A booklet of some of analytic philosophy's faulty rational reconstructions Author. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 161__Rajivan, if that helps) Software used: Google docs (freeware), cloudconvert.com (freeware), Chromebook operating system. Draft version: version 3 (11th March 2026, Stemplowska and Fowler paper added) Preface The analytic tradition of philosophy was founded by Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore in the early twentieth century, when they rebelled against the Hegelianism that was fashionable in British philosophy at the time, or so legend says. Gottlob Frege is recognized as a distinguished predecessor. As one might expect, given this history, analytic philosophy is renowned for its emphasis on logic - Frege and Russell are important figures in the history of logic - and the tradition features many people who are experts in logic and philosophical issues arising from logic, as participants. No doubt it attracts students because of this logical emphasis. But there is also a wing of the analytic tradition known as analytic political philosophy and here I have found for some years that elementary logical errors abound. Logical errors can sometimes also be found beyond this area, but they are uncommon in my experience. Some of the errors in the analytic literature as a whole are, I believe, on purpose but not all. In political philosophy the faulty reconstructions are strange because the ideal of fair equality of opportunity is widely endorsed - if persons A and B both have the talent for a job and both apply, then they should stand an equal chance - and being strict on logic seems a way of improving fair equality of opportunity: "You can do your logic well, so you stand a better chance than various others even if you do not come from our social network." Anyway, this booklet collects together some faulty rational reconstructions which I have commented on (along with the commentaries!). Most of the commentaries on these reconstructions have appeared online before, but the last one has not. It was written during the corona virus pandemic - warning: I have not double-checked it carefully. One reason for collecting them is that it is convenient for when I want to refer to them as a set, which is quite often probably. "That is a reason for you. But who else cares about all these?" you might say. A comparable problem might exist in another profession, one which you think matters, such as with builders or medics. Perhaps this booklet is a good starting point for identifying a general problem! (Anyway, I wonder whether someone regarded as an intruder or outsider to this field, or profession, is expected to "clean all these up" and more! I should probably thank the Politics discipline area of the University of Manchester for employing me from 2011 to 2017 and thereby helping me find these at least. And logic experts Doctor Graham Stevens and Doctor Sean Crawford for the occasions on which they have answered questions of mine about formal logic.) Table of contents A flawed argument reconstruction in political philosophy - p.3 Ifs and buts: Anca Gheaus's flawed argument construction - p.8 Andrei Marmor's reconstruction of Ronald Dworkin - p.11 46% tax? Jonathan Quong's reconstruction of Jeremy Waldron - p.13 On Christine Swanton's rational reconstruction of an anti-intuitionist argument - p.15 Jonathan Quong's reconstruction of G.A. Cohen - p.17 On Professor Anca Gheaus's premise-by-premise reconstruction of a defence of the family - p.21 Another flawed argument reconstruction in political philosophy: W. Kymlicka on R. Nozick - p.24 Rational reconstructions in political philosophy again: Zofia Stemplowska and Tim Fowler - p.29 ________________ A flawed argument reconstruction in political philosophy: Richard Child on Andrea Sangiovanni Author: Terence Rajivan Edward Abstract. There are some premise-by-premise reconstructions in political philosophy which are flawed, because they omit at least one premise or misword at least one premise. This paper focuses on a reconstruction by Richard Child. The original argument is by Andrea Sangiovanni and is about whether egalitarian values of distributive justice apply both within a state and globally. Child's reconstruction has been reproduced in a paper by Ian Davis, who approves of it. But I point out five logical problems with the reconstruction. Introduction A rational reconstruction of an argument presents that argument as a set of premises and a conclusion inferred from those premises. If a rational reconstruction is done correctly, then it often provides a quick way of presenting an argument. Another advantage of a rational reconstruction – or a pair of advantages, to be precise – concerns evaluating the argument. Faced with a rational reconstruction, we can ask, "If we suppose that the premises are true, does the conclusion follow?"[1] And we can also ask, "Are the premises true?" Of course, we cannot pursue these questions properly if the reconstruction omits one of the premises or if the premises are erroneously formulated. I have found some reconstructions in recent political philosophy which suffer from one or both of these problems. In this paper, I focus on a single reconstruction. It is by Richard Child and comes from an article entitled "Global migratory potential and the scope of justice." His reconstruction is reproduced in another paper, which approves of it (Davis n.d.: 4). However, I think there are some problems which this author has not noticed. Child reconstructs an argument by Andrea Sangiovanni. He reconstructs the argument as five premises and a conclusion inferred from them: 1. Talented individuals do not deserve their place in the distribution of native endowments. 2. In the world as it is now, the stable conditions necessary for wealth creation through the exercise of talent are provided by the institutions that comprise modern states. 3. In a number of ways – for example, through taxation, through participation in various forms of political activity, and through simple compliance – citizens maintain the institutions that comprise modern states. 4. The principle of reciprocity: those who willingly contribute to the conditions necessary for the accumulation of benefits are owed a fair share of these benefits. 5. Only citizens, and not non-citizens, contribute to the conditions necessary for wealth creation in a particular state. Therefore: 6. Only the distribution of goods between citizens (and not non-citizens) should be regulated by principles of justice. Note that Child himself does not call the conclusion (6), rather he refers to it as (SC). Note also that Child uses the language of logic when presenting this argument. For example, when presenting (5), he writes, "The fifth and final premise of Sangiovanni's argument is…" (2011: 288) Problems After reconstructing the argument, Child writes as if it has only one problem. He says, "The problem with this is that, even if we accept P1-P4, the statist conclusion does not follow, because P5* is false." (2011: 288, my emphasis) But there are a number of other problems with the argument, as formulated by Child, even if we grant that all the premises are true. I shall draw attention to five problems, which I have labelled "A" to "E." Before presenting them, it will be useful to isolate the part of the argument that begins at (4): 4. The principle of reciprocity: those who willingly contribute to the conditions necessary for the accumulation of benefits are owed a fair share of these benefits. 5. Only citizens, and not non-citizens, contribute to the conditions necessary for wealth creation in a particular state. Therefore: 6. Only the distribution of goods between citizens (and not non-citizens) should be regulated by principles of justice. As far as I can see, the conclusion is actually inferred from just these two premises, not all five, and it would have been clearer to remove the earlier premises. (Child would have to explain the justifications for these two and he could have introduced the propositions within the earlier premises when explaining.