Summary of Robert Nozick's objections to John Rawls Author: Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan, if that helps) I only present objections from chapter 7, section 2 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia below. The separateness-of-persons objection to the difference principle is the most well-known from these, though various others are worthy of attention. The most well-known objection from Nozick overall, or at least what is interpreted as this, is elsewhere in the book: that liberty upsets any attempt at a specific distributional pattern, with his Wilt Chamberlain illustration. Note: I have not included replies from Rawlsians. 1 & 2. Two objections to Rawls's specification of the problem of distributive justice. Rawls says that the problem of distributive justice concerns how the benefits of social cooperation are to be distributed. Nozick observes that Rawls does not distinguish between two specifications of the problem, though he prefers the first: (a) how is the total set of benefits in a society to be distributed; (b) how are the benefits that go beyond the sum of what individuals would have without social cooperation to be distributed. So there is an objection that Rawls prefers (a) without argument. Nozick offers an argument on Rawls's behalf: that the benefits from social cooperation are so large compared to what one would have without this that we can simply focus on (a). But he observes that people entering into a cooperative scheme would not think like this (pp.184-185). So Nozick is unable to find an entirely convincing argument for (a) and suggests a second objection: that there isn't one. 3. Objection to social cooperation as the source of the problem. Nozick asks why social cooperation is thought to give rise to the problem of distributive justice. He imagines individuals living alone on separate islands for two years and then discovering radio transmitters left behind twenty years ago which enable communication (p.185). Would the poorest have a claim to benefits from others? One might propose that what each person should have in this situation is what they have managed to gain by their own labour. Nozick objects that to say this is to apply a theory of distributive justice. So the question of what would be a just distribution is independent of social cooperation, contrary to Rawls. 4 & 5. Two objections to social cooperation as transforming the problem. Since Rawls focuses on social cooperation as giving rise to the question of how to distribute benefits, Nozick attributes to him the theory that in the island situation described above each individual is simply entitled to the fruits of their labour and no more. If this attribution is correct, it gives rise to the question of why Rawls does not apply the same theory when social cooperation occurs – why is the problem transformed so that this theory does not apply? An objection Nozick implies is that Rawls does not address this question. Nozick considers the answer that in social cooperation we cannot easily disentangle what each individual's contribution is. But he disputes this answer. One way he does so is by focusing on a situation in which there is specialization, with each individual working alone on their specialist product, or sub-product, and then making exchanges (p.186). In this case, we can disentangle individual contributions. Nozick also considers a situation involving making a joint product, but he is still unable to see why the kind of theory used in the island situation cannot be used in the context of social cooperation. So a second objection is that there does not appear to be a good answer to this question, in which case the problem is not transformed. 6. Objection to the difference principle's focus on groups. Rawls imagines a situation in which self-interested individuals who lack knowledge of various biasing-factors about themselves agree to principles for the distribution of rights, duties, and benefits – the original position. He argues that, once certain basic liberty rights and fair equality of opportunity are secured, they would agree to implement "the difference principle," because it is rational for them to maximize the minimum they could end up with. The principle tells us to prefer the economic system which is best for the worst-off group. Nozick objects that there is no reason to think that people in this situation would not focus on individuals instead, aiming for an economy in which the wealth and income of the worst-off individual is maximized (p.190). 7. Objection to which groups. When Rawls writes of the worst-off group, he is excluding groups of alcoholics or depressives or paraplegics, but Nozick says that it is unclear why (p.190). 