Summary of (most of) my criticisms of John Rawls Author: Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan, if that helps) Date: 5th June 2026 (v.3, Rawls versus intuitionism added and next two; v.1 on 21st June 2024) Note: I have excluded most of my responses to fair equality of opportunity and some more complex objections. The fallibility objection. In his original position thought experiment, Rawls asks us to consider which societal principles self-interested individuals who lack biasing knowledge would agree to, because such principles would be fair. The individuals are to treat the agreement as final and not make an agreement they would break under appropriate circumstances. Although no individual knows their sex, skin colour, talents, wealth, etc., they do have general knowledge of human nature. In which case, they know that they are fallible: they might make a mistake. In which case, they will not agree to anything, because they cannot be confident of keeping the agreement, because their fallibility might have led them to make a mistake. (An objection loosely inspired by a Joseph Raz footnote.) See: 2019, The fallibility objection to the original position. Available on PhilPapers: https://philarchive.org/rec/EDWJRF Why not freedom from arrest? Rawls argues that individuals in the original position would agree to a set of basic liberties, including freedom from arbitrary arrest. But since they are assumed to be perfectly compliant with the laws they agree to, why would they not simply agree to freedom from arrest, because arrest usually makes it impossible for an individual to pursue their life plan and there is no compensating gain for them? See: 2023, Banned in the US? Freedom from arbitrary arrest and right to a fair trial as basic liberties. Available at academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/98395627/Banned_in_the_US_Freedom_from_arbitrary_arrest_and_right_to_a_fair_trial_as_basic_liberties Real equal freedom of movement. The individuals in the original position agree to an equal freedom of movement right. But is not the easiest way to give equal freedom of movement to give each individual the same sized patch of land to move in, beyond which they are not allowed to venture? See: 2023, Faux Nozick: in defence of unequal freedom of movement? Available at academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/99883965/Faux_Nozick_in_defence_of_unequal_freedom_of_movement Unequal freedom of movement if… Why would individuals in the original position not agree to an unequal right to freedom of movement if it means that the lowest amount of freedom of movement one might get is higher than under an equal system, analogous to what they agree on regarding wealth? See: 2023, Faux Nozick: in defence of unequal freedom of movement? Available at academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/99883965/Faux_Nozick_in_defence_of_unequal_freedom_of_movement Freedom of movement and the difference principle. In Rawls’s system of principles, the basic liberties given by the first principle are not to be sacrificed for realizing the second principle. One basic liberty is freedom of movement. Now suppose a person draws up a plan of their movements in a day, not taking into account the second principle. They then find that the only way to be in line with the second principle is to alter their plan to make time for filling in tax returns. The second principle can only be realized, in many societies, by some restriction of freedom of movement. See: 2022, Are Rawls’s principles consistent? Available at academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/102167725/Are_Rawlss_principles_consistent Rawls versus utilitarianism: the subset objection. One of Rawls’s arguments against utilitarianism is that it does not take into account the separateness of persons: that each person is a distinct being with their own life to lead and ought to be treated as such. Utilitarianism treats individuals in society as if they were mere parts of an organism. Just as an individual might remove a part (a tooth, say) for the good of the whole, so utilitarianism allows things to be done to an individual if there is an overall gain in happiness in society. Let’s grant here that this is a good argument. Another argument, or set of arguments, is that utilitarianism would not be chosen in the original position. But the original position method is justified by reference to the separateness of persons, so we can just take a subset of the many premises involved in such an argument and argue against utilitarianism like that. The original position arguments seem pointless. (In broad outline, this line of criticism was earlier conceived by T.H. Irwin, but not pursued by him.) See: 2016, Rawls versus utilitarianism: the subset objection. E-Logos 23 (2): 37-41. Available at: https://e-logos.vse.cz/artkey/elg-201602-0004_rawls-versus-utilitarianism-the-subset-objection.php And: 2022, "What is the difference between your subset objection to Rawls on utilitarianism and T.H. Irwin’s commentary?" Available at PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWWIT-5.pdf "Nozick’s" secret macro-micro objection to Rawls. I call it Nozick’s because it is entailed by propositions scattered in Robert Nozick’s book Anarchy, State, and Utopia, but Nozick does not himself make it. It begins with these propositions. (a) John Rawls objects that utilitarianism does not take the distinction