[2]) The problems I identify arise whether or not one makes this change, but here is an account of what is going on in the argument from (4) onwards, with various details omitted. The point of premise (4) is to specify a criterion for those who are owed a fair share of the benefits accumulated[3] in a particular state. The criterion is meant to work like this: if you meet this criterion, you are owed a fair share; if you do not meet it, you are not. The point of premise (5) is to say that only citizens of this state meet the criterion and others do not. From these two premises, we arrive at the conclusion that only citizens of a particular state are owed a fair share of the benefits accumulated in this state; others are not. If the details are filled in appropriately, the premises would logically entail the conclusion. Should the premises be true, the conclusion would be as well. But I think the details have not been filled in appropriately. We are now ready to look into the five problems. A. Let us begin by focusing on the principle of reciprocity stated in premise (4). The principle should actually be: only those who willingly contribute to the conditions necessary for the accumulation of benefits in a particular state are owed a fair share of these benefits. Child has omitted the "only" and the "in a particular state." The problem I am referring to here is the omission of "only." By omitting it, the conclusion does not follow, because the principle of reciprocity, as Child formulates it, asserts that those who willingly make certain contributions are owed a fair share of the benefits, but is neutral on the question of whether anyone else is owed a fair share. B. Premise (5) also contains an omission. Premise (4) tells us what willing contributors are owed, whereas premise (5) refers to citizens who contribute, without specifying whether these contributions are willing or not. Premise (5) should be: only citizens of a particular state, and not non-citizens, willingly contribute to the conditions necessary for the accumulation of benefits in that state. Otherwise the conclusion cannot follow from the premises. C. Apart from adding "willingly," my proposed revision of (5) also replaces Child's expression "for wealth creation" with "for the accumulation of benefits," or else there is a question of to what extent premises (4) and (5) are referring to the same contribution and an extra premise would be needed to address this issue. (Is contributing to the conditions necessary for the accumulation of benefits always contributing to the conditions necessary for wealth creation?) D. Child writes of being owed a fair share of benefits in premise (4), but of the distribution of goods in the conclusion. This gives rise to the question of whether goods and benefits are the same,[4] or if not, what is the relationship between them. It is easy to reformulate the conclusion so that it does not give rise to this question, by writing of benefits throughout. Otherwise an extra premise is needed to answer the question. E. I have pointed out the problems above as if the conclusion aims to say that citizens of a particular state are owed a fair share of the benefits accumulated in that state, while non-citizens are not. However, Child's formulation of the conclusion, taken literally, does not deny that non-citizens are owed a fair share of the benefits/goods accumulated in a particular state. Look at what the conclusion says literally: "Only the distribution of goods between citizens (and not non-citizens) should be regulated by principles of justice." This does not deny that non-citizens are owed a fair share; it merely denies that any distribution they get should be regulated by principles of justice. His formulation seems consistent with the view that although both citizens of a particular state and non-citizens are owed a fair share of the goods accumulated in that state, there are only principles for determining what is a fair share when the focus is on citizens. One might think as follows: any attempt to identify principles which determine what would be a fair share for non-citizens fails. Since there are no adequate principles to guide us, when a state has accumulated goods we should use our intuition to determine what would be a fair share for those who are not citizens of it. (To adapt a slogan of Robert Nozick's, "intuitionism for non-citizens, principles for citizens."[5]) But Child clearly means for the conclusion to deny that non-citizens are owed a fair share of the goods accumulated in a state (2011: 290), hence it needs reformulation. Conclusion Putting the revisions proposed in the section above together, we arrive at the following argument, with premise (4) shifted to (1) and the main revisions underlined[6]: 1. Only those who willingly contribute to the conditions necessary for the accumulation of benefits in a particular state are owed a fair share of these benefits. 2. Only citizens of a particular state, and not non-citizens, willingly contribute to the conditions necessary for the accumulation of benefits in that state. Therefore: 3. Only citizens of a particular state, and not non-citizens, are owed a fair share of the benefits accumulated in that state. How many of the problems with Child's reconstructed argument belong to the reconstruction, rather than the original argument? Let us assume that Child is at least "in the right ballpark" with his interpretation of the original.[7] Nevertheless, I cannot see any reason for attributing to Sangiovanni an argument which contains the five logical errors that Child's reconstruction attributes to him. Despite this, there is probably much value in Child's paper and also the other paper which uses the reconstruction, both of which have interesting counterexamples. References Child, R. 2011. Global migratory potential and the scope of justice. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 10: 282-300. Dancy, J. 2013. Moral Particularism. In Zalta, E. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2013 Edition. Accessed on 24th August 2017 from: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/moral-particularism/ Davis, I. n.d. Can Reciprocity-Based Arguments Justify Anti-Cosmopolitanism. academia.edu. Accessed on 21st August 2017 from: http://www.academia.edu/3413125/Can_Reciprocity-Based_Arguments_Justify_Anti-Cosmopolitanism Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. Sangiovanni, A. 2007. Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State. Philosophy and Public Affairs 35: 3-39. ________________ Ifs and buts: Anca Gheaus's flawed argument construction Author: Terence Rajivan Edward Draft version: Version 1 (July 28th 2022) Abstract. This is my response to a premise-by-premise argument in Anca Gheaus's "Biological Parenthood: Gestational, Not Genetic." A rose by the gate Of the very great I went to the website of the academic Anca Gheaus, whom I once saw speak. There I found an article published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. And I clicked on it. I clicked on it because I associate that journal with good quality controls and reliability and I just wanted to read something which I knew in advance would have been carefully checked. But my jaw dropped when I found this: "I argue as follows," says Gheaus, P1. Any account of how we acquire the moral right to parent must be centred, partially or exclusively, in the interest of the child. P2. A gestational relationship with a child is a better indicator that the interest of the child will be served than is a genetic relationship with the child. C. Therefore, more moral relevance should be attached to the gestational, than to the genetic, connection when deciding who has the right to parent a biologically related newborn." (Gheaus, 2018: 226) Should there not be some premise like the one below in order for the conclusion to follow? If a gestational relationship with a child is a better indicator that the interest of