes? (And appendix with code)


Author: Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward
Abstract. As professional philosophers, when we are presented with a book such as On What Matters (or set of books), we are disposed to respond to its arguments and set aside the inner psychology of the person: why they write what they do. Do they write it because they believe that this is the approach that best contributes to knowledge, or some other official aim of the academic discipline, or do they write it for some other reason? I observed pencil jottings on the University of Manchester's volume 2 of On What Matters, which criticized Parfit's attempt at metaethics: questions of whether there can be objective ethics, questions of what we can know of moral truth, questions of the nature of moral discourse. "Shame," it patronizingly said. But I have other questions, leaving aside how well he does as a skilled philosopher slightly outside of his home territory: "can he match the specialist here?" the scribbler presumably wonders. One of my questions is why he does not offer paradox after paradox, instead counterexample after counterexample. I consider four solutions. (i) He cannot do that. I doubt that. (ii) He is responsive to a history of paradox deletion. The paradoxes just before the French revolution and the paradoxes made by the bright young things of the early 20th century were deleted. (iii) The counterexamples are valued more by literature departments. These little hypothetical fictions are accorded higher literary value. (iv) There are paradoxes but they are hidden.
Draft version. version 1 (12th November 2025)
Word processors: editpad.org -- I can't find yidword, as I call it - and google docs.


Sham sham, curly lamb,
Can't pass an easy exam


As professional philosophers, when presented with a philosophical book such as On What Matters - it is actually three volumes - we react by evaluating its arguments. Is this a good argument? Is that a good argument? Parfit goes into territories which he has less specialist knowledge in, such as metaethics. The professional metaethicist is likely to consider whether he is any good as a metaethicist. By the way, if you do not know what metaethics is, it concerns questions of whether moral values really exist, whether we can know moral truth, and the nature of moral discourse (does it present propositions or does it express emotions, etc.?). But other members of the humanities faculty, or arts faculty, which is where philosophy is usually located, may well read it differently, and so too may some of us. They look at the choices Parfit has made and wonder why these choices and not others. Even if we turn to a discipline that seems out of place in the faculty - economics - there will be questions of this kind. Parfit's text is a strategic object aiming at an end, but why this strategy rather than some other strategy.


The analytic tradition of philosophy, with its focus on logic and argument, values paradoxes as puzzles to look into. Why does Parfit not offer paradox after paradox? I myself was advised to do this, as my best chance in this competitive field, in which I was a dutiful member of an underrepresented group. But Parfit does not? Instead he offers hypothetical counterexample after hypothetical counterexample. Against this thesis, this counterexample. Against that thesis, that counterexample. Or if not counterexample, then example. Here is one:
The train is headed for the five, but there is no other track and tunnel. I am on a bridge above the track. Your only way to save the five would be to open, by remote control, the trap door on which I am standing, so that I would fall in front of the train, thereby triggering its automatic break. (2011: 218)
Why not offer paradox after paradox? Also je seems as if he has tried to make a fun book too and there are lots of fun paradoxes he can devise, such as "Why are there utilitarian philosopher professors, since utilitarianism (aiming for the greatest total happiness, of good sensations over bad, as the ultimate moral end) requires shutting down the philosophy department and giving the funds to others, who help people more?" (And are not paradoxes accorded a higher value than counterexamples? And does he not love paradoxes more? And…)


One we doubt: inability. One answer is that he cannot do this. It is easier to find paradoxes now that I have made public some steps that occurred to me for doing so, steps which only occurred to me after formulating many paradoxes from inspiration (more than hundred probably) or keeping a metaphorical eye out. But I shall presume Parfit did not know of these steps, though they have presumably occurred to someone and his background is one of privilege: Eton and then the University of Oxford. I suspect Parfit can do this, but I cannot be totally confident


Two we think: historical knowledge. Another answer is that Parfit is influenced by knowledge of what happened to previous paradox makers. In a prize winning essay of 1750, Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes:
…tell us what we should think of that crowd of obscure writers and idle men of letters who are uselessly eating up the substance of the state. Did I say idle? Would to God they really were! Our morality would be healthier and society more peaceful. But these vain and futile declaimers move around in all directions armed with their fatal paradoxes, undermining the foundations of faith, and annihilating virtue. (1750: 15-16)
What happened to all these paradox makers? What happened? Were they any good? We do not know of them. Here is a guess at one. "My name is Henry Marie. My paradox is: if the royal family is dead, then we shall be fed." The royal family are supposed to take care of its people and yet this conditional is true apparently! By the way, they are not the only multitude of paradox-makers to be beyond the knowledge of reasonably knowledgeable people such as ourselves. Consider this quotation, from H.M. Tomlinson, in 1920:
Cleverness, anyhow, is the level of mediocrity today; we are all too infernally clever. The first witty and perverse paradox blows out the candle. Only the sick in mind crave cleverness, as a morbid body turns to drink.
Whether they are mediocre or not, paradoxes are useful to look into. We improve our knowledge and even our wisdom by looking into paradoxes and solutions. "Two sets of deleted or marginalized paradox-makers. I am not doing that again."


Three: we wonder. Perhaps there are other communities which prefer Parfit to focus on making hypothetical examples rather than paradoxes. Are they accorded more literary value? They are a good choice in the age of flash fiction, no? (But have you seen how boring a lot of flash fiction is?) This is one of mine that got rejected:
Once there was a boy from a poor family, with mushrooms strangely growing on his head. The family decided to cook the mushrooms. The boy did not eat, because it disgusted him to eat what came from his own body. The mushrooms turned out to be poisonous and the rest of the family died.


Four: we diagnose. "Has Parfit hidden the paradoxes in his text? If you examine the text carefully, you can extract them? He's the highest genius of Oxford! Joe Horton took an example from Parfit and produced a puzzle, didn't he?" This proposal is what merits time with the psychiatrist?


Appendix
You know how some secretaries, when you give them your name, they spell it out with each letter associated with some word which starts with that letter. For example, you say "Helen" and they say: is that H for happy, E for easy, L for love, E for easy, and N for nap? I asked people to write code which does that. It takes an input and spells it out. Here is some code for QuiteBASIC which does this.


10 INPUT "What is the name IN CAPITAL LETTERS (uppercase)"; N
20 LET X = 0
30 LET L = LEN(N)
40 LET C = MID (N, X, 1)
50 GOSUB 1000
60 LET X = X + 1
70 IF X < L THEN GOTO 40
80 END


1000 IF C = "A" THEN PRINT "Is that A for Always?"
1010 IF C = "B" THEN PRINT "Is that B for BupaDentist?"
1020 IF C = "C" THEN PRINT "Is that C for Chow?"
1030 IF C = "D" THEN PRINT "Is that D for Drunk Desires?"
1040 IF C = "E" THEN PRINT "Is that E for Esoteric?"
1050 IF C = "F" THEN PRINT "Is that F for Flower?"
1060 IF C = "G" THEN PRINT "Is that G for genetic grandma?"
1070 IF C = "H"  THEN PRINT "Is that H for haiku or handmaiden?"
1080 IF C = "I"  THEN PRINT "Is that I for I?"
1090 If C = "J" THEN PRINT "Is that J for Joy?"
1100 IF C = "K" THEN PRINT  "Is that K for Kafkaesque?"
1110 IF C = "L" THEN PRINT "Is that L for lazybones?"
1120 IF C = "M" THEN PRINT "Is that M for Magginoodles?"
1130 IF C = "N" THEN PRINT "Is that N for noodle?"
1140 IF C = "O" THEN PRINT "Is that for O for order received?"
1150 IF C = "P" THEN PRINT "Is that P for please?"
1160 IF C = "Q"  THEN PRINT "Is that Q for quixotic questions?"
1170 IF C = "R" THEN PRINT "Is that R for rectitude?"
1180 IF C = "S"  THEN PRINT "Is that S for sugar?"
1190 IF C = "T" THEN PRINT "Is that T for two?"
1200 IF C = "U" THEN PRINT "Is that U for undeterred undergraduate?"
1210 IF C = "V" THEN PRINT "Is that V for viola?"
1220 IF C = "W" THEN PRINT "Is that W for waves?"
1230 IF C = "X"  THEN PRINT "Is that X for xylophone?"
1240 IF C = "Y" THEN PRINT "Is that Y for yawning?"
1250 IF C = "Z"  THEN PRINT "Is that Z for zany?"
1260 IF C = "1" THEN PRINT "The number one in your name?"
1270 IF C = "2" THEN PRINT "Two? Are you serious?"
1280 RETURN




References
https://www.quitebasic.com/
Horton, J. 2017. The All or Nothing Problem. Journal of Philosophy 114(2): 94-104.
Parfit, D. 2011. On What Matters. Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. 2011. On What Matters. Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rousseau, J.J. 1750. Discourse on the Arts and Sciences. Available at:
https://www.stmarys-ca.edu/sites/default/files/2023-03/arts.pdf
Tomlinson, H.M. 1920. Old Junk. Available at:
https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/25523/pg25523.txt
________________