between persons seriously. (b) The full justification for taking the distinction between persons seriously involves micro-analysis: attending to small-scale situations and drawing conclusions from them. (It is wrong to do that to a person for greater societal happiness.) (c) When we assess one of Rawls’s principles of justice by reference to small-scale situations, he implies that we should not do that, rather we should focus on the whole – we should engage in macro analysis. The objection is that Rawls commits himself to macro analysis as the way to assess principles of justice, but then he cannot make his separateness-of-persons objection to utilitarianism, because it depends on the legitimacy of assessing principles of justice by micro analysis. See: 2022, Nozick’s "secret" macro-micro objection to Rawls. Available at PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWNSM.pdf Rawls, Nozick, and the worst off family. John Rawls’s difference principle recommends the economy which is best for the worst off group. If the worst off group in economy A is worse off than the worst off group in economy B, then the principle recommends B. But Nozick asks, why focus on groups rather than individuals? Now in the qualified original position, the self-interested individuals are all heads of families, so "What’s the worst position my family could be in? Is it worse in economy A or B? If A, then prefer B," is how they would think it seems. The difference principle should be explained in terms of the worst off family. See: 2023, Rawls, Nozick, and why not the worst off individual? Available at ResearchGate: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Terence-Edward/publication/371563612_Rawls_Nozick_and_why_not_the_worst_off_individual/links/6489e8e99605ba270e44c4fb/Rawls-Nozick-and-why-not-the-worst-off-individual.pdf Head of families and veil of ignorance not needed. To achieve fairness, Rawls asks us to imagine self-interested individuals who are behind a veil of ignorance: each individual does not know their sex, skin colour, talents, wealth, and more. Otherwise an individual will try to tailor principles to their own case, e.g. "Only people with my talents can run for public office." But he also asks us to imagine that these individuals are heads of families, who care about their children’s futures, so that the constitution they agree on is not short-term. However, then why do they need the veil of ignorance to avoid bias? They can avoid bias from maximin reasoning and worrying about their children’s futures: "What if my child lacks a talent I have or marries someone of another skin colour or falls out of our wealth class?" See: 2023, The heads of families assumption: no need for the veil of ignorance? Available at academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/96254889/The_heads_of_families_assumption_no_need_for_the_veil_of_ignorance Rawls versus intuitionism: use the method? Intuitionism, or the specific kind which Rawls attends to, says that there are different principles relevant to assessing justice (e.g. give freedom and give equality) and they often conflict and there is no rational way to arrive at an assessment of which proposed policy is most just, achieves the best compromise between principles etc., without using one's intuition. Any attempt at a formula will result in oversimplification. Rawls's argument against intuitionism is his whole book: "These proposals altogether are not an oversimplification," he thinks. But why not simply enter intuitionism into his original position method and compare whether it is preferred over his proposed principles of justice? Presumably, it would not be because one fears that someone else in the role of judging will present injustice towards one - perhaps only mild injustice though - as intuitively just, as the best way of balancing conflicting considerations. See: 2023. On Rawls's case against intuitionism: why not use the menu? Available at academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/99397896/On_Rawlss_case_against_intuitionism_why_not_use_the_menu And, more complicatedly, for how Rawls understands intuitionism, see: https://www.academia.edu/100550141/Rawls_versus_intuitionism_an_analytical_response Sacrificing liberty for the difference principle. Rawls specifies a set of basic liberties, which cannot be sacrificed for economic gain. Only once they are secured can we implement fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle: organizing the economy so that the worst one can get is as high as possible. In a paper which I uploaded, with the same title as this section, and probably sensibly deleted (13 December 2022!), I introduced roughly this problem. There are times where one works harder than normal to acquire a skill, making sacrifices elsewhere, and after a short period of doing so, one is able to exercise this skill within a normal schedule. Many individuals have experiences like this. But why could a country not rationally do the same. People must work harder for a short period and this moves everyone up a level and after that period a normal Rawlsian system is implemented. If one is economically behind various liberal countries, while nevertheless above a minimal level, there may be no other sensible option. Perfect-compliance and transition. In her 2012 "Ideal versus non-ideal theory: a conceptual map," Laura Valentini points out that John Rawls, when asking us to decide between principles of