the child will be served than is a genetic relationship with the child, then more moral relevance should be attached to the gestational, than to the genetic, connection… I would have that as premise 1 instead. (By the way, being self-evident is not an excuse for omitting a premise in logic; and anyway this premise is not self-evident. Here is a tennis analogy by a possible opponent: "There needs to be a 2 point gap between the gestational and the genetic as indicators in order for there to be a moral winner. With a 1 point gap, we say equal moral relevance still." It would not be surprising if a point scoring system was introduced.) The tradition of analytic philosophy has a reputation for being logical, but I am worried that there are places where one can get past adequate checks on logical capacities within the tradition. One can somehow get past the competition, for jobs and for publications, without having the relevant capacities, even when producing premise-by-premise reconstructions. Of course, everyone makes mistakes, but there are number now in the literature, sometimes much worse than above. That looks dodgy. Here is what I know or some of it, in case that is helpful. There are valid logical forms and if you use one of those forms in reconstructing your own argument or that of others, then the argument is valid (leaving aside some smoky exceptions). By "valid," I mean that granting the premises the conclusion must be true. That is how we use "valid" in logic. The conclusion follows. The premises themselves may be objectionable. I shall only present one valid form here. This is the modus ponens form – the form has a Latin name, which I fear is off-putting for some: Premise 1: If A, then B. Premise 2: A. Therefore: Conclusion: B. You can replace A and B with numerous propositions, and given the premises the conclusion follows. It is like filling in a form, though that is probably not why it is called an argument form. I shall use an example with A as "The rose is overgrown" and B as "The rose must be left by the gate." Wherever A occurs in the form specified above, you replace it with "The rose is overgrown" and wherever B occurs, you replace it with "The rose must be left by the gate," perhaps removing the capital letter at the beginning to improve grammar. Thus we get: Premise 1: If the rose is overgrown, then the rose must be left by the gate. Premise 2: The rose is overgrown. Therefore: Conclusion: The rose must be left by the gate. Of course, one of the premises may be false, but given the premises the conclusion follows. To repeat: that is what we mean by "valid" in logic. Now in conversation someone might remark, "The rose must be left by the gate, because it is overgrown." If you try to turn this into an argument manifesting the modus ponens form, which seems a sensible move in various contexts, you are probably going to have to realize certain things. (i) In the conversational remark, the conclusion comes first and the argument for it later, whereas in the modus ponens reconstruction the conclusion comes at the end. The order of conversation is not necessarily the order of logic. (ii) And you need to add a premise for the argument to take the modus ponens form. Premise 1 above is not stated. In conversation and much writing too, we do not spell out everything. But for various purposes, it seems pointless reconstructing an argument invalidly when it can be changed slightly to make it valid. Just work with a valid version and concentrate on other problems, if they exist. (iii) And a speaker who makes the conversational remark above may be neutral on whether anything that is overgrown should be left by the gate, or even opposed to such a rule! The speaker's argument specifically concerns some rose, which they refer to as "the rose." If you are producing a premise-by-premise reconstruction I recommend learning to ask and answer, "What is the logical form of this argument?" or "What is the inferential rule by which that conclusion follows from that premise, or those premises?" though I have not always kept to this recommendation. I once used an argument reconstruction which seems rather risky to me, but there is a case for learning the basics first. Reference Gheaus, A. 2018. Biological Parenthood: Gestational, Not Genetic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2): 225-240. ________________ Andrei Marmor's reconstruction of Ronald Dworkin Author: Terence Rajivan Edward Abstract. Andrei Marmor's premise-by-premise reconstruction omits a premise, which I draw attention to and contest. Draft version: Version 1 (8th March 2023) I really like reading Andrei Marmor, insofar as I know myself. But I think his premise-by-premise reconstruction of Ronald Dworkin omits a premise. This is the reconstruction. 1. Every conclusion about what the law requires, in any given case, is necessarily the result of interpretation. 2. Interpretation is, essentially, an attempt to present its object as the best possible example of the kind or genre it belongs to. 3. Therefore, interpretation necessarily involves evaluative considerations, and of two main kinds: considerations about values inherent in the relevant genre, and evaluative considerations about the elements of the object of interpretation that best exhibit those values. 4. From (1) and (3), it follows that every conclusion about what the law is necessarily involves evaluative considerations. What we deem the law to be always depends on our views about the values we associate with the relevant legal domain and ways in which those values are best exemplified in the norms under consideration. I shall focus (largely) on the inference to (3) from (1) and (2) – it is being inferred from just (2) actually. Does there not also need to be the following premise? Any attempt to present an object of interpretation as the best possible example of the kind or genre it belongs to necessarily involves evaluative considerations and of two main kinds… I have not filled in the rest. By the way, I doubt the premise italicized. Consider "This is the best nuclear war ever," said about the only nuclear war. The statement maker need not get involved in at least one of the two kinds of evaluative consideration: the values inherent in war. (Perhaps someone will say, "You can only call it the best if there is another," but that restriction won't work for this argument.) I think what Marmor is ultimately after is a rhythmical reconstruction of the form "Every A requires B, every B requires C, every C requires D, so every A requires D." Reference Marmor, A. 2011. Philosophy of Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ________________ Jonathan Quong's reconstruction of Jeremy Waldron Author: Terence Rajivan Edward Abstract. This paper examines Jonathan Quong's premise-by-premise reconstruction of an argument by Jeremy Waldron. I draw attention to some concerns. Draft version: Version 3 (16th March 2023, "To present the form…") I found a paper online by Jonathan Quong entitled "Legitimate Injustice." In it, there is a premise-by-premise reconstruction of an argument by Jeremy Waldron. I respond to the reconstruction. (I don't know if this is really fair, since it is a draft.) Form. Before presenting the reconstruction, Quong writes: Jeremy Waldron famously appeals to the value of integrity or self-constitution to explain the right to do wrong. Waldon's argument takes, roughly, the following form… (2018: 5) A right to do wrong! I hope I am not ignoring that, but you might also find this information useful. To present the form of the argument, as usually understood, is to present the argument as an instance of a general type of argument, leaving out details of its content. For example, "P1: If A, then B. P2: A. Therefore Conclusion: B." is the logical form of some arguments. (In certain respects it is like a form, in which you fill in A and B.) Old tradition says: once one knows the form, one can know whether the argument is valid or not. That is to say, whether the conclusion follows from the