November's other lump and statue paper: from David Liggins to David Builes


Author. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 161__Rajivan)
Abstract. This paper responds to Doctor David Builes's paper which appeared in the PhilPapers  new manuscripts section today: "A Dilemma for Plenitude." I find what is called the scene setting of the paper puzzling. Consider the view (or claim or thesis) that if a lump has been sculpted into a statue, there are now two things in one place: a lump and a statue. Builes describes this view as narrow (presumably because it is only about a lump and a statue, amongst the many things in this world), so it is rational to generalize if we can, but he aims to argue that the only rational generalization is a view of reality which is too objectionable. I make what seems to me to be an obvious point: I argue that the view is significant even if narrow from a certain perspective, because it challenges the assumption that two physical objects do not occupy the same physical space. (For convenience of exposition, the paper contains an imitation of Laura Riding, which may also be of literary interest.)
Draft version: version 1 (15th November 2025)


Forecasters take a day sick
When they forecast versus the Orphic


        I want to begin with some brief autobiographical material, although it is perhaps a deviation from the favoured norms within this database. The now more experienced philosopher Doctor David Liggins once told me that if you tried to specify all the inferences in a mathematical proof, the proof would be so long. This is the autobiographical material over. Here I will stick to philosophy. First, I will explain some material from a paper which appeared today in top place in the PhilPapers manuscripts section. It is by Doctor David Builes. Second, I will explain why I find a line of argument that Builes pursues objectionable. It seems to me obviously objectionable, so I am surprised that the Princeton-based philosopher did not register the objection. But probably we all make surprising oversights at some point in time, so it is somehow not surprising if this is an isolated instance.
        Lump and statue. Builes opens his paper in the following way:
Suppose a lump of clay is fashioned into a statue. What is the relationship between the Lump and the Statue? On the one hand, they seem to be one and the same thing: after all, they seem to share all the same parts and have the same mass, size, shape, etc. On the other hand, there seem to be compelling arguments that they are two distinct things. For example, they seem to differ in their modal properties: the Lump could exist without being statue-shaped, but the Statue could not exist without being statue-shaped.
If you do not understand this argument (which is quite old I think, but of uncertain origins to me), I will try to spell it out. I will do so imitating the modernist poet Laura Riding, although it is perhaps a departure from the favoured norms within this database and some of the material is to be ignored for philosophy. I have put it in smaller writing. "A home is indeed a home and is always home, until perhaps someone else comes in. And this room was not much but it was your home. And there was a lump of clay in your home. Because you were the first person to speak, you called it Lump, with an uppercase letter at the beginning. That is its name. By the mirror it was, for at least two centuries. Then you moved it from over there to over here, by your bedside. You still referred to it as Lump. Of course, it used to have the property of being over there, which some called the quality of being over there and some called the feature. Now it has the property of being over here. So what? It is still Lump, you think. It still has lots of the same properties, but there has been some change: a change in its location. What a terrible world it would be if things had to change name whenever there is a slight change of properties. One day you alter the Lump somewhat. It was a blob shape and it is now more rounded. So what? It is still Lump, you think, and it still has lots of the same properties. Then an artist visits your home a few times and turns it into a statue. You certainly did not want to let him in, but he knocked and if there is one thing you are, it is hospitable. It now has a more pleasing shape, but it is still Lump, isn't it? However, the artist refers to his artwork simply as Statue. What an unimaginative attempt at a name! This artist is all hands you think, skillfully shaping the lump, and lacks the verbal touch: he is no poet. Also he has left you with a philosophical problem. You do not want to say that there are two things in the same place. What an untidy world that would be! But you say that Lump is here and he says that Statue is here. Can you not say that they are two different names for the same thing? Suddenly a philosopher knocks on your door. You certainly don't want to let him in. You ask him: what is his problem? He says that he has overheard a lot of commotion and that if Lump and Statue are the same thing, truly identical, then they have the same properties. But they do not have the same properties. Statue can be destroyed by reshaping the clay. Lump cannot be destroyed so easily. So Lump and Statue must be different things, even though they are in the same region of space, occupying the same portion of space."
        Builes' argument. In the second paragraph of his paper, Builes tells us:
Let a two-thinger be anyone who thinks that the Lump and the Statue are distinct. As it stands, the two-thinger position is very narrow: it is simply a view about states and lumps of clay. What is the best way to generalize the two-thinger's position?
Before going on, let us consider why Builes says that the view that there are two things in one physical space is narrow. His thinking seems to be this. "The view that Lump and Statue are distinct, are not the same, is only about these two things in the same place: Lump and Statue. There are so many other things in the world, however, such as horses and cars and people and cats and paintings and houses. There needs to be some generalization from this case in order for the case to be of interest: where we say that this other case is the same, and this other case, and this other case, and more." I don't accept this claim about what is interesting. Some people may assume the view (or else may not see any problem with the view) that each physical object occupies its own region of space, at a given point in time, and no two objects are in the very same place, occupying the same space. If you say that Lump and Statue are both physical objects and not identical, then you are going to say that this assumption is false (or this view or this thesis). Even if there is no generalization, it does not matter - by which I mean you are still going to say that the assumption is false and that in itself is interesting. (Who wants to walk around with a false assumption? Perhaps it is best not to answer this question! Anyway, do you even have this assumption?) That is one main point I wish to make 
Builes goes on: 
In recent times, many philosophers have argued for a generalization of the two-thinger view known as modal plenitude. According to modal plenitude, every material object (not just statue-shaped lumps of clay) is exactly coincident with infinitely many distinct material objects, where these exactly coincident material objects merely differ from one another in their modal properties.
This generalization is quite sweeping. Roughly, there is a stone outside and there is something else located exactly where the stone is, occupying exactly the same region/portion of space, not less and not more, but it is not identical to the stone, because of something to do with what is possible: perhaps there is a possible situation in which the other thing goes out of existence but not the stone. Given the sweeping generalization, it is like Lump and Statue. And, roughly (assuming here dogs are physical beings), there is a dog outside too and there is something else located exactly where the dog is, but it is not identical to the dog, because of something to do with what is possible: perhaps there is a possible situation in which the other thing goes out of existence but not the dog. And so on. Builes plans to argue against this highly general view: that wherever there is one physical object, there is actually another located in the same place, occupying exactly the same space, not less and not more, but with different possibility properties. But it is a most strange view to us, or some of us. Why would one be attracted to it to begin with, or simply believe it? Merely in order to generalize from the Lump-and-Statue-not-identical view? But as said before, the view is interesting without the generalization, because it challenges an attractive assumption (or view or thesis). Maybe Builes has successfully argued against the strange view he refers to as modal plenitude, but we were never attracted to it.
        Conclusion? Builes introduces a case where we (or some of us) want to say that two things are in the same place, that they occupy the very same physical region, the same portion of space: Lump and Statue. (He was not the first to introduce the case, however. It has been known for a long time.) The two things are not the same, because they have different properties: Lump can continue to exist if one (significantly) reshapes the clay, whereas Statue cannot. Builes writes as if this case is only of interest if we can generalize from it. Then he presents a strange generalization, in which every physical thing is the same (it shares its space with at least one other thing), and then argues against this view. But the case is of interest, even without generalization, because it challenges the assumption that each physical thing is in its own space! Does he not realize this?
Here is an argument, which Builes does not himself make but maybe it was in his first draft.
1. If we cannot generalize from it, then the Lump and Statue case is not of interest.
2. We cannot generalize from it.
Therefore (by modus ponens):
3. The Lump and Statue case is not of interest.
I at least reject (1). Builes seems to accept this premise even in this online draft, which seems to have entered the public domain rather recklessly. "Do you have any self-knowledge when saying this???"


References
Beebee, H. and Mele, A. 2002. Humean Compatibilism. Mind 111 (442): 201-223.
Builes, D.. 2025. A Dilemma for Plenitude. Available at PhilPapers:
https://philpapers.org/archive/BUIADF.pdf
Riding, L. Collected Works.


________________








Salon culture: Nozickian hairdressers, functionalist social anthropology, and cultural studies audiences


Author. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161_Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. Libertarian Robert Nozick, on my reading, responds to Bernard Williams by saying that if Williams thinks the way we should distribute medical goods is based on medical need, he is analogously committed to the distribution of haircuts based on need. As I read him, Nozick wonders why other aims to do with haircuts matter less for Williams than the "proper aim" of getting a haircut: can't a barber set up a business because he likes conversation with a variety of people and give haircuts based on whom he likes conversations with? I argue that a socially just attempt to distribute opportunities for haircuts will have to take into account other aims of a haircut than reducing inconveniently long hair. Haircuts have social functions, including subtly signalling sexuality. More subtle signals may be important in imperfectly liberal societies. This paper challenges an assumption which may be widespread on this database (or maybe not - I am the last one disposed to make it?): one assumes that a Williamsian approach applied to haircuts is all about preventing inconveniently long hair.
Draft version: version 2 (16th November 2025, abstract amended)


Is this paper easy to write?
Perhaps for the right kind of "bright,"
It reads like daylight but is written by "night"