8 & 9. Can the less-well endowed expect the better endowed to cooperate on the basis of the difference principle? Two objections. Rawls thinks any other basis is unstable. Nozick suggests an objection: that Rawls addresses this question by comparing the pains of no cooperation with his cooperative scheme involving both types of person, but actually one has to address the question by comparing this scheme with what the better endowed would have if only cooperating amongst themselves (p.193). Even without this comparison, if the better endowed devise new inventions, ways of doing things and the like, then cooperation with the less well-endowed is already in the favour of the latter, which should make us suspicious of imposing further constraints in the form of the difference principle. Rawls says that cooperation with this constraint enables all to have a more satisfactory life than lack of cooperation; but that could be said about alternative constraints, objects Nozick, including a principle that economic inequalities should favour the better endowed (p.195). So Rawls has not adequately answered the question. There is no good answer, Nozick thinks. 10. The manna-from-heaven objection. There are such facts as that a certain person found something valuable, or used their labour to grow something which they then sold. All such historical facts are excluded from the original position. Given this ignorance, individuals deciding on a distribution will treat the benefits of social cooperation as if they fell from heaven and are now to be divided up (pp.198-199). Nozick objects that this is a mistaken approach, but finds it hard to make the objection compelling. He regards the manna-from-heaven approach as making it rational for individuals to choose some end state as their ideal distribution, rather than a principle according to which distribution should be determined by historical facts; but he acknowledges that one could just include his historical theory of justice into the original position and individuals would not choose it. 11-13. Three micro-macro objections. Nozick claims that the difference principle is obviously not a requirement of justice in various small-scale situations. An example he gives is a loving family. They are not required to make decisions in a way that is best for the least-talented child, at the expense of the other children (p.167). But, says Nozick, Rawls implies that small-scale situations cannot be used to object to the difference principle, which applies to macro contexts (pp.204-205). Nozick disputes this defence in three ways. * Rawls has to conceive that, in a just society, a small-scale part which taken in itself meets a fundamental principle of justice can still be unjust unless counterbalanced by the converse injustice of another part. But surely this is only true of specialized parts and not ordinary parts (p.205). * Rawls must say that the fundamental level of justice is the macro level, so that any apparent injustice at the small-scale level cannot be judged unjust until we consider the whole and whether some other part cancels it out. But the small scale reveals some fundamental principles of justice, e.g. if Nozick argues by small-scale examples for my entitlement to my body parts, he identifies something fundamental (p.206). * Rawls allows us to evaluate principles by comparing them with our intuitions about examples, but if the examples must only concern complex wholes, such wholes are not easily scanned and we cannot easily keep track of everything relevant, generating an obstacle to properly evaluating his difference principle (p.205). 14. A process dilemma. If processes of arriving at principles are so important, says Nozick, it should be possible for people in the original position to choose a process principle, rather than one which specifies an ideal distribution – an end-state principle. If they are not so important, one lacks sufficient grounds for relying on the original position process (p.208). Note: perhaps "possible" should be replaced by rational. 15. Unearned attributes and respect for autonomy: a tension. Rawls treats people's attributes as morally arbitrary, because they are undeserved, even if some attributes are the outcome of a person's putting a lot of effort into cultivating their talents – the capacity for such effort is itself the result of the luck of genes or upbringing. A system based purely on equal liberty and the free market would provide rewards on the basis of morally arbitrary factors, for Rawls, and he designs his original position to exclude what he regards as morally arbitrary. But his conception of the morally arbitrary sits uneasily with his aim to respect individual autonomy, says Nozick (pp.213-214). If one regards all valued attributes of individuals as morally arbitrary, and the arbitrary as morally insignificant, why set out to respect autonomy? Why aim to respect individual choices, if these choices are the result of morally arbitrary factors and what is morally arbitrary is morally insignificant? 16. Objections to the positive and negative arguments. Nozick surveys various attempts to argue from undeserved natural assets to the conclusion that differences in holdings should not arise from such assets – what he calls the positive arguments. He finds them unsuccessful. Nozick also considers appeals to undeserved natural assets as a way of blocking counterarguments to Rawls's conclusion – the negative arguments. Nozick find this kind of defence unconvincing, but it is difficult to capture what he says against the positive and negative arguments here. A point Nozick makes as part of assessing the negative arguments, important for his philosophy, is that there are some things a person is entitled to, such as their natural assets, regardless of whether it is morally arbitrary that they have this thing (p.226). 