premises. Given a valid form: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be. What Quong is presenting is not the form of the argument in this sense. (By the way, tradition has had to acknowledge exceptions; cases where what is or was called valid form does not necessarily result in a valid argument, when filled in.) Roughly. There are at least two interpretations of what is being conveyed by "roughly," in the quotation above. Textual departure interpretation: "In the process of turning Waldron's text into a premise-by-premise argument I may have departed slightly from the original, but not in significant ways." Logical departure interpretation: "I might have missed out a premise. Can we just relax about that?" Regarding this second interpretation, it may seem that a premise-by-premise reconstruction with an omission is still useful, because it still provides a quick way of digesting the argument. I have quite strong doubts about whether this is actually a good idea. It is a complicated issue, but I would not find it surprising if the intuition that it is a good idea is just mistaken in 99% of cases. (Related to this: if I had the concerns about logic hanging over me that this research community has, I suppose I would just show that I can do certain basics by an older standard reliably.) Quong's reconstruction. So this is Quong's reconstruction: P1. Some individual rights are justified by appeal to the value of personal integrity or self-constitution. P2. Personal integrity or self-constitution requires having the secure ability to make meaningful choices within certain domains. P3. If all morally prohibited options are excluded from the relevant domains, it won't be possible to make meaningful choice, since the remaining options will be either morally required or morally indifferent. Therefore: C1 Rights designed to protect personal integrity or self-constitution must include rights to perform at least some morally wrong acts. I find the reconstruction difficult to make sense of. "Split P3?" "Add a premise more?" Here is an alternative reconstruction, working from Quong, not Waldron. P1. If personal integrity requires a meaningful choice and a meaningful choice requires the option to do a moral wrong, then a right to personal integrity requires a right to do a moral wrong. P2. Personal integrity requires a meaningful choice and a meaningful choice requires the option to do a moral wrong. Therefore (by modus ponens): C. A right to personal integrity requires a right to do a moral wrong. Reference Quong, J. 2018? Legitimate Injustice. Available at: https://philosophy.cornell.edu/sites/phil/files/Quong%20-%20Legitimate%20Injustice%20Nov.%2015%202019.pdf ________________ On Christine Swanton's rational reconstruction of an anti-intuitionist argument Author: Terence Rajivan Edward Abstract. This paper examines Christine Swanton's premise-by-premise reconstruction of an argument apparently made by John Rawls against intuitionism. I identify faults and propose a replacement. Draft version: Version 2 (22nd April 2023, "An intuitionism premise," section rewrite) An argument that is attributed to John Rawls is that intuitionism provides no justified way of resolving moral conflicts (Naticchia 2015: 372). Is that Rawls's argument? (Bonevac 2004: 364) Let us grant here that it is. I find Christine Swanton's articles on John Rawls to be useful and precise, but I was surprised to find that she has a faulty premise-by-premise reconstruction of this argument. Could these really be accidental? My aim here is to identify faults and improve upon it. She writes that "a version of Rawls' subjectivist criticism can be presented more fully as follows" (1987: 176). And then she presents us with three premises and a conclusion inferred from them: 1. It is not the case that, for all moral conflicts, some underlying moral conception justifies rankings of the conflicting prima facie duties such that one is the or a most stringent prima facie duty. 2. In order to be well justified, resolutions of moral conflicts require a justified ranking of prima facie duties such that one is the or a most stringent prima facie duty. 3. Where an underlying moral conception cannot justify rankings of prima facie duties of the type specified in (1), there is no other objective basis (such as intuition) for justifying such rankings. Therefore: 4. There is a residue of moral conflicts – perhaps a very large residue – of which intuitionists 'can only say it seems to us more correct to balance this way rather than that'. It might be worth some readers pausing here and contemplating what the problems with this rational reconstruction are. An intuitionism premise. From the conclusion of the argument and Swanton's paper structure, the aim of the argument is to identify some unacceptable consequence of intuitionism. It seems that the way this is intended to work is by starting with a commitment of intuitionism and showing that it has this unacceptable consequence, or it combined with certain defensible premises, does. But none of the three premises are identified as specifically intuitionist premises. This is Rawls's argument and the reconstruction represents him as accepting each premise! Presumably, premise (1) should be presented as an intuitionist premise or assumption, e.g. an assumption introduced for the purpose of revealing a contradiction with it. Why so weak? Premise (1) opens like so: "It is not the case that, for all moral conflicts…" That could be true if there are rare exceptions, but the intuitionist thinks that what is described by the remainder of the premise is normal. A proposal. I think what Swanton is after is this. 1. If there is a moral conflict, then there is no underlying moral conception which justifies a ranking of duties such that one is the most stringent duty. (Intuitionist assumption.) 2. If there is no underlying moral conception which justifies a ranking of duties such that one is the most stringent duty, then there is no justified ranking of duties such that one is the most stringent duty. 3. If there is no justified ranking of duties such that one is the most stringent duty, then there is no justified resolution of that conflict. From (1) and (2): 4. If there is a moral conflict, then there is no justified ranking of duties such that one is the most stringent duty. From (3) and (4): 5. If there is a moral conflict, then there is no justified resolution of that conflict. The form of this argument is "(1) If A, then B. (2) If B then, C. (3) If C, then D. From (1) and (2), (4): If A, then C. From (3) and (4), (5): If A, then D." Premise (1) is more fully meant to be that in that situation of conflict there is no underlying moral conception which justifies a ranking of duties such that one is the most stringent duty. (Perhaps Rawls prefers a watered-down version of this premise, according to which the intuitionist maintains that this is true in most situations of moral conflict, though perhaps not all. I think it is better to offer a less qualified reconstruction as a simplified representation to begin with.) Premise (2) denies that there is some way of getting a justified ranking of duties without an underlying moral conception. Specifically ranking by intuition will not provide this! One kind of example of an underlying moral conception is a religious one based on the authority of God, but this is not what Rawls has in mind himself. He thinks general commitments to the separateness and equality of individuals and to the value of forming a society enable a ranking, though these commitments might be arrived at by religious routes. References Bonevac, D. 2004. Reflection Without Equilibrium. The Journal of Philosophy 101: 363-388. Naticchia, C. 2015. Intuitionism. In J. Mandle and D.A. Reidy (eds.), The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rawls, J. 1999 (revised edition). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press. Swanton, C. 1981. Is the Difference Principle a Principle of Justice? Mind 90 (359): 415-421. Swanton, C. 1987. The rationality of ethical intuitionism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (2): 172-181. ________________ Jonathan Quong's reconstruction of G.A. Cohen Author: Terence Rajivan Edward Abstract. This paper examines Jonathan Quong's reconstruction of G.A. Cohen's argument against the difference principle, or more precisely appealing to the difference principle to justify inequalities of wealth. Draft version: Version 2 (27th April 2023, grammar corrections, references added). In a 2010 paper, Jonathan Quong presents us with a premise-by-premise reconstruction of an argument by G.A. Cohen: against appealing to John Rawls's difference principle to justify inequalities of wealth. My aim below is to offer a better reconstruction, assuming that Quong's interpretation of Cohen is broadly right. This is how Quong reconstructs Cohen (2010: 321): 1. Inequalities caused by morally arbitrary factors are unfair and unjust. 2. Unequalizing incentive payments to the talented will create arbitrary inequalities. 3. Unfairness and injustice are not dissolved or eliminated by Pareto improvements that contain arbitrary inequalities. 4. Therefore, unequalizing incentives, even if they render the least advantaged better off than they would be under an equal distribution, are pro tanto unfair and unjust. And here are some questions before I offer my own reconstruction. (a) Is premise 2 meant to be "All the inequalities brought about by unequalizing incentive payments to the talented are caused by morally arbitrary factors," so that 1 and 2 entail that all the inequalities brought about by unequal incentivizing payments are unfair and unjust? (Or more fully "There are/would be inequalities brought about by unequalizing incentive payments to the talented and all these inequalities are caused by morally arbitrary factors"?) At the moment, the wording of 1 and 2 gives rise to the question of whether the arbitrary inequalities referred to in 2 count as inequalities caused by morally arbitrary factors, as described by 1. (Maybe there can be circumstances in which a lottery is morally justified and so its result is not morally arbitrary, but there is some kind of arbitrariness in the result: why should it be you and rather than me who won? See also Lewis 1989.) (b) Also why is premise 3 needed? I think it is just 1 and 2 which are meant to entail the conclusion, i.e. granting these the conclusion must obtain; and the content of premise 3, or something like it (see below), appears in the defence of 2, when someone asks, "What about the inequalities involved in certain pareto improvements?"(There is other stuff in the defence of 2 which is not in this argument, by the way.) (c) Is premise 3 meant to convey that for any Pareto improvement which causes an inequality, the inequality is caused by morally arbitrary factors? It does not say that. (d) In this kind of deductive reasoning, you only get out what you put in. So how did pro tanto get in? (By the way, "You only get out what you put in" in logic is not the same as any concepts that did not appear in the premises should not appear in the conclusion, see Prior 1960, but still the question remains.) Here is my reconstruction. 1. If an inequality is caused by a morally arbitrary factor, then it is unfair and unjust. 2. If an inequality is caused by unequalizing incentive payments, then it is caused by a morally arbitrary factor. Therefore: 3. If an inequality is caused by unequalizing incentive payments, then it is unfair and unjust. The form of this argument is: "If B, then A. If C, then B. Therefore: if C then A." But how would you argue for (2)? You might look at all the ways in which unequalizing incentive payments arise and then argue that in each way there is at least one morally arbitrary factor as a cause. But that looks a monumental task. This one arose by the king's whim, this other one by the madness of the king's advisor, etc. What Quong's Cohen tries to do is reject the most plausible proposal for when unequalizing incentive payments are not morally arbitrary: when the result of such payments is that the level of the worst off group is better. (Or, more precisely, the most plausible proposal from the perspective of people involved in this debate.) "If even that is a case of inequality caused by a morally arbitrary factor, then we are going to have to accept (2)," Quong's Cohen is saying. References Cohen, G.A. 2008. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Lewis, D. 1989. The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance. Philosophy & Public Affairs 18 (1): 53-67. Pigden, C. 2013. The Is-Ought Gap. In H. Lafollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/5664257/The_Is_Ought_Gap Prior, A.N. 1960. The autonomy of ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3): 199-206. Quong, J. 2010. Justice Beyond Equality. Social Theory and Practice 36 (2): 315-340. ________________ On Professor Anca Gheaus's premise-by-premise reconstruction of a defence of the family Author: Terence Rajivan Edward Abstract. This paper presents Anca Gheaus's attempt to reconstruct Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift's defence of the family against abolitionists. I propose that the reconstruction suffers from at least two problems: it is missing a premise given the aim of not attributing an invalid argument unnecessarily; and it fails to distinguish the inference to a conclusion from the conclusion itself. Draft version: version 2 (3rd September 2025; version 1 29th August 2025) Turning the radio dial In search of party style The database academia.edu recommended to me a paper by Professor Anca Gheaus entitled "What abolishing the family will not do," published in 2018. I started reading the paper and found it strange. It refers to Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift in its opening paragraph, their 2014 book, but was not the issue discussed first raised by Veronique Munoz-Dardé, in the 1990s? Well, at least she appears later BUT with her name is misspelt. (What will replace analytic philosophy's terrible track record with justice towards women?) Anyway, all accidental or excusable for sure. I want to examine Gheaus's premise-by-premise reconstruction of Brighouse and Swift's argument. I shall identify two problems with it, without relying upon knowledge of these authors. Here is Gheaus's reconstruction. 1. The family inevitably disrupts just distributions – and as is, it perpetuates and exacerbates objectionable inequalities of income, status and various other non-material goods; even well regulated, it would undermine equality of opportunity. 2. But the family is uniquely able to generate, via the parent–child intimacy, very important goods for both children and adults. 3. The value indicated in (2) is more important than the disvalue indicated in (1). 