1. Introduction. In this paper, I shall discuss Robert Nozick versus Bernard Williams in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. My aim is not purely philosophical though. I want to write a paper which is of interest also to old-fashioned social anthropologists and cultural studies audiences, if permitted. I was prompted to write this by a conversation with a friend, in which she referred to a certain haircut as indicating a certain sexuality, a subtle indication it seems to me. In the next part of this paper, I will present relevant material from the Williams-Nozick  debate. Nozick argues that haircuts should not be distributed based on need, contrary to Williams, or his Williams. In the third part, I will challenge a tempting assumption, at least for some audiences, maybe many on this database: that distribution based on need is about cutting inconveniently long hair. Haircuts may well have a social function which contributes to ensuring a stable society. In the fourth part, I argue that the realization of this function is a barrier to the obvious way of realizing distribution based on need.
        2. Nozick versus Williams. Nozick quotes Bernard Williams as saying:
Leaving aside preventative medicine, the proper ground of distribution of medical care is ill health: this is a necessary truth. (1974: 233)
Nozick actually quotes much more of Williams and after a few sentences writes:
Presumably, then, the only proper criterion for the distribution of barbering services is barbering need. (1974: 234)
What is Nozick's argument? When I have read him before, without magnifying this material, I supposed it is this: "Williams is saying that for any good (or service), there is a proper use of that good and the way to distribute the good is based on who needs to use it in that proper way: those who have the relevant need should have the good and those who do not have the relevant need should not. Thus the proper use of psoriasis medicine is to counter psoriasis and it should be available to people with psoriasis, not to people without psoriasis. But then we have to distribute haircuts based on need and that is surely a mistake."
        Nozick complains that he might have misunderstood Williams: "No doubt many readers will feel that all hangs on some other argument." But perhaps there are others who will feel that Nozick himself is also mysterious (or that he is the mysterious one). I shall work with the interpretation of Nozick above. It may be useful to spell matters out in premises and a conclusion. This is the argument Nozick thinks Bernard Williams must accept given what Williams says.
1. If a haircut is a good/service, then a haircut must be distributed on the basis of need: you have the opportunity for a haircut, if you need the haircut, otherwise you do not.
2. A haircut is a good/service.
Therefore (by modus ponens):
3. A haircut must be distributed on the basis of need: you have the opportunity for a haircut, if you need the haircut, otherwise you do not..
Nozick thinks premise (1) is false. It is within his (or her) rights for a barber to set up a business because he likes talking to a variety of people and, furthermore, to distribute his services based on whom he prefers talking to. Anyway, I want to contest an assumption.
        3. The longhair assumption. When I read Nozick before, I thought of how you need a haircut when your hair was inconveniently long: it gets into food or it is so long that you trample on it. That was my assumption when engaging with the debate. But it occurs to me from experience, from conversation, and from learning social anthropology that haircuts can have important social functions, or other important social functions. A haircut can subtly indicate a non-mainstream sexual preference, for example homosexuality in a predominantly heterosexual society. Maybe it will cause considerable disruption to some societies if this subtle indicator is not available. People will leave or perform worse at work. "But are we not all liberal now?" We may not live in ideally liberal circumstances. Various people from various communities still feel uncomfortable with open expression of preferences in a widely understood language. ("You feel uncomfortable with expressing anything, it seems to me." I am not sure if my speech is fully governed by economic rationality, e.g. "Just take a side in a debate and assert it firmly, because it is too much use of resources to think carefully about what is really the case.") 
        4. A problem. If you think that the distribution of goods/services should only be on the basis of need and so haircut distribution should only be on the basis of need, then you probably think the government should be responsible for the distribution: for who gets to have a haircut (in a given period of time, e.g. this week!) and who does not. But what if people need certain haircuts or society needs certain haircuts as a subtle indicator of sexuality. How can the government get involved with subtle indicators of sexuality by means of haircut? A government policy in a liberal society should ideally be transparent and justifiable to all citizens.
          


References
Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Available at, um:
https://antilogicalism.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/anarchy-state-utopia.pdf
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. 1940. On Social Structure. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland  70(1): 1-12. Available at:
https://www.bebr.ufl.edu/sites/default/files/Radcliffe-Brown%20-%201940%20-%20On%20Social%20Structure.pdf
Williams, B. 1973. The idea of equality. In Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (I cannot find this online.)


________________


Comparison of Marilyn Strathern's "synthesis" of social anthropology and cultural studies versus my own
Add earlier paper reference and functionalism hospital complaint…
Author: Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. One of the big issues which dominated British social anthropology in the 1990s was its relationship to cultural studies. Here are some standard stories of origins: cultural studies developed from applying predominantly French 1960s theoretical frameworks, developed for the study of prestigious arts, to less esteemed culture, on the grounds that they can be used there too or that there is no defensible distinction between the two. Social anthropology, older, had started out in the 19th century as the study of human societies, with a special emphasis on primitive societies, and developed a special method of lengthy intensive fieldwork and later applied this method "at home" too. Its traditional reference points are different and unsurprisingly there is rivalry, sometimes bitter. I interpret Marilyn Strathern as trying to offer an anthropology to win over students for whom cultural studies has appeal, in her 1992 book After Nature: English kinship in the late 20th century. She engages in a kind of worldview analysis of a number of things of interest to students of English culture - she grasps the intellectual tastes of the student and aims at an anthropology which works for that taste, it seems to me. My own synthesis is at a philosophical level. Building on John Searle''s responses to Jacques Derrida, I observe positivist premises shared by this influential figure in cultural studies and the functionalist tradition which dominated British anthropology from the 1920s to the 1960s at least. These allow us to conceive a more Derridean functionalist anthropology. Also I propose that it is possible to do a number of functionalist analyses for "1990s cultural studies tastes," as Strathern does worldview analyses.
Draft version: version 1 (18th November 2025)
Word processor: Google Docs.


"I too let out a frustrated sigh
Although I don't quite know why,
So great is our distance from the great:
How long can Sally-Ann wait?"




1. Introduction
        Perhaps this paper is of most interest to historians of the academic world looking back at how history could have been. Perhaps it is of interest to people interested in fairness: can you fairly deal with a bitter dispute within the academic world during the 1990s, and probably some years before and some years beyond, on the boundary between the social sciences and the arts? The dispute is between social anthropology and cultural studies. I can. I fear though that I don't have enough rules when dealing with disputes, but I do have the character for it, I think (or hope). My fear is that someone will simply say, "Figure out a system of rules for being fair in such cases, available to loyal members of either side, or this text gets locked in the closet." But what happens if I do? "We will do our best to improve it slightly and then lock your one in the closet"? In the next part and third part of this paper, I present the histories of both disciplines, or fields of research, according to standard accounts of our time. In the fourth part, I present Strathern's attempt at "synthesis." It aims at meeting the taste of the student contemplating cultural studies instead of anthropology. In the fifth part, I argue that she could have appealed to this taste without abandoning traditional structural-functionalist analysis. In the sixth part, I present my synthesis of structural-functionalism and part of cultural studies. The seventh part is a side note on the sexes of the participants.


2. Origins of British social anthropology 
        Social anthropology was once defined as the study of primitive societies. Legend says that British social anthropology was founded by the Pole Bronislaw Malinowski and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, once known as Anarchy Brown, who had climbed up from the lower classes. Malinowski provided the method which has come to define social anthropology in the eyes of many: lengthy fieldwork involving participating in the way of life of the society studied. Malinowski was counted as a member of the enemy by the British during World War One, because he was from the Austro-Hungarian empire, but was allowed to do fieldwork amongst the Trobriand Islanders, an exotic people by British standards. His 1921 book Argonauts of the Western Pacific is referred to as the founding text. Malinowski also devised a new theoretical framework, influenced by French thinker Émile Durkheim: functionalism. Malinowski's functionalism was simple: individuals in every society have certain needs, but different societies have different ways of meeting those needs. For example, the need for bodily comfort is partly met by agencies which rent rooms in our society, but is met in other ways in other societies. Radcliffe-Brown was also inspired by Durkheim, but developed a different kind of functionalism, which was probably more popular in British anthropology: structural functionalism. Structural functionalism does not focus on the functions of institutions within a society to meet individual needs, rather on how the different institutions form a coherent structure and function to maintain that structure. For example, if you departed from certain norms in your professional work, this may be of value for moving up a social class, but if you also have an episode of mental illness, the psychiatrist will say, "Why are you doing these unprofessional things? Your mind seems to be not in its right state." Psychiatry functions to maintain hierarchy, preventing people from one social class from moving up a rank. (This example is from personal experience, by the way.)
        How accurate is legend? In truth, there was a demand for fieldwork to be done by social anthropologists from the mid-19th century at least, but for some reason it proved difficult to meet the demand. Anthropology in the 19th century was defined as the study of man, of human beings, but there was a special emphasis on primitive societies. However, the armchair academics involved mostly did not actually study primitive societies. Prior to Malinowski, there were earlier efforts, such as the Torres Strait expedition of the 1890s and W. H. Rivers' study of the Todas. Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown are not considered to be gentlemen, an important concept in British society, and are even considered to be enemies of the gentleman academic, harbouring murderous desires, but a series of more refined researchers had earlier failed to do what they did, bring about the desired revolution, though they probably contributed much.
        Academic social anthropology continues to focus on societies regarded as primitive, although anthropologists today do not think of them as such and emphasize their histories and the consequences of colonialism. One of the repeated criticisms of earlier social anthropology was that it was the handmaiden of colonialism: and functionalist Since the 1980s, there has been a considerable expansion of anthropology at home, in developed complex liberal societies, such as Britain. 