justice, asks us to assume perfect compliance: that people will follow legal rules which serve to realize the principles chosen. But in a process of transition, should we prefer people who follow whatever rules are in place, and seek to implement liberal rules so as to ensure a liberal society, or prefer people of broadly liberal temperament, who may not be such good rule followers? Rawls seems to leave open or even encourage a preference for the former kind, who can be very frightening under less liberal systems. [I recall raising this issue, but I cannot recall where.] Rawls as a system of hypothetical imperatives? Rawls faces a dilemma when it comes to addressing the talented who think they can make more money under an alternative system of principles. Either he tells them to endorse his system because that is the moral thing to do, regardless of their desires, which is consistent with his Kantianism but looks ineffective motivationally. Or he tells them to endorse his system because it is better for realizing their desires - other systems will prove unstable - which looks motivationally effective if well-argued, but is inconsistent with his Kantianism; his system can instead be understood as a set of hypothetical imperatives - rational requirements if one has the appropriate desires. See 2023, Rawls as a system of hypothetical imperatives. Available at academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/98739788/Rawls_as_a_system_of_hypothetical_imperatives Reflective equilibrium, simplicity, and hesitation. Rawls asks us to take our moral judgments from non-hesitant states of mind and build a theory which fits with them. Let’s suppose that we take 20 judgments, J1 to J20, but have two theories which fit equally. T1 fits with J1 to J19 and T2 with J2 to J20. In this situation, Rawls thinks we should choose the simpler theory. But why not turn to hesitant moral judgments to decide between the two, rather than an aesthetic consideration? See: 2022, Its many varieties: does liberalism merely alternate between ethics and economics?. Available at PhilPapers: https://philarchive.org/archive/EDWIMV Ought-implies-can, reflective equilibrium, and the original position. Rawls recommends a reflective equilibrium procedure in which one tries to ensure that general principles entail moral judgments about specific situations. But should one consider only actual situations, or hypothetical ones as well. Rawls opts for the latter but while conceding that it is impossible to consider them all. So he seems to be rejecting ought-implies-can. We ought to consider judgments in response to all hypothetical situations even if we cannot. However, his original position procedure is committed to ought-implies-can. The self-interested individuals are to use a general knowledge of human nature when assessing principles, because it is only the case that we ought to implement the principles they select if we can. See: 2022, Ought-implies-can, reflective equilibrium, and the original position. Available at PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWOTO.pdf Considered moral judgments and the dubious witnesses problem. Rawls thinks we should only enter judgments from some states of mind into his reflective equilibrium procedure. Judgments only made outside these states, or this state, are likely to be erroneous. He lists being hesitant, frightened, and upset as examples of risky states to make moral judgments in. Suppose a certain judgment is made in only one of these states, only when frightened say. And now suppose instead that it is made in all of the states judged risky, but not in the ones judged non-risky. Rawls seems to assume that the probability of its being erroneous stays the same. But why assume this? An alternative approach is to say that if the judgment is made in enough risky states, its probability of being wrong reduces and it can be entered into the reflective equilibrium procedure. (Is it not like a set of dubious witnesses who converge in their description of an event?) See: 2022, Moral philosophy and psychoanalysis: a point of convergence. Available at PhilPapers: https://philarchive.org/archive/EDWMPAv1 2025 objections Fair equality of opportunity and the basic structure restriction. After giving all adult citizens a set of basic liberties, the next task for achieving a socially just liberal society, as envisaged by John Rawls, is to realize fair equality of opportunity. Fair equality of opportunity in a society is more than this: if citizens A and B are both capable of doing an advertised job, then both have a right to apply. A further requirement is this: if A and B are equally capable, then they stand an equal chance of getting the job (assuming they apply), whereas if B is less capable, then B stands a lower chance. But Rawls's principles are only meant to apply to the basic structure of society: there is no obligation of social justice to ensure that institutions beyond this basic structure are just. What though is the basic structure? A simple thought for us is that it is the public sector of our UK society (or your Canadian or American society, etc.). But then fair equality of opportunity is no great help unless one is going to work in this sector, for example as a schoolteacher in the UK or a national health service doctor. Another interpretation is that it includes all institutions which are institutions by law, including private companies. But whether this is