4. Therefore, all things considered, reasons of equality of opportunity do not show that the family is morally unjustified. There are at least two problems with this reconstruction, I suspect, one definitely. Before identifying them, let us recall how the terms "valid" and "sound" are used in logic. If the premises cannot be true without the conclusion's also being true, then we say that the argument is valid - this description is neutral on whether the premises actually are true. Modus ponens arguments are an example of valid arguments (leaving aside some peculiar exceptions - "OH NO"). See later on this paper if you need a concrete example. If the argument is valid and the premises are true, then we say that the argument is sound. Problem 1: missing premise. One does not want to reconstruct an author's argument as invalid when they can easily be interpreted as making a valid argument, though perhaps one in which a certain premise has been assumed rather than stated. Such a reconstruction makes them too easy to object to; the argument will just return in a valid form. But Gheaus's reconstruction, I suspect, does precisely this. To get to the conclusion, one probably needs a premise on these lines: (Bridge premise) If the value indicated in (2) is more important than the disvalue indicated in (1), then all things considered, reasons of equality of opportunity do not show that the family is morally unjustified. "BUT can one not just get to this conclusion from the very meanings of the words in premise (3) and the conclusion?" (Is that semantic entailment?) A problem with doing so: the reference to "the value indicated in (2)" is not transparently a reference to moral value. It might be a reference to how families are in a unique position to pass on artistic skills. Someone might judge its value for this purpose to be above the social injustice families cause. Problem 2: therefore there. The conclusion appears to be stated by (4) but (4) says this: "Therefore, all things considered, reasons of equality of opportunity do not show that the family is morally unjustified." What is "therefore" doing in the conclusion? "Therefore" indicates the inference to the conclusion. To better grasp this point, let us switch focus to arguments of the modus ponens form: (Premise 1) If P, then Q; (Premise 2) P; Therefore (Conclusion) Q. P and Q are replaced by propositions, such as "I care for you" and "I will visit you": 1. If I care for you, then I will visit you. 2. I care for you. Therefore: 3. I will visit you. The conclusion of a modus argument is whatever Q is, in this case the proposition "I will visit you." It is not "therefore Q." Did Wittgenstein become a violent primary school or elementary school teacher or something, and WHY? This is the solution to the problem you sent him? Reference Gheaus, A. 2018. What abolishing the family will not do. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21 (3): 284-300. ________________ Another flawed argument reconstruction in political philosophy: W. Kymlicka on R. Nozick Author: Terence Rajivan, Edward, University of Manchester. Abstract. There are some premise-by-premise reconstructions in political philosophy which are flawed, because they omit at least one premise or misword at least one premise. This paper focuses on a reconstruction by Will Kymlicka, in his widely recommended introduction. The original argument is by Robert Nozick and is about when a free market in capital and labour is required. Kymlicka objects to the argument. Some papers reproduce the reconstruction as if it is without problems, but actually it has significant flaws. A rational reconstruction of an argument presents that argument as a set of premises and a conclusion inferred from those premises. If a rational reconstruction is done correctly, then it often provides a quick way of presenting an argument. Another advantage of a rational reconstruction – or a pair of advantages, to be precise – concerns evaluating the argument. Faced with a rational reconstruction, we can ask, "If we suppose that the premises are true, does the conclusion follow?" And we can also ask, "Are the premises true?" Of course, we cannot pursue these questions properly if the reconstruction omits one of the premises or if the premises are not correctly formulated. I have found some reconstructions in recent political philosophy which suffer from one or both of these problems. In this paper, I focus on a single reconstruction. It is by Will Kymlicka, in a book widely recommended on undergraduate course guides, namely Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. The reconstruction appears in both editions of the book (1993: 112; 2002: 120). It aims to capture in premises when Robert Nozick thinks that a free market in capital and labour is required (2002: 120). After reconstructing the argument, Kymlicka objects to it. Others have reproduced Kymlicka's reconstruction as if it succeeds in capturing Nozick's thinking in premise-by-premise form (Coulam 1996: 8; Fricker 2014: 54; Greeves n.d.: 4-5). That is what I dispute below. Kymlicka reconstructs Nozick's argument as four premises and a conclusion inferred from them: 1. People own themselves. 2. The world is initially unowned. 3. You can acquire absolute rights over a disproportionate share of the world, if you do not worsen the condition of others. 4. It is relatively easy to acquire absolute rights over a disproportionate share of the world. Therefore: 5. Once people have appropriated private property, a free market in capital and labour is morally required. Kymlicka says that he will concentrate on premise (3). But whatever concerns there are about the premises, the conclusion seems remote from them. This is not an argument like "All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal." How does one move from those premises to that conclusion? Below, I am going to grant that the premises are true, so that the focus is on what can or cannot be deduced from them. Before going on to examine the argument in more detail, I shall make a few of brief clarifications. I take 'people' in this context to mean human beings. I take the term 'private property' in the conclusion to refer, more fully, to private property beyond the property a person has simply in virtue of owing themselves, such as owning their heart or arm. Kymlicka uses the expression 'appropriated private property' in the conclusion. Rather than private property being appropriated, I shall write of private property being acquired below, but shall mean, more fully, private property being acquired with an ownership right to it. My impression is that there are actually two conclusions that Kymlicka's reconstructed argument aims to draw. There is the conclusion which is expressed in (5). Furthermore, if we look closely at the four premises and not at what is said in (5), the argument suggests another conclusion: that once people come into existence, some people will acquire a disproportionate share of the world as their private property. Indeed, I wonder what the point of premises (3) and (4) is, if there is no interest in drawing this conclusion? Why refer to both the possibility of and ease with which some people can acquire rights to a disproportionate share of the world? However, this second conclusion is not openly stated.[8] The second conclusion does not follow from the premises. To make a deductive argument with much the same premises but in which this conclusion does follow, one cannot just say that it is possible and easy to acquire rights over a disproportionate share of the world. One also has to say that if this is easy, then it will happen. Here then is an argument[9] for the second conclusion: 1. Once people come into existence, it is relatively easy for some people to acquire absolute rights over a disproportionate share of the world, as their private property. 2. If once people come into existence, this is relatively easy, then once people come into existence, it will happen. Therefore: 3. Once people come into existence, some people will acquire absolute rights over a disproportionate share of the world, as their private property. This reconstruction omits some of the propositions in Kymlicka's version. Some of those propositions can be introduced when explaining the justification for these premises, specifically premise (1). I have in mind the propositions that the world is initially unowned, that people own themselves and that when acquiring part of the world one must not worsen the condition of others. I do not wish to endorse the argument immediately above. My claim is that, if Kymlicka aims to attribute to Nozick a deductive argument for its conclusion, I cannot see any reason to portray Nozick as making a logic-defying jump from his premises to this conclusion. And, of course, it would be better to openly state the conclusion. Let us turn now to the conclusion which is openly stated: that once some people have acquired private property, then a free market in labour and capital is morally required. There are various concepts that appear in this conclusion, but not in any of the premises that Kymlicka attributes to Nozick. One example is the concept of a market. Another is the concept of labour. Furthermore, it is unclear how those concepts entered into the conclusion, given the premises.