3. Origins of Cultural Studies
        The origins of Cultural Studies are quite different. Cultural Studies, according to a standard origins story, developed from applying theoretical frameworks for the interpretation of prestigious arts to less esteemed creative works: "trashy" novels, advertisements, and more. These were applied either simply because they could be or because of doubts about the division between high arts (literature in a prestigious sense, painting, classical music, and more) and popular arts of less esteem. In his much used textbook on literary theory, Terry Eagleton writes.
Some literary theory has indeed been excessively in-group and  obscurantist, and this book represents one attempt to undo that damage  and make it more widely accessible. But there is another sense in which such theory is the very reverse of elitist. What is truly elitist in  literary studies is the idea that works of literature can only be  appreciated by those with a particular sort of cultural breeding… Theory was a way of emancipating literary works from the stranglehold of a 'civilized sensibility', and throwing them open to a kind of analysis in which, in principle at least, anyone could participate. There are those who have 'literary values' in their bones, and those who languish in the outer darkness. One important reason for the growth of literary theory since the 1960s was the gradual breakdown of this assumption, under the impact of new kinds of students entering higher education from supposedly 'uncultivated' backgrounds. (1996: viii)
The new theoretical frameworks for analysing prestigious literary texts and more came mostly from 1960s France, more specifically 1960s Paris, such as most infamously Derridean deconstruction. Derridean deconstruction said that a text always has some other interpretation which is equally legitimate, when compared with the orthodox interpretation. Such an interpretation is often achieved by paying attention to aspects of a text regarded as marginal or much lesser importance by the orthodox interpretation, such as a piece of dialogue in play which could be cut while preserving the main characterization and plot.
        How true is this origins story? Some of the theoretical frameworks which came out of Paris were, officially at least, not foremostly developed for the purpose of interpreting prestigious or less prestigious cultural objects. Lacanian psychoanalysis was presented as an interpretation of Freud and its official end was to provide therapy for patients. The historically-minded Foucault was probably tasked with letting more people know what psychiatry is really like by means of flashier texts: it functions to produce docile subjects, to borrow his apt word "docile." A different kind of story emphasizes Cultural Studies as an interdisciplinary formation, allocating interpretation of the arts a lesser role. Decades before these French theorists, there were scientific and systematic projects of literary interpretation, but they are mostly obscure now and not mentioned even in lengthier histories. I recall opening a book which had been brought up from the store section of the University of Manchester library which simply counted kinds of metaphor or similar in Elizabethan writers, such as metallic imagery and earthy imagery. It was by a University of London scholar, a woman, I cannot remember her name or the book. It had graphs you could pull out. Her first name was Catherine perhaps.


4. Rivalry and Strathern's "synthesis"
        Social anthropology and Cultural Studies unsurprisingly developed rivalrous relations, which were especially visible in the 1990s but probably existed long before and still continues: professional philosophers seem to die much younger than anthropologists. The two disciplines, if they can be called that, have different origins and they have different concepts and they are prominent in different institutions. British social anthropology is mainly based in elite and some other old universities of the United Kingdom. The London School of Economics, where Malinowski was based, is particularly important in its history; the University of Cambridge was extremely influential before the functionalist period and with its demise; other universities involved include Oxford, the University of Manchester (the home of a late stage functionalism), St Andrews and more: the elite and the solidly respectable, in short. Cultural Studies is popular in a variety of newer universities in Britain, which gained university status in the 1960s and afterwards.
        I think of Marilyn Strathern in her book After Nature: English kinship in the late twentieth century as writing a book for a student choosing between a career in social anthropology and cultural studies. It seems to me to have heavily taken into account the tastes, or perceived tastes, of such a student and is the fruit of years of experience and debate. In 1988, Strathern wrote an article which addressed revisionary historians of social anthropology who emphasized the overlaps between Malinowski and earlier anthropologists, including overlaps with an armchair anthropologist who never did fieldwork but was enormously popular with Victorian audiences, namely Sir James Frazer. She said that Malinowski pioneered a new way of writing an anthropology text, contrasting this way with Frazer's pages of decontextualized pieces of information. The philosopher of anthropology I.C. Jarvie was invited to respond and charged Strathern with being a relativist, instead of regarding Malinowski's fieldwork revolution as scientific progress. It was mere a change of literary fashion, or that is the depiction Jarvie attributes to Stathern (Note: if you try to write anthropology, you are usually heavily dependent on how predecessors did: the framework for putting all this data into a coherent shape. The development of such a framework is a major achievement, so I would not say that Strathern is flagging mere changes of literary fashion.) Despite their intense disagreement, Jarvie and Strathern share the common ground of wanting  to bring back Frazer, much to the opposition of most anthropologists. Jarvie more or less gives Strathern some advice:
Assuming that ethnographic monographs are fictions, we may wish them more readable and hence persuasive; for that they would better be modelled on the astringent Trollope, Surtees, or Waugh than, as they often seem to be, on Melville, Dreiser, and Dos Passos (1988: 273)
I think it is difficult to underestimate the extent to which the debate influenced Strathern's book After Nature, although he is not acknowledged. Early on, the book presents itself as a positivist text focused on publicly observable behaviour. Her text:
…should not be mistaken for a study of what people think or feel.
In response to the charge of relativism: she more or less says that she is scientific, a positivist. To overcome the experience of boredom which various readers complain of with the older anthropology (and maybe almost anything from the London School of Economics, and which Jarvie publicly flags), Strathern has lots of brief analyses. And to cover interest in literature, there is analysis of Jane Austen's assumptions about society.
        The old functionalist anthropologists were mostly opposed to the concept of culture, which they found vague. They thought of society as a set of individuals bound by relations of rights and duties specified within the society. They also sought to avoid describing people's beliefs, even their public statements. Rituals start up and different individuals give different justifications for why it is there. Focus on what the function of this ritual is, for maintaining the society. Strathern abandons functionalist anthropology for analysing changing assumptions, a focus which has significant resemblance to Frazer's interest in how societies move from magic to religion to scientific thinking. She more or less treats English middle class kinship as a folk theory which has endured for long but which is challenged by new reproductive technologies. (Another aim of Strathern's, I think, is to say something about these which is better than the Warnock Report.)
Strathern's so-called synthesis then involves bringing back a pre-functionalist emphasis on changing assumptions, on worldview in short, and focusing more on home contexts, rather than so-called primitive societies, and having lots of brief analyses. It seems to me that the book is aimed at the tastes of the student who would otherwise prefer Cultural Studies. It is anthropology adapted for that taste. That is as far as it goes with synthesis. (Behold the charming Victorian book cover and compare it to the cover on her older work of anthropology at home, on Elmdon ) Is it successful? The brief sparkly analyses which bubble and disappear have prevented it from being included in kinship readers, I think, despite its large influence. This is a major problem. The older anthropology has more mainstream status, e.g. Radcliffe-Brown on the mother's brother and joking relationships! From the oral culture, it has received criticisms for being insufficiently historically-minded, a criticism which dogs Strathern wherever she contributes, and for being essentialist about the English middle class, conveyed by David Mills, for being overly focused on the middle class of England, which John Gledhill conveys (there is Marxist strand of Cultural Studies), and for being obscure or simply too condensed, from almost everyone involved. David Mills is on the boundary between cultural studies and social anthropology and he is not buying, which is a big mark against Sfrathern's effort, I think. But it is a foundational text for anthropology in Britain and has influenced numerous fieldworkers here, such as Nigel Rapport, Jeanette Edwards, Sarah Green, Katharine Tyler, and Gillian Evans. Not Raminder Kaur?
 
5. Structural functionalist in cultural studies style
        Strathern writes that structural functionalist anthropology has not been of significant value when applied in home contexts, in Britain for example, in contrast to how rewarding it has been when applied in the societies traditionally studied by social anthropologists:
The social anthropological models of kinship so well nurtured in Britain in the mid-century, and so illuminating in relation to non-Western societies, seemed after all to obscure rather than clarify things when it came to elucidating the English. (1992: 4)
It seems to me that structural-functionalism can be profitably applied to British society. As already suggested, it can be applied to psychiatry and doing so leads one to anticipate Foucault: the same basic lesson that this institution functions to produce docile subjects and thereby maintain the social structure can be learnt: one emerges from treatment behaving in line with the norms of one's social class and fears to do anything else. (If I may draw on personal experience, I had some troubles with mental health in 2023 and the psychiatrist, apart from recommending injections, which were carried out, said that my house was cluttered, evidence of a disordered mind, and my fingernails long. After the two months in hospital, I was careful to behave in line with middle class social conventions for more than a year.) Drawing on my earlier work, I shall present two other structural-functionalist analyses.
        Structural-functionalism can be used to analyse literary fashion. In prestigious literature, there are the best, a few, and the many rest. A foreigner appears and is in-between: a Milan Kundera say, a Joseph Conrad from an earlier period. The rest move up a level and produce similar work, posing the question: is this person any better than us? Unless the foreigner clearly moves up a level, literary fashion probably functions to maintain social structure
        Structural-functionalism can also be used to understand haircuts and social justice. When we think of social justice and haircuts, we think firstly that people with inconveniently long hair should be entitled to a haircut. But haircuts can also serve as subtle signalling systems, for example for oppressed groups in a society. The removal of those signalling systems can result in excessive oppression and lead to instability. A structural functionalist analysis of the barber is available. It seems to me that structural-functionalism could have been used to offer lots of brief insightful analyses, of the kind attractive to the reader Strathern is seeking to win over.