17. Objection to the view that from the morally arbitrary flows the morally insignificant. For Nozick morally significant things can flow from what is arbitrary, contrary to Rawls. Nozick points out that a person's existence is morally significant but the fact that this particular sperm fertilized this particular egg is arbitrary from a moral point of view (p.226). Note: this objection could do with a clarification of certain terms involved. 18. Inconsistency concerning the exclusion of what is morally arbitrary. Rawls excludes information about the distinguishing attributes individuals have from the original position, because these attributes are arbitrary. But he allows them knowledge of general attributes, such as that they all have a life span of more than three days, a memory, and are able to communicate with other organisms like themselves. These are the result of morally arbitrary factors, such as specific genetic material, so Rawls cannot consistently include this information (p.227). 19. The separateness-of-persons objection to the difference principle. A creature may rationally choose to sacrifice a part of themselves for the good of the whole, for example get a tooth removed if it is a major problem. Utilitarianism treats individuals as if they were parts of a whole organism, such that it is acceptable to sacrifice or enslave one such individual if it is better for the happiness of the whole social organism. But individuals are separate beings, not parts of a super-organism, and should be treated as such, says Rawls (p.27). Nozick tells us that some will say that Rawls's difference principle is no better (p.228). It treats people with talents as if their talents were collective property, best used as a means to achieve the end of improving the lives of the worst-off. For example, they are taxed if they earn more by means of their talents and these taxes are used to improve the situation of the worst-off group. 20. The envy concern. Rawls says that no one deserves their greater natural capacities, but it does not follow that we should eliminate these; we can instead make these capacities work for improving the lives of the worst-off. Nozick asks, what if there is not this option? Should we take measures to prevent anyone from having greater natural capacities, if possible? He suggests that the entire approach is based on envy, hence Rawls's implication that something must be done regarding greater natural capacities, such as elimination if there is no alternative (p.229). Note: There may be other objections which I have not identified. References Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. Available at: https://antilogicalism.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/anarchy-state-utopia.pdf Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press. 1999 revised version available at: https://giuseppecapograssi.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/rawls99.pdf Other texts on the debate Barnes, Gordon. 2016. Wilt Chamberlain Redux? Philosophia 44 (1):79-85. Bozac, Zlata. 2021. There's me, there's you, and there's us: separateness of persons, contractualism, and their role in establishing distributive principle. PhD thesis submitted to Central European University. [Accent removed, computer display problem.] Available at: https://www.etd.ceu.edu › 2021 › bozac_zlata.pdf Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2022. Incentives to scan complex wholes? Available at: https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWITS-3.pdf Edward, Terence Rajivan. 2022. Nozick's "secret" macro-micro objection to Rawls. Available at: https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWNSM.pdf Kraynaya, Darya. 2012. Economics and Jurisprudence: Is John Rawls’ difference principle just another form of supply side economics and can it be applied effectively in modern society? Manchester Student Law Review 1: 49-59. Available at: https://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/law/main/research/MSLR_Vol1_5(Kraynaya).pdf McKerlie, Dennis. 1988. Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):205 - 225. Mack, Eric. 2024. Nozick on the separateness of persons: a reconstruction. The Independent Review 29(2): 275-287. Available at: https://www.independent.org/wp-content/uploads/tir/2024/09/tir_29_2_08_mack.pdf Rodgers, Lamont & Rodgers, Travis Joseph (2018). Wilt Chamberlain Redux: Thinking Clearly about Externalities and the Promises of Justice. Reason Papers 39 (2):90-114. Available at: https://philpapers.org/archive/RODWCR.pdf Tuncel, Ozer Baris. 2017. Liberty, Patterns and Justice: Nozick’s Critique of Distributive Justice. [Accents removed, computer display problem.] Available at: https://www.academia.edu/31132637/Liberty_Patterns_and_Justice_Nozicks_Critique_of_Distributive_Justice Zwolinski, Matt. 2003. The separateness of persons. A PhD thesis submitted to The University of Arizona. Available at: https://repository.arizona.edu/bitstream/handle/10150/298730/azu_td_3107059_sip1_m.pdf?sequence=1 Zwokinski, Matt. 2008. The separateness of persons and liberal theory. Journal of Value Inquiry 42(2): 147-165. Available at SSRN.