[10] At this stage, it is useful to quote a general point which Charles Pigden refers to as the conservativeness of logic –"in a logically valid argument you cannot get out what you haven't put in."(2013) The openly-stated conclusion implies two claims: (i) that once people come into existence, some people will acquire private property; (ii) that if some people have acquired private property, then a free market in capital and labour is morally required. It seems to me that when trying to understand Nozick, it is better to reconstruct separate arguments for each of these claims. The first claim straightforwardly follows from my earlier reconstruction. Below is what I propose as a sensible starting point for reasoning validly to second claim: 1. If some people have acquired private property, then condition X obtains. 2. If condition X obtains, then a free market in capital and labour is morally required. Therefore: 3. If some people have acquired private property, then a free market in capital and labour is morally required. The conclusion of this argument follows from the premises. The only thing left to do is fill in the X. Nozick's book Anarchy, State and Utopia implies a certain filling in of the condition X in this argument. The condition is that some people have a right to transfer private property in exchanges. So with this filling in, the two premises are: (1) if some people have acquired private property, then some people have a right to transfer private property in exchanges; and (2) if some people have a right to transfer private property in exchanges, then a free market in capital and labour is morally required. As I read him, Nozick accepts (1) because he thinks that part of acquiring a piece of private property is gaining a right to give it to someone else in an exchange, such as for work or for another piece of private property. And he accepts (2) because he thinks that nothing other than a free market will protect people's self-ownership rights and rights over their private property. Given his premises, he is not making an error of reasoning to draw his conclusion. Rather it is Kymlicka's reconstruction which misrepresents Nozick as making a logic-defying jump from premises to conclusion. References Coulam, P. 1996. For a new libertarianism: problems and perspectives in the thought of Ayn Rand, Murray Rothbard and David Friedman. Libertarian Alliance, Philosophical Notes 39: 1-10. Accessed on 21st August 2017 from: http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/philn/philn039.pdf Fricker, M. 2014. Nozick's Entitlement Theory of Justice: A Response to the Objection of Arbitrariness. Aporia 24: 51-62. Accessed on 21.8.2017 from: http://aporia.byu.edu/pdfs/ficker-nozick's_entitlement_theory.pdf Greeves, R. n.d. Defending libertarianism: a thinking point for educationalists. Accessed on 21st August 2017 from: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.508.9039&rep=rep1&type=pdf Kymlicka, W. 1990 (first edition).Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kymlicka, W. 2002 (second edition). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://archive.org/details/will-kymlicka-contemporary-political-philosophy/page/n6/mode/1up Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. Pigden, C. 2013. The Is-Ought Gap. In H. LaFolette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. Accessed on 16th January 2017 from: http://www.academia.edu/5664257/The_Is-Ought_Gap Prior, A. 1960.The autonomy of ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38: 199-206. ________________ Rational reconstructions in political philosophy again: Zofia Stemplowska and Tim Fowler Author. Doctor Terence Rajivan Edward (or 0161__Rajivan, if that helps) Abstract. This paper finds Zofia Stemplowska and Tim Fowler's premise-by-premise reconstruction of Jonathan Quong's argument to be faulty in various respects. It does not distinguish the conclusion from the inference to it, it includes a premise that should probably be in a sub-argument for one of the premises, and its conclusion does not follow. I cannot see any reason to reconstruct Quong like this, given the purpose of accurate evaluation. Draft version: version 1 (16th January 2026) Introduction I heard that a certain political and legal philosopher has a relative who is, or was, a chancellor of a university. In pessimistic moments, I sometimes wonder whether professional political philosophers in the UK are largely a set of well-connected friends, most of whom don't display the skills one would expect, while the British tax payer pays for them - or UK the tax payer, if that is more accurate. But maybe I simply don't understand the world very well. In this paper, I want to respond to a paper by two political philosophers, namely Zofia Stemplowska and Tim Fowler. It is on a topic on which I have written and published in a journal. Theirs is within a working paper. It is cited by 38 according to Google scholar, whereas mine has zero citations apparently. Theirs is the third result on the first page of a Google scholar search for "asymmetry objection political liberalism" whereas mine is the second result on the fourth page, with 10 results per page. But doing an ordinary Google search mine is the second result on the first page; theirs is first. What is so good about it, Google?! Stemplowska and Fowler offer a premise-by-premise reconstruction of a philosopher we all respond to, namely Jonathan Quong. I shall look into this here. Quong distinguishes between two kinds of disagreement between citizens with liberal commitments - foundational and justificatory - and says that it is acceptable for the state to implement a policy which is subject to one kind (justificatory) but not the other. (Some other jargon: burdens of judgement are a set of factors which make disagreement in a free society likely; and "reasonable citizen" roughly means citizen committed to liberal values; and a distinction is made between conceptions of justice and the good, based on the ideal of there is a minimal set the rules and different citizens can pursue their different ideals of a good life within the rules: their conceptions of the good.) This is Stemplowska and Fowler's reconstruction: 1. Burdens of judgment apply to thinking about both comprehensive issues (including the good) and to matters of justice (a premise of the asymmetry objection and accepted by Quong). 2. Legitimate state action is compatible with justificatory disagreement but not foundational one. 3. Disagreement about justice between reasonable people is (necessarily) justificatory. 4. Disagreement between reasonable people about conceptions of the good is almost always foundational. 5. Therefore, it is likely the case that legitimate state action is compatible only with disagreement on justice but not with disagreement about conceptions of the good. This reconstruction seems to me to have a number of flaws, which make it less than ideal as a device for representing Quong's argument, in order to then evaluate. (Look at this cleaning up to do: should I call it logico-dhobi work?! Actual dhobi-work looks so much harder.) This may not be in order of importance for you, by the way. Inference-in-conclusion. As you may be able to learn from Lewis Carroll, an argument involves premises (or one premise), a conclusion, and an inference to the conclusion. The inference is different from a premise and the conclusion. An argument of the form "If P is true, then Q is true. P is true. Therefore Q is true" has as its conclusion a proposition of the form "Q is true", not "Therefore Q is true." The word "therefore" represents the inference to the conclusion. For example, "If roses are red, then I should pick one for you. Roses are red. Therefore I should pick one for you," has "I should pick one for you" as its conclusion, not "Therefore I should pick one for you." But in the reconstruction above the "Therefore" is in the conclusion. First premise: in