6. My synthesis   
        My synthesis is not about achieving an anthropology adapted for the aesthetic tastes of someone attracted to cultural studies: the pacing of material, etc. My synthesis is philosophical! It is the old functionalists and their close intellectual descendants who are most opposed to cultural studies. At a 1999 conference to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the opening of the University of Manchester's anthropology department, I recall an old anthropologist standing up and saying, "If we do this, we will finally become CULTURAL STUDIES." Was it Jean La Fontaine? Also, Maia Green used to unhappily inquire about the work of another anthropologist: is it cultural studies? My synthesis combines Derrida and the old functionalism.
John Searle in his long debate with the infamous French philosopher Derrida pointed out that Derrida relies on positivist assumptions: either something falls under a concept or not (e.g. either the concept of fiction applies to a literary work or it does not apply: either it is fiction or not); and there must be a method of verifying whether it does or does not, for any proper concept. Derrida's positivism leads him to doubt the value of the concept of a social context when analysing a literary text, to minimize reliance on the attribution of intentions, and to propose that regarding the interpretation of a text which (supposedly) most closely fits with the evidence, there is an alternative interpretation which fits just as well or better. The old structural-functionalism was also based on positivism. It did not get involved in attributing beliefs because what the anthropologist has is behavioural evidence, which may not correspond to inner states. My synthesis is this:
* We can think of the structural-functionalist who tries to specify the social structure of a society and how it is maintained as like an interpreter of a text.
* For any structure attributed with justification by the anthropologist's evidence, there is an  alternative structure which is also justifiable.
But the synthesis is, I think, a dangerous one for anthropologists in very different societies to ours, in practice. Just imagine oneself doing fieldwork amongst an exotic tribe. They tell you that a certain person is the chief. Given the second component, you wonder whether some other person is the chief (or at least whether you can make such a hypothesis practically workable - you can orient yourself in the society with some other attribution of chiefhood), much as a footballer may sometimes wonder whether the actual captain of a rival team is the one who wears the captain's armband. But if you are busy looking into alternative hypotheses, which may not prove practically workable, you may be confused for too long. You should be doing things on the basis of the official structure and instead you are looking into whether an alternative model works. It is probably too much for the working anthropologist elsewhere, although the synthesis surely cannot be ignored.


7. A sidenote
I fear someone will simply say, "Professor Marilyn Strathern's is a typically female approach to the problem of bridging anthropology and cultural studies: it pays considerable attention to people's tastes; it is a pragmatic local fix. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward, building on Professor John Searle's observations about Derrida, is a typically male approach: a systematic synthesis. Men have come in and laid solid long-term foundations, which will probably persist through changes of taste." I don't see why a woman could not do our roles. Female influence is quite large in social anthropology, so perhaps there is a problem of "chemistry" amongst females preventing the synthesis from emerging - this type and that type don't get along - rather than "I could not do the synthesis." Or maybe specialization is the problem: the space between anthropology and analytic philosophy is largely unoccupied. (Many incentives were presented against my occupying it, but I was determined. "It never happened"?) Apart from devising the synthesis, I also more or less tested out the synthesis while I was in hospital, leading me to my concern that it is too much for the working anthropologist outside of special contexts. Philosophically-minded people can come up with all sorts of ideas for anthropologists, but many may end up labelled toxic. Anyway, I am a bit proud of the synthesis, I confess, assuming it was not known in some less visible discussion club and not in the voluminous literature elsewhere. I can sit on the floor beside an enthroned Kant perhaps (see Williamson 2020: 104).


References
Derrida J. 1988. Limited Inc. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Available at:
https://lab404.com/misc/ltdinc.pdf
(Some key texts from his debate with John Searle.)
Eagleton, T. 1996 (second ed.). Literary Theory. An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell. (Google Docs refuses to close the gap below.)
Edward, T.R. 2016. Does Marilyn Strathern Argue That The Concept of Nature Is a Social Construction? Symposion 3(4): 437-442. Available at:
http://symposion.acadiasi.ro/does-marilyn-strathern-argue-that-the-concept-of-nature-is-a-social-construction-pages-437-442/
And:
https://philarchive.org/archive/VIRDMS
(This is a useful source of information for behaviourism in  contemporary social anthropology, and has been cited by various sources. If symbolic capital matters to you, it was on a Brazilian undergraduate curriculum, is cited by an Indonesian psychology paper, and was discussed by Jakub Havlicek in Imagining Religion in the Czech Republic : Anthropological Perspectives.)
Edward, T.R. 2022. Do anthropologists use rational actor models? The case of Marilyn Strathern. IJRDO - Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research 7 (3): 
https://www.ijrdo.org/index.php/sshr/article/view/4838/3252
Edward, T.R. 2022. Traditional literary interpretation versus subversive interpretation. Asian Journal of Advances in Research 16 (3):34-39:
https://jasianresearch.com/index.php/AJOAIR/article/view/359/382
(Several earlier drafts are available on PhilPapers. Useful for understanding behaviourism in contemporary social anthropology.)
Edward, T.R. 2023. Are individuals a problem for British structural-functionalist anthropology? IJRDO 9(8): 106-108. Available at:
https://ijrdo.org/index.php/sshr/article/view/5912/3807
(A foundation for my synthesis.)
Edward, T.R. 2025. "If it cannot predict, then it is not science": I argue social anthropology can. Available on PhilPapers:
https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWIIC.pdf
Edward, T.R. 2025. Salon culture: Nozickian hairdressers, functionalist social anthropology, and cultural studies audiences. Available at PhilPapers:
https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWSCN.pdf
Foucault, M. 1988 (originally 1965, in English, translated by RIchard Howard). Madness and civilization. A history of insanity in the age of reason. New York: Vintage Books. (Originally Random House, in English. Originally the French tradition?! I have only read bits, but I have read Foucault.) Available at:
https://monoskop.org/images/1/14/Foucault_Michel_Madness_and_Civilization_A_History_of_Insanity_in_the_Age_of_Reason.pdf
Foucault, M. 1995 (a second English edition, translated by Alan Sheridan). DIscipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books (a division of Random House). Available at:
https://monoskop.org/images/4/43/Foucault_Michel_Discipline_and_Punish_The_Birth_of_the_Prison_1977_1995.pdf
(This book may seem indulgent and flashy, but it is an immense achievement.)
Radcliffe-Brown, A.R. 1940. On Social Structure. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 70(1): 1-12. Available at:
https://www.bebr.ufl.edu/sites/default/files/Radcliffe-Brown%20-%201940%20-%20On%20Social%20Structure.pdf
Searle, J.R. 1983. The Word Turned Upside Down. The New York Review of Books October 27 1983: 74-79.
Searle, J.R. 1994. Literary Theory and Its Discontents. New Literary History 25: 637-667.
Strathern, M. (with a foreword by A. Richards and an epilogue by F. Oxford). 1981. Kinship at the core. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Strathern, M. et al. (including I.C. Jarvie as commentator) 1987. Out of Context: The Persuasive Fictions of Anthropology. Current Anthropology 28(1): 251-281.
Strathern, M. 1992. After Nature: English kinship in the late twentieth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Williamson, T. 2020. Philosophical Method. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
________________
Is social anthropology best defined by its fieldwork method? (An analytic philosophy paper?)


Author: Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. Social anthropology is mostly associated with a method of study by those who have some acquaintance with it. The standard image of a researcher in this discipline for many of us is that of a posh white Westerner, an English gentleman or lady, living amongst an exotic faraway tribe, participating in their way of life for an extended period, and then reporting on the society: its customs, the shared worldview and ethos, the social structure, and perhaps more. This fieldwork by participation is referred to as ethnography and in the eyes of many anthropologists defines the discipline, which was once defined as the study of primitive societies. I provide an alternative account of why this definition is now offered, the standard account being that primitive societies mostly disappeared, forcing a change. Professor Tim Ingold has attacked the definition over decades, recommending a vision of social anthropology as philosophy with the people in it. In this paper, I raise a worry about the fieldwork definition - it will be a worry for some anthropologists anyway: it allows for a kind of journalism to count as anthropology, a kind which does not draw upon the specific tradition of concepts, theses, and fieldwork insights of British academic anthropology (or French anthropology or American anthropology, for that matter). An appendix considers whether this paper is analytic philosophy.
Draft version: version 1 (20th November 2025)
Software used (freeware): Google docs and kleki.com
  
"Sally-Ann wonders during the wait:
Is it too late
To cook you, mate?"


1. Introduction
        What is social anthropology? It is a discipline which one can study at universities. In the country in which I live, the United Kingdom, it is mostly studied at old well-established universities. A popular image of this discipline, amongst those who know of it, is this: it involves a posh white gentleman or lady travelling to an exotic faraway tribe, living amongst them for an extended period of time (a year or longer), participating in their way of life, and then reporting what they found: reporting on the customs, the worldview and ethos, the social structure, and perhaps more. Fieldwork by participatory observation can also be done in less exotic contexts, by our standards anyway, and it is. Many social anthropologists are attracted to a definition of social anthropology according to which its fieldwork method, known as ethnography, defines it. In the next part of this paper, I present an alternative account of why this definition is popular, in contrast to the standard account: social anthropology was once defined as the study of primitive societies, but anthropologists ran out of primitive societies to study and so changed definition. The definition of social anthropology as fieldwork also meets with opposition, traditionally from anthropologists who believe anthropology should be a generalizing science in search of laws of society, with fieldwork supplying data, a position associated with A.R. Radcliffe-Brown. More recently, opposition is led by Professor Tim Ingold, who since 1992, has memorably described anthropology as philosophy with the people in it. In the final part of this paper, I present a problem for the fieldwork definition and consider solutions: the problem is that a kind of journalism counts as social anthropology.