useful enough for you depends significantly on how influential associations outside the basic structure are in your society: e.g. student-run after school clubs for learning Russian or computer coding, etc, and clubs at elite universities. ("You cannot join our club; you are not our type.") Their influence is not something you know when choosing principles. Possibly such clubs can figure largely in the society one ends up in. This undermines Rawls’s vision severely - a point surely realized by someone before, if not in the public literature. See: 2025, Fair equality of opportunity and the basic structure restriction. Available at PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/EDWFEO-2 On the priority of the political. Rawlsians think that political values should be prioritized over other values, such as medical ones. This means one must oppose the enemy to the nation's way of life - a growing body of unreasonable citizens, for Rawls’s liberal state, in his specific sense - even if they better realize some other value. But remember how European colonialists brought new diseases which wiped out so many tribes. Which tribes survived? Here is a guess: only the ones which prioritized the medical over the political. "We have the best doctors: they can beat your diseases!" See: 2025, Carl Schmitt and Rawls's the political versus the medical: a massive loss for Schmitt & co.: https://philpapers.org/rec/EDWCSA-4 The heads of families restriction versus the right to run for public office. In John Rawls's original position model, self-interested individuals are choosing principles to be implemented by their society. Rawls famously prohibits reference to the specifics of an individual's case when arguing for a principle: wealth, talents, etc. A much less famous restriction he adds is that the original position should only feature heads of families. This restriction is so that individuals take into account future generations when choosing principles: the principles should be in the interests of future generations as well. Now Rawls recommends a liberty principle which gives each adult citizen - or each sane adult citizen - a set of liberty rights which cannot be compromised for economic or other gain. The rights include the political liberty to run for public office. But a person in public office has a significant chance of making decisions which affect future generations. There are two points I wish to make, the first of which seems more important. (i) Given his introduction of the heads of families restriction into his original position method to ensure an interest in future generations, does consistency not require Rawls to restrict the right to run for public office to heads of families, since only they can be rationally expected to take into account future generations in their decision-making? (ii) How can Rawls consistently block a variation on his liberty principle which restricts the right to run for public office to heads of families, because the individuals who choose principles would not see anything wrong with this restriction? See: 2025, An inconsistency in Rawls: the heads of families restriction versus the universal right to run for public office. Available at PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/EDWAII-3 Do we need to argue for all of our rights? For any core liberal right, the Rawlsian tries to argue for that right, e.g. "We should have this right because individuals in the original position would agree to it." But as I observed in my paper, 'Rejecting the question "What is the right to freedom of speech derived from?" ' some rights are absences and, unless there is a special reason to think the absence mistaken, we don't need to argue for why there are these absences. I have a legal right to say, "When" if the legal system I am under does not contain laws restricting me from saying, "When" (leaving aside special contexts perhaps): the absence of such restrictive laws is sufficient for me to have the right. Why aren't there such restrictive laws? Well, why should there be? There is no reason to answer the former question unless the latter question is addressed, but the Rawlsian peculiarly goes ahead and answers it any way: there aren't, because individuals in the original position would reject a legal system featuring such laws. See: 2025, Do we need to argue for all our of rights, Rawlsians? Available at PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/EDWDWN And 2024, Rejecting the question "What is the right to freedom of speech derived from?" Available at academia.edu: https://www.academia.edu/121377507/Rejecting_the_question_What_is_the_right_to_freedom_of_speech_derived_from_ Unfortunate temperaments and the difference principle. In his original position thought experiment, John Rawls does not appear to allow for tailoring towards a specific temperament, including choosing principles on the basis of "What if I have that unfortunate temperament?" More specifically, he does not allow for choosing principles on the basis of "What if I want social interaction but alienate people easily?" But why then does he argue for the difference principle on the basis of "What if I am in the most unfortunate position economically?"? This asymmetry does not look defensible. See: 2025, Unfortunate temperaments versus the difference principle: why the asymmetry? (With coding homework appendix). Available on PhilPapers at: https://philpapers.org/archive/EDWQAA-2.pdf