a sub-argument. I am not sure why this argument features premise 1. Even if Quong is committed to that proposition, it seems as if it should be within a sub-argument at best. There is the main argument and then there are (often) arguments for premises within the main argument. Consider the example argument from earlier: "If roses are red, then I should pick one for you. Roses are red. Therefore I should pick one for you." Someone who makes this argument, referring to a certain person, may offer evidence in favour of each of the two premises: "If roses are red, then I should pick one for you" and "Roses are red." They might show some photographs of roses. This evidence should be in the subargument for the second premise. In logic, there are a set of what are called valid argument forms: they are valid in the sense that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true. (Actually some of them have some peculiar exceptions, but anyway…) "Valid" as used by logicians is neutral on whether the premises are actually true. You can make a valid argument and then put some of the evidence (or reasoning) for a premise in a subargument - an argument for one of the premises in the main argument. What the authors could do is present Quong's main argument in a valid form and then present various other commitments in sub-arguments! Their premise 1 seems to be involved in a subargument for what they call premise 3. Recall premise 3: "Disagreement about justice between reasonable people is (necessarily) justificatory." This assumes that there are disagreements about justice between reasonable people. ("Reasonable" here roughly means people with liberal values, if you have forgotten.) But why assume that? Premise 1 is part of the explanation for why. ("The burdens of judgment" is a specialist term for a set of factors which make disagreement likely in free societies, recall.) Conclusion doesn't follow. So here is their argument without the first premise and with the inference separate from the conclusion. 2. Legitimate state action is compatible with justificatory disagreement but not foundational one. 3. Disagreement about justice between reasonable people is (necessarily) justificatory. 4. Disagreement between reasonable people about conceptions of the good is almost always foundational. Therefore: 5. It is likely the case that legitimate state action is compatible only with disagreement on justice but not with disagreement about conceptions of the good. Why would you use "likely" here, in reconstructing Quong? Does likely mean less than 100% probable? If disagreement about justice is necessarily justificatory, then it simply is compatible with state action, given premise 2. (Is "likely" because the sub-arguments are not knockdown arguments: certain proofs?) Anyway, from 2 and 4 - that disagreement about conceptions of the good is almost always foundational - you cannot validly conclude that legitimate state action is not compatible with any disagreement about conceptions of the good. You would need to know about the exceptions. And there is no reason to conclude that such total incompatibility is likely, from the argument's premises alone. Again you would need to know about the exceptions! ("Almost always"!) Faint reflections. I cannot see any reason to attribute to Quong a faulty premise-by-premise reconstruction, for the purpose of evaluating his argument, if there is a reconstruction without these faults available. (Stemplowska was in Manchester University, Reading, and Warwick briefly, before returning to Oxford. I wonder whether she would turn into a Unabomber with more time at provincial universities. I saw her give a seminar in the philosophy "department"; she was based in politics. The chair asked her a question that drew on philosophy that political philosophers don't engage with, perhaps curious about her first class in all areas of PPE: politics, philosophy, and economics at Oxford University, an elite university. I certainly was! What is the level of such a person, such a genius a certain economics student would say? Well, the economics part might tell you to deliberately make errors if you are being subject to audit.) References Carroll, Lewis. (1895) What the Tortoise Said to Achilles. Mind 4 (14): 278-280. Edward, Terence Rajivan (2018). The asymmetry objection to political liberalism: evaluation of a defence. E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 25 (1):26-32. Fowler, Timothy and Stemplowska, Zofia. 2014. The Asymmetry Objection Rides Again: On the Nature and Significance of Justificatory Disagreement. Working Paper of Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. Available at: https://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/inline-files/SJ025_The%20Asymmetry%20Objection%20Rides%20Again.pdf Amusing Instagram reel theoneshu and thehutwinsies. 2026. We're Asian. Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/p/DTSgaJ5ky8s ________________ [1] Child writes of the conclusion "following" when the argument is sound rather than just valid. I am using the clause "If we suppose that the premises are true" to focus on validity. [2] Premises (2) and (3), with slight alternations, justify part of the content of (5): that citizens contribute to the conditions necessary for wealth creation in a particular state. And it seems that (1) contributes to the justification of (4), because it contributes to denying special rights for the talented. [3] I find it more natural to write of providing, gaining or receiving benefits than accumulating them, except in some specific contexts where benefit has a technical meaning, such as in relation to pensions or employee contracts; but I adopt Child's usage. [4] I wonder whether in political philosophy we can be open to the possibility of a good which gives no benefit to anyone and only has value in itself. (Even the description of a good as giving a benefit implies a distinction between the good and the benefit given.) [5] This route to the slogan requires that ought implies can. Nozick uses the slogan "utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people," but it is just the form of this slogan which I am taking here – "approach 1 for Xs, approach 2 for Ys" – not the content. Given the current literature, "particularism" may be a better choice of term than "intuitionism." (see Dancy 2013) [6] This argument could probably do with a specification of whether "citizens of a particular state" means all citizens of a particular state or all citizens of a particular state above age X or something else. Non-citizens means everyone outside of the specified group. The main non-citizens of interest for Child are citizens of other states. [7] To capture Sangiovanni's thinking more accurately, I think it is better to replace "fair" with "egalitarian." He thinks that there are some requirements of justice at a global level, to help human beings reach a minimal threshold, so he could say that there is fairness and unfairness at this level as well (see 2007: 4). [8]There is actually a weaker conclusion that someone who appeals to premises (3) and (4) may be interested in drawing: that once people come into existence, it is likely that some people will acquire a disproportionate share of the world as their private property. The claims that I make about the second conclusion can be adapted for this one. [9]This is the argument in symbolic logic. Let us say that p is the following proposition: once people come into existence, it is relatively easy for some people to acquire absolute rights over a disproportionate share of the world, as their private property. Let us say that q is the following proposition: once people come into existence, some people will acquire absolute rights over a disproportionate share of the world, as their private property. The argument is: (1) p; (2) p ⊃q; therefore (3) q. [10]Of course, there is a way for concepts to appear in the conclusion but not in any of the premises, as Arthur Prior emphasized when discussing the is-ought gap (Prior 1960).