2. Why the fieldwork definition
        In the nineteenth century, anthropology was not yet a properly professional discipline. Information about societies was often provided by amateurs, such as missionaries and travellers, sometimes "immortally" talented amateurs though. The analysis of data was done by armchair anthropologists, as they are now metaphorically called: academics who did not do fieldwork. Anthropology was defined as the study of man or the study of human societies or these with the qualification: a special emphasis on primitive societies. So-called primitive societies were a focus of attention because they revealed what the earliest societies were like. There was a demand for the academics to do fieldwork themselves but fieldwork only became compulsory in the 1920s, after Bronislaw Malinowski's Argonauts of the Western Pacific, based on his fieldwork study of the Trobriand Islanders. Social anthropology became defined as the study of primitive societies - defined not as the earliest, but as small and technologically simple (Evans-Pritchard 1951: 8) - and a fieldwork of lengthy participant observation became its method.
        The standard account of why social anthropology came to be defined simply by fieldwork, for many anthropologists, is that anthropology ran out of primitive societies, if they ever were. The societies traditionally studied by anthropologists have entered into relations between capitalism and imperialist powers and have transformed to the point where they cannot be called primitive, in any relevant sense. This is the account that occurs to just about any outsider looking in. But here I wish to present an alternative account.
        Once an innovative and important method becomes compulsory within a discipline, it tends to become what defines the discipline, displacing earlier definitions. What is economics? A natural starting point for us is: the study of the economy. But it uses rational actor models, which feature simplified hypothetical situations in which one can deduce what rational agents will do, and these have come to define the discipline. An economist uses models, economists will say. But then, one can count as doing economics without studying the economy, or what we intuitively think of as the economy. Prisoner's dilemma is economics, but it concerns whether it is rational for prisoners to confess or not. Why did this method take over and come to define the discipline for many, so that economics is now the study of rational choice, by the use of models? One answer is that once the method is devised and made much use of to study the economy, one does not want to lose other uses to other disciplines (or other uses when dealing with human beings, if one must leave some uses to biology). Another answer is that one's department becomes a centre for anyone interested in using the method. I think social anthropology would have analogously come to be defined by its fieldwork method anyway, even if primitive societies as defined by anthropologists from the 1920s to the 60s remained. People find it useful to use the method in other situations, other contexts, and one wants one's department to be a centre to which researchers can come. Thus the attractiveness of an alternative account of why this definition has become popular.


3. A problematic definition
        If we think of social anthropology as defined by its fieldwork method - if you produce a text based on such fieldwork research, then you are an anthropologist; otherwise not - we run into a problem. A work of journalism could potentially count as social anthropology. But what is the problem with that? Why not simply be broad minded? What the British social anthropology professor is likely to a feel - a Jeanette Edwards, say - is that British anthropology has developed a valuable set of concepts and theses and fieldwork insights from its earlier research, focused primarily on so-called primitive societies, and also its more recent research in less exotic contexts by our standards. "We would like to see future research draw upon that tradition." For example, social anthropologists find that people in a number of societies they study feel bound to reciprocate: upon receiving a gift, they feel an obligation to return at some point. Gift exchange is more pervasive and influential in other societies than in Western liberal societies, it seems. But is it actually? A social anthropologist studying the British National Health Service could inquire into the extent to which people feel they should reciprocate after receiving treatment. Do they simply feel "I pay my taxes and vote for the maintenance of this service, so I am entitled to it?" The definition of social anthropology as based on its fieldwork method does little to ensure that research will draw upon this valuable tradition. Instead there might be works - experienced by various readers probably as much lighter in intellectual content - in which a person has spent time with a social group and journalistically reported their ways.
        But won't journalistic research simply be in the newspapers rather than in more prestigious publications, in, say, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute? Not necessarily. The newspapers are governed by market forces, which favour hot topics. There are probably a variety of topics on which the government, or public funding bodies, want information and they will take it in journalistic "style," or a style much closer to journalism. 
        How to react to this problem? One response is to simply accept that there will be exceptions in prestigious outlets for disseminating research: top journals in the field will occasionally publish journalism-like papers. But there is a risk of being overrun with exceptions: almost every new researcher ignores the high-minded tradition, shaped by studying so-called primitive societies, and goes for this journalism-beyond-market-incentives option. Another response is to nag people. The definition of social anthropology emphasizes its fieldwork method and there is the possibility of these journalistic works which meet the definition, but someone has to nag people into drawing upon the long British tradition of concepts, theses, and fieldwork insights in their research, generally preventing this possibility from being realized. This is stressful for the person who must do the nagging, however, or it is over the years: surely there are anthropologists who are nagged-out by now! And people think: "If only we could get rid of this annoying person, we could have much easier lives." A third response is to change the definition. For example, one might define social anthropology as research into certain general cross-cultural questions, such as "Why does every society have an incest taboo?" or "Is every society either a monetary economy or a barter economy?" You cannot do proper research into these questions without attending to past works of British (and also French) social anthropology. But that is the end of the fieldwork-based definition! Also people may try to join your department who say, "I have not done fieldwork but I have a model to address your question." Social anthropology departments are small, they depend on their brand identity, and on everyone's doing their part in adding to the body of fieldwork.


4. Philosophy with the people in it?
        A strict definitional separation of social anthropology from fieldwork description was advocated by A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, generally recognized as a foundational figure alongside Malinowski. (An overly simple story is that Malinowski laid down the fieldwork method, this foundational stone, and Radcliffe-Brown laid down the theoretical emphasis on social structures and how they are maintained, this other foundational stone.) Contemporary professor Tim Ingold neatly summarizes Radcliffe-Brown as follows:
An idiographic inquiry, Radcliffe-Brown explained, aims to document the particular facts of past and present lives, whereas the aim of nomothetic inquiry is to arrive at general propositions or theoretical statements. Ethnography, then, is specifically a mode of idiographic inquiry, differing from history and archaeology in that it is based on the direct observation of living people rather than on written records or material remains attesting to the activities of people in the past. Anthropology, to the contrary, is a field of nomothetic science. (2008: 21)
Ingold himself favours distinguishing social anthropology from ethnography. Actually he prefers to write simply of anthropology. In 1992, he introduced the description "Anthropology is philosophy with the people in it." (1992: 696) It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine this statement, although I do wonder whether others might claim to be anthropology then! (It is interesting how long it took before this description was foregrounded by the average anthropologist. There was a slow process of assessment by experts? Also why introduce it in 1992: "We are expecting you already"? Also Professor Marilyn Strathern on the authenticity of Chinese food in Manchester, 1992: 36.) Anyway, the main contributions of this paper are in the previous section.


Appendix: an analytic paper?
Is this a paper in analytic philosophy? On the one hand, analytic philosophy focuses on definition, argument, and clarity. I think it is unreasonable to expect higher standards in these areas than above at present. To demand more would probably severely strict the extent to which analytic philosophers are likely to help other disciplines with philosophical needs. But analytic philosophy is also associated with a specific canon of texts and these have not been referred to well. "It is not analytic philosophy then," some will think. Well, I could easily add a reference to philosopher of anthropology I.C. Jarvie's paper opposing fieldwork as compulsory to do that (Jarvie 1967). Others will have this reaction. "The analytic philosophy in this topic begins when you start distinguishing several subtly different definitions of anthropology as fieldwork by participant observation. Don't call us on the journey from Jeanette Edwards asserting her preference for detailed reports of people's kinship concepts and practices to this paper above, however useful it may be for the anthropology professor." This has a somewhat similar effect to insisting on reference to items within a canon of texts. One tends to refer mainly to familiar topics because they have reached a stage where it is sensible to engage in such fine-grained analysis. (The exceptions will be scattered? "Men" shouting to each other from hilltops? If I have a contribution to identity studies, it is how academics and various others indirectly reinforce a traditional identity without an explicitly conservative requirement: you must refer to one these texts, etc.) 
  

References
(A "-"  before where one needs to sign up, rather than a fully open access source.)
Edward, T.R. 2023. Real diversity and Chinese food in Manchester. Available at:
https://www.academia.edu/96487245/Real_diversity_and_Chinese_food_in_Manchester
(Note: I cannot find this using Google search, but I can with bing and duckduckgo, 20th November, using the title as search string: it comes up as the first or second result.)
Edward, T.R. 2025. Beyond journalism: what is social anthropology of the British National Health Service? A response to Degnen, Tyler, and Blamire. Available at:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/396680264_Beyond_journalism_what_is_social_anthropology_of_the_British_National_Health_Service_A_response_to_Degnen_Tyler_and_Blamire
Edwards, J. (no relation). Donor siblings: participating in each other's conception. HAU: Journal of ethnographic theory 3(2): 285-292. Available at:
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.14318/hau3.2.018
Ingold T. 1992. Editorial. Man 27(4): 693-696.
https://pedropeixotoferreira.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/ingold_1992_editorial_man.pdf
Ingold, T. 2008. Anthropology is not ethnography. British Academy Review 11:
https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/documents/2051/pba154p069.pdf
-Jarvie, I.C. 1967. On Theories of Fieldwork and the Scientific Character of Anthropology. Philosophy of Science 34(3): 223-242. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/186498
-Sfrathern, M. 1992. After Nature: English kinship in the late twentieth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at:
https://www.scribd.com/doc/103131881/After-Nature-1992-Strathern
________________


Moral intuitionism, particularism, and why there was the British empire


Author. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 161__Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. When we think of why there was a British empire, we think foremostly of economic explanations - we think of raw materials gained, of foreign peoples exploited for gain, of commerce - and then of the civilizing mission: converting savages to Christianity. But were there other reasons for why people supported the empire project? This paper speculates that a few people supported the empire because they were particularists, against simple standardized systems such as the metric system, and rather like moral intuitionists and moral particularists of analytic philosophy today, such as Jonathan Dancy. "The Europeans are not particularists and we British imperialists are interested in finding fellow particularists and helping them join the modern world," they thought.
Draft version: version 1 (20th November 2025)
Software used (freeware): Google Docs and jspaint and Google search


Although she may never understand
She will nevertheless say, "AND?"


Introduction
        I have the impression that many people in the country in which I live are deeply puzzled by its policies and how it is today. Walking around Manchester today and for some decades, one finds shops selling goods from all over the world or at least goods which have roots in other traditions: for example, a China town in the city centre composed of many Chinese restaurants; and numerous Indian or Pakistani restaurants in Rusholme and Longsight. The city contains large ethnic populations as well: with roots in the Indian subcontinent or East Asia, as well as many black people. In our day, Kathleen Stock is probably a more sophisticated and articulate voice for such puzzlement. Don't people by nature like to be amongst like-minded people in small communities? Don't their moral feelings, and their sense of moral obligation, only extend to those they really know? If one says what seems obvious - many are here because of Britain's imperial past and the relations which were developed through the British empire - that just leads to a question of why this empire was made to begin with? "One has to spend time amongst foreigners with foreign ways, when they are too different and one must even govern them, when they are simply unsuited to British customs, by nature or by their ways of upbringing": that is surely a Stockish view, which we can also find earlier in our specific philosophical tradition in C.D. Broad. Or "Don't people like everything in its proper place and the proper place for a British person is in Britain, with its mild temperatures and damp weather." I suspect Stock's political philosophy and that of many of others is my station and its duties, to use a memorable phrase (Bradley 1876?): a nation is a community which must, in order for it to function, form a hierarchy of social classes, each of which has an important role to play; members of a given social class should generally work to meet that role instead of getting out of place, even if they have the talents. (And probably her view is that democracy and universal suffrage are itself puzzling: "Politics is a skilled craft like any other and the more one progresses in it, the more one realizes how clueless the novice is and yet we give a lot of novices votes, such as myself.")
Kathleen Stock's outlook - C.D. Broad's outlook some decades before, more or less - probably goes back centuries, but is it the outlook of people sufficiently poor, or lacking in resources? If you are trained in a craft and develop a bond to the community that trained you but become sufficiently poor, you may well do other things and not care so much for which community you do them for - you need to eat, after all, to have shelter, and more. And there may be others, more fortunate, who do not share the Stock-Broad outlook. Why was there a British empire, or any empires for that matter? We think foremostly of economic reasons: the empire was a source of raw materials, of people to exploit, of commerce opportunities. "I can imagine doing all this for economic reasons, to benefit a community I care about, but not bringing them here! And I would not bother ever trying to govern them. They are simply too different for British government: by blood or custom or whatever determines their repulsive behaviour," a skilled philosophical craftsperson thinks, or almost any articulate craftsperson: "If you want the raw materials, use your more advanced technology to massacre the people and then take the materials. Anything else seems irrational to us. If you don't want to do that, because it is indeed immoral, then don't attempt imperialism. Let us be like Denmark."
When we think of why there was a British empire, we also think of civilising projects, most obviously to spread Christianity amongst "heathen" peoples. Christians may well regard this as a moral duty and therefore engage in imperialist projects. In this paper, I want to consider a reason for why some must have supported imperialism which is quite different and perhaps only a reason for a few. In short, one finds that the rest of Europe is not particularist: its countries prefer standardized systems, such as the metric system. One seeks out fellow particularists peoples, across the globe, and aims to prepare them for life in the modern world, as allies. Because they are particularist, one regards them as already somewhat civilized, but in need of some "mothering," so that they are ready for the modern world. Other empire-builders are likely to either irresponsibly leave them in an impoverished condition or massacre them.


Particularism
        When we read or hear the word "particularism" as professional philosophers, we think of the moral particularism of Jonathan Dancy. He opposes moral-political philosophies such as utilitarianism, on the grounds that morality cannot be captured in a simple formula, such as "The greatest happiness for the greatest number": an instruction to prefer the act which produces the greatest amount of happiness in the world. But he goes further than predecessor W.D. Ross. Ross believed that there were different principles which were relevant for evaluating a proposed government policy, such as "Maximize happiness" and "Maximize freedom" and these principles often came into conflict in such assessment. A policy would realize one relevant principle, but not another, say, or comes closer to realizing one relevant principle but not another. Another policy better realizes the second principle than the first, less happiness and more freedom say. Ross thought that we should use sensible intuition to settle such conflicts of value and choose a policy: there is no formula for resolving the conflicts. (He wrote of the intuition of an educated man. Whozzat? My friend Liz Perez once said to me, "So you think you are educated?") An example may be useful. The British government has recently debated whether to ban first cousin marriage: prospective marriage partners who are first cousins cannot legally marry then. The policy is favoured because of the health risks for the offspring of such unions. It is opposed on the grounds of freedom - one should be more free to marry whom one pleases - and also respect for the communities which engage in it.
        Dancy's moral particularism goes further than Ross, who supposed there were general principles but conflicts of value are normal and there is no formula (some further principle really, or so I am tempted to say) for resolving these. Dancy denies that there are these general principles to begin with, or denies that they are defensible anyway and that they should be applied to specific cases. Each situation is different, is particular, and one has to attend to the specific situation and by moral intuition determine what to do.
        The particularist spirit can probably be found well beyond moral philosophy. Are there general principles for ranking literary works? "No," some critic presumably thinks, "we must treat each work as a particular thing and attend to its features and come to a decision about its overall value." I think it is overwhelmingly likely that there were British particularists opposed to the preference for standardization in the rest of Europe (the metric system, etc.) and who favoured imperialists projects for the purpose of finding and helping other particularist peoples. "We will help prepare them for the modern world and they will be our allies." (I confess I once thought to develop my own political philosophy, but looking closer at British government, I do not see how to avoid utilitarianism.)


  

References
Broad, C.D. 1950. Some Common Fallacies of Political Thinking. Philosophy 25: 99-113. Available at:
https://www.ditext.com/broad/political.html
Dancy, J. 2017. Moral Particularism. In E.N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter 2017. Available at:
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/moral-particularism/
Edward, T.R. 2025. How well do we understand our own societies? Kakonomia again and Kathleen Stock on the perspective of love. Available at:
https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWHWD.pdf
(Part of this paper does not concern Kathleen Stock, rather two Italian scholars, but it again shows how puzzled seemingly commonsensical scholars are when it comes to understanding the bigger picture: in their case, how Italy is a first world country if it is as they say?)
Ross, W.D. 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Available at:
https://ia601405.us.archive.org/29/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.87082/2015.87082.The-Right-And-The-Good.pdf
Stock, K. 2020. In the face of death: Reality and hurting other people. Times Literary Supplement May 15th 2020. Available at:
https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/the-force-of-nonviolence-judith-butler-review-kathleen-stock/


Is it Henry Alexandre-Junod who first said that the peoples of the British empire don't like standardized systems?
________________


Suddenly stylish? Situationalism versus Pierre Bourdieu (and appendix with coding task done)


Author. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan, if that helps)
Abstract. Pierre Bourdieu proposes that irrelevant stylistic factors play a role in who progresses in various careers, various fields. "You may be as good a researcher as me, or better, but I progress, because I have an elegant style, say. How to do this cannot be captured in rules, for you to learn, unfortunately, and usually requires upbringing in a privileged social class" - that is a Bourdieusian way of thinking. Situationalism is a theory from psychology which denies that there are character differences between human beings: humans are the same but behave differently because of their different situations; if you were in my situation, you would behave as I do. Situationalism poses a challenge to Bourdieu: "A style that pleases the selector simply comes if one has done more reading, say, and so selection based on stylistic factors as well is acceptable" a situationalist might argue. I consider a philosophical response to this argument.
Draft version: version 1(21st November 2025)
Software used (freeware): Google docs, Google search, QuiteBASIC


Aliens amongst us, says my photograph,
Or perhaps I've seen the cat-giraffe


        Introduction. Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) was a distinguished French sociologist who applied his theoretical framework to understand social injustice, such as why jobs in a certain prestigious field are dominated by people of a certain social class. Bourdieu is influential and there are many Bourdieusians. Bourdieu distinguishes four kinds of capital: economic capital, social capital, symbolic capital, and cultural capital. Cultural capital covers being able to have or do certain culturally valued styles, for example able to write in an elegant style. In some fields, this can enable one to progress even though someone without the style can meet the official job requirements as well, thinks Bourdieu. In the next part of this paper, I present this line of thought from Bourdieu in more detail. In the third paper, I introduce a situationalist challenge, albeit a speculative one. Situationalism is a psychological theory which denies that there are differences in human character: if you were in my situation, you would do the same as me. In the fourth part, I consider a philosophical response to the situationalist argument I present.
        Cultural capital and social injustice. Pierre Bourdieu is renowned in sociology and beyond for his concepts of four kinds of capital. There is economic capital, which is standardly defined when presenting Bourdieu as money or property that can be readily converted to money, by means of exchange. But Bourdieu himself sounds as if he wants to define it as capital as conceived by the discipline of economics (1986). There is social capital, which is one's social network. There is symbolic capital, which consists of titles or qualifications, such as being a professor at College de France and directeur d'etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris: positions held by Bourdieu himself. Also there is a kind of capital that Bourdieu emphasizes greatly, when analyzing certain fields: cultural capital. Cultural capital has to do with matters of taste. To illustrate: if you buy a book on how to write letters, you are probably trying to increase your cultural capital: you learn ways of opening letters to employers, to relatives, and more, and closing letters. One has some cultural capital when one has or can do a style which is valued by some people. This paper will focus on cultural capital.
To be faithful to Bourdieu, one has to define cultural capital more broadly than skills to have or do a valued style. Cultural capital also includes the ability to make discriminations between what is of good taste and bad taste, at least to a certain group of people. There are some rules regarding this, but it is an important part of Bourdieu's thinking that cultural capital, or high cultural capital, generally cannot be achieved by learning to follow rules. How to do an attractive style cannot be adequately specified in rules or instructions.
Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital, or his interest in this kind of capital, and his associated concept of habitus - a set of dispositions one brings to a field or situation - has attracted the attention of receivers of his theory. Feminist Professor Toril Moi, of Duke University, writes:
Bourdieu will analyse various ways of chewing one's food, different forms of dressing, musical tastes ranging from a predilection for "Home on the Range" to a liking for John Cage, home decoration, the kind of friends one has and the films one likes to see, and the way a student may feel when talking to her professor. In one sense, then, some of my interest in Bourdieu is grounded in my basic conviction that much of what patriarchal minds like to trivialize as gossip, and as women's gossip at that, is in fact socially significant. (1991: 1018)
A lot of her list is about cultural capital: styles of doing things, such as masticating and conversing, and one's taste discriminations. In his interesting book The Anthropology of Time, Professor Alfred Gell, long based at the London School of Economics, writes:
Bourdieu's basic perception is that social agents do not behave like puppets on a string, as they tend to in conventional structural models, nor yet are they free spirit. They are, he says, more like jazz musicians, who enter a session equipped with a body of practical techniques for playing their instruments and an agreed format for collectively improvising on a theme, but who produce music which cannot be anticipated in advance, even by themselves… (1992: 272)
When we think of examples in which this jazz analogy seems apt, producing an attractive style for a group is likely to come to mind. I myself think economic capital is what matters most in Western liberal societies, but I will continue the focus on cultural capital.
Cultural capital can be used to explain social injustice in the following way. "There is a prestigious job in a field which is dominated by an affluent social class. You would like the job and meet the requirements. Someone can do the job to the same extent but has a more attractive style to the selectors. They get the job and you do not. How do you achieve this style, for next time? It cannot be achieved by simply following rules and it is much easier to achieve if one comes from a certain affluent social class, which you do not. For example, to be a professor in British philosophy, a somewhat Victorian writing style is preferred, as if the Victorian era did not actually end, and you cannot do this." What I have enclosed in quotation marks is a typically Bourdieusian explanation. In the next part of this paper, I present a challenge to it.


Situationalism and style 
We ordinarily think that individuals differ in character and we appeal to differences to explain and to predict, for example, "Of course, he pawned your jewellery. He is that sort of man." Situationalism, often referred to as situationism, is a psychological theory which says that there are no differences in human character. The explanation for why one person does one thing and another person does another thing is that they face different situations. If you were in the same situation as me, you would do as I do: or the differences are too small to be of interest. It is unclear who devised situationalism. It is a psychological theory which suits various social sciences, or branches of them, branches which have long disregarded individual differences in human character. In the early twentieth century (1903), Leslie Stephen, an honorary Cambridge fellow and father of novelist Virginia Woolf, amusingly writes:
Carlyle used to tell us in my youth that everything was due to the hero; that the whole course of human history depended upon your Cromwell or Frederick. Our scientific teachers are inclined to reply that no single person had much importance, and that an ideal history could omit all names of individuals. If, for example, Napoleon had been killed at the siege of Toulon, the only difference would have been that the dictator would have been called say Moreau.
Philosophers have in recent decades taken an interest in situationalism because if it is true, then virtue ethics is false (Harman 1999; Sreenivasan 2002). Virtue ethics thinks of ethics as a matter of developing virtuous dispositions - a virtuous character, in short - rather than focusing on the outcomes of one's actions, regardless of motivation. I will set aside virtue ethics here, at least as an explicit topic of discussion.
        A situationalist might argue that certain attractive styles appear once one is advanced enough in a field, regardless of one's background, and so it is acceptable to select on the basis of style as well. This is a speculation here - I don't have much evidence for it - but it is interesting. Let us focus on the academic field, or set of fields, because we know so much about this, although we are learning about other fields too. "If you have progressed significantly in social anthropology, with understanding earlier texts and understanding a community through fieldwork, then you begin to write in a certain way, also somewhat Victorian. You do not have to try to; it just comes out when you write. It does not matter which social group you are from or what one's character is. There is no stylistic requirement, as one of the job requirements, and the same information can be presented in another writing style, but it is acceptable to select on the basis of the presence of a certain style, given that doing this style is a reliable indicator of progress." We can describe this as a situationalist argument and a challenge to the Bourdieusian argument at the end of the last section.


A philosophical response 
        A philosophical response to the situationalist argument above, with its example, is, first, to say that there is indeed a situationalist component but there are also normative components to this argument.
SITUATIONALIST COMPONENT: the style preferred by the selection committee simply appears when one has progressed sufficiently in the field, regardless of one's social class background.
NORMATIVE COMPONENT 1 (style selection): If this is so, then it is morally acceptable for selectors to select on the basis of style, when choosing between two candidates who appear otherwise equal on the basis of the evidence available.
NORMATIVE COMPONENT 2 (transparency fail): If this is so, then it is morally acceptable for selectors to select on the basis of style, as described above, but without explicitly saying so: for example, in the job advertisement.
A philosopher can then say that the normative components do not straightforwardly follow from the situationalist component. I would reject at least the second normative component. If you are selecting on the basis of style, this should be said. (I suppose a fear is that there is someone who will force themselves to do the style, against their "natural" dispositions, and so appear to be more advanced in a field than they are.)


Appendix 
This is some QuiteBASIC code, related to a "homework" I set (Edward 2025: appendix 1). But I asked for five lines of input to be turned into BASIC code and this involves only three. I don't know how to do it yet without getting the double quotation mark input at the beginning. Maybe you are better than me already!


10  PRINT "Haiku to BASIC code converter"
20 PRINT 
30 PRINT " Press double quotations marks or this will not work."
40 LET C = GETCHAR()
50 IF C = "" THEN GOTO 40
60 PRINT C
70 PRINT "I hope that is double quotation marks."
80 PRINT
90 INPUT "First line of Haiku"; L1
100 INPUT "Second line of Haiku"; L2
110 INPUT "Third line of Haiku"; L3
120 PRINT "10 PRINT " + C + L1 + C
130 PRINT "20 PRINT " + C + L2 + C
130 PRINT "30 PRINT " + C + L3 + C


References
Bourdieu, P. 1986. The Forms of Capital. In J. Richardson (ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood. Available at:
https://home.iitk.ac.in/~amman/soc748/bourdieu_forms_of_capital.pdf
Edward, T.R. 2025. Any Donkey Could, common sense, and an economic account of the origins of the arts (and a coding task appendix). Available at PhilPapers:
https://philpapers.org/rec/EDWADC-6
Gell, A. 1992. The Anthropology of Time. London: Berg.
(A very useful book but it strikingly omits a Marilyn Strathern paper, preferring to instead cover relevant research on time in a number of other disciplines.)
Harman, G. 1999. Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99: 315-331. Available with Google account password at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545312
Moi, T. 1991. Appropriating Bourdieu: Feminist Theory and Pierre Bourdieu's Sociology of Culture. New Literary History 22(4): 1017-1049. Available at:
http://torilmoi.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Appropriating_Bourdieu_Moi1.pdf
https://www.quitebasic.com/
Sreenivasan, G. 2002. Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution. Mind 111(441): 47-68. Available with Google account password at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/3093787
Stephen, L. 1903. English Literature and English Society in the Eighteenth Century. London: Duckworth & Co. https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